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The standpoint from which my criticisms of empiricist philosophy 
are made is phenomenological , in the senr;e given to that word by Husocrl. 
Dut it is m1.lCh closer to Sartre and J.!erl eau- Ponty thaJ1 to the master. 
In particular , r efl exive analysis in my terms c onc erns expe r ience of 
thi nc;s in the world and doc s no·t put in parenthesis the quest i on of their 
. I 
existence or reality . The thesis of the world, or in Humc ' s terms , the 
natural belie f i n the indepcnden·t existence of the 'il'Orld , i:3 in rny view 
primordial, untJ.1inl~ ing , unreasoned, and i n separable from our b eing embodied 
subjects. The form in which I expound phenomenological doct r inec is 
dctcr lllin ·.Jd by t:"w a r t,'UJ!lonts of the empiricis t philosophL: r s v1hic~ I have 
t aken for discussion. It i s a critique of e1npir:kinm and not of phcn om-
· enoloc;y . 
PhenomenolOGY i s essentially C011CC:' 'n()d wi th i ntentionality, . the r c lc?-tion 
of consr:iousnesc to Hhatevcr i t. is consciousness o f . Per haps the best 
r:;;.y of undcrr>tand in(S t hiu is t hrouch one of the common mc <l!'lin0G of the vrJr b 
II ~ (l I ,,; Q.!l II 0 '.'ih ·'n wo sec or .lo,_·l: at t>J1ythinc; , r:hat ,·rc sec io not j m;t a 
V·tL; but a ::;nch - a lwuoc , a rainbow , a peculiar c <; J.our on a Gl' rfu.Gc , and 
so onc , and tll:i.s i~ oxpro8:;;ed j n a r;o1·<1 or phra:>e st clt a::; " the :wusc i'i.i. th ._ 
th<) c;r0 !11 s hnttor::;", " t he policeman ," " thit pecul·i.o.r ·:1hiti h cc•lt)ur", 8tc . 
an<.l - ::;nch. " In f-:n.:;lj ::;h ~he ve rb "to r:t·) an" is CN'Pnonly n:.;cd :i.n pl'C'0i:::oly tbi.s 
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sencc. .For exn.i'llpl e , I may seq to a fr iend at a football - match , " See thn.t 
man over there". He may reply , " 'You mean t:zte man in the r eel scarf?" and 
I may r eply, " No , I mean thu one in th0 blue coat ." ~he nan I s e e is 
tlw man I mean or " intend", my seeint; is r.ty meaninG or " intcmdin;J" that 
man. The seeinG is v;hat Husserl calls the intentional act or noesis and 
the man in the blue coat i::.; what he calls t he inte ntional object or noE:sis . 
(It is not very illuminating ·to sn.y , as is often said in brief accounts of 
inten tionality , that consciounncss is alv1ays consciousness of , for this is 
merely to ncq , vllw.t everyone; han al'iiays known, that , for e xample , to see 
is to s O(! some t h i ng nnd not nothing.) 
It is worth r _e mark:Lnl1' that the abovn mean inc of " meaninG", vr.hi ch cri.vcs 
exactly +.he sen::;e in \'lh ich cons ciousne ns is said to intend an object , · hJ 
lackinc in French , r1hich has to fall back on the mueh ' l ess satisfactory 
" viso r " , c . e;., Quand j 'ai uno i mage de Pier r e , c ' ent Pi erre lni- mgme que 
j o vice . The Enclish runs : i'ihcn I have an imace of Pe ter , it is Peter -
himself that I m(~an . 
There are di :.;advu.ntages and dance rs in ta.lldnc about concciousn~;>ss . 
'l'hc c!def of t i1e--• i::.; tha.t one may forget that all (1ur e xpeLLcnce is c:-:!bodiecl 
c ,-:pcriencc : to scr~ ; :::; tu .lo·ok VIi 'th one ' s eyes , to to,Jch, [,Ta::;p or lmntllc 
i:_, t tl th' co wiLh onc ' :J h a nd:::; , to spea.l-:. i s to voic.;c a ·1d mo<lul a te ·:iith onr.; ' s 
thr out , tonc;uc , i;C'oth . and l i p.:; , to have a pn.in :i.s to 1_.-~ in p.:.~.in bodily , i n 
.~;orne :ra r t of r.'nu ' s budy, a.nd :;o on. ~rhouch !Ins::;m:l r c.c0[,1Ji:Jcd t ,i. ::; , he often 
ci.vc:::; the i mi'l·c::::;::;ion of ionol'inc it , e ::;:poC'i.ally in lt i::; es~;-;ntj. ally I\n.nti un 
cl octri.n0 of tll ~~ tru.n s r;cndcntn..l con ..;c.i.onsnoss 0..11r1. its con,-;ti t ution of the 
':lo r J.cl. . 
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of apperception , t ends to be a general f unct i on which belongs t o no one 
:tn partlocular, or to everyone. Such n doctri ne leads to a view of one ' s 
orm bocly which r egards it as a peculiar sort of conctHut-o.d obj ect , 0 ho;v-
eve r diffe rent f rom othe r things , the transcendent al consciousneos b eing 
essentially disembodied. This is f ar from being my v ievt . 
Lit tle in to be ga i ned by trying t o define conoeiousncss or experience . 
The b8st one can do i s to make one ' s meaninG' clear in particular contexts. 
\iherever pos s ible , I v1ill t a lk of s eeing, hr)arinc, moving, ima.ginin;-, 
toucld.nt; , a.ud so one , that 
0 
ic, of the various nays i n 'I"Thich we experience 
( and mean or int end ) thingo and events and processes in the ~vorld , and , 
as embodied subjects , live and move and have our being. "Experience ," like 
"perception" and "desi r e " and many othe r '.'lO rds is s i e,nificantly ambi e;uous: 
it rnoans ei thor \'lhat is e xpe r ienced, or the experience of i t , or both to-
gcthc r . The rea son is, of couroe , that the sub,joctive and the objc ci;i ve 
arc inseparabl e end corre lative . rr' I see a tab l e; , my seeinG is not the 
t able , but t o see at all t her e must be sometltint; to see . I u :.>e the words 
" subject " and " obje ct", " ::;ubje ct i ve" and "objective" free ly, but I do not 
think my usage i s ever amb:Lt;uou::; in t he various conLcxts . I s hare Locl<:e ' s , 
and Ilussorl ' s ,v i.;m t:1a t t o say v;hat one l"iant::; to s ay effective ly one. r'\u::rt 
not 1Jc too "nice a1x ,ut t crr:1s" , but just ;:;ay i t as r:elJO a s ons can . 
I t is irnpot;:;;iblc to discus::;; come i mportnn t ques~ions if one dec i des in .. 
<.J..dvancc to cu11.f i n c t.h(~ 'l.'Ord " r~enn in8'" tc t lw :nea.ni n_:; O L' Go:n:;c o 1 ::;tat mrtm ts 
and other e>:pr es!::i.ons , even if one tak l.:S into account t h';.; l~inll of con lic.xt 
at;J cltua.~i<'n in r:ilich they r:onld c:om1~only be u:.>cd . 'l'ht.:: l(; :..~,:·d nc of words 0 
t hey acquir< i L; j t ir; not nui cr:nr:rin . 
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It is not an tmfortuna to accident , as it were , that the s<.lllle ~•ords are 
used in so many ways ; that , for example , I CD.Tl moan thine::; or people , 
( e . ;$., "tha·~ man over thr')re"), that I say whn.t I mean , that n .hat I say 
( the e;cpr e::::;sion ) means s uch-and-such, or 'that an expression r efers by 
means of its meaninG• It is signi ficant that " to mean" has all these 
and more r elated meanincs, and philosophically importa.11t to see how th~:;y 
are r e lated. I have tried to do t his in some of the later chapters . 
t.zy procedure in this s tucy iCJ to examine some characteri::::;tic empiri-
cist doctrj.n8s in f our r epresentative works : IIume ' s "Trcati:::c", nuasell 's 
"Analysis of Hind", l\:y<..;r ' s " Foundations of Empirical Knorlledc;e" , and Ryl e ' s 
" Concept of i•.!ind". 
Part of my purpose in to show that in IIume ' s account of experience the 
causal or gcn?t i c accoun-t and tho phenomenological or r eflexive a.ccouut 
arc i n conflict . 'rhose who believe that the trul y philo:;ophical part of 
hi::; nork con::;ist ed of ·tho J cc;ico.l analysi::> and r ccon::;truction of experience , 
lump the causal nnd r eflexive accounts toe-ethe r and dub them "psycholo~icc.l " 
for the pur:Rose of quicl~ di smis:;al . In effect , tlli:::; vi en r educes Hnmc t •' 
a ficure of minor hiGtoric~J. i nte r c ::::;t, fo r j.-L i::; cvid.cnt that !fume t houcht 
h r.: ·:to.s pr oducinG a philosophi cal trc ati::;c on r.w.n , and. trw n<J.tnl'c of knovT-
l c rJ.:::;c , r'lorn.ls and hurr1o.n ::;ociety ; if IIumc r:cre merely the C<1rnap or Aycr 
of tlw t;.i.ehtecmth century i:>u:r.ely no one nould r ead hi,. 
Tho. "id0 o. o.f nr 'c ·.: ~sary connc xion", wltich Htunc ncvnr ~1ouhte~1 Y:e ~tavc , 
often tends ·i;o b () n.:(:ardc·~ a::: m<...aui.n[;'lecG or W1'i. ro;•ortn.x \: , nnd ~hUrt('! ' ::; o.n o.l:;::;}.s 
of c.:.tu :;;al:i t y i s of'l; r.)n tCJ.bm i;o have shorm that tlH.T'.~ :i.~> no nece:;:::;ury con~c.xion 
-Jo. 4 t, it .. 
't . . 
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of cause and effect . This happens be cause the problem is taken to be 
that of inductive inference of a deliberate and explicit kind . Hume 
is concerned vri:th that too , but he is also , and prit::arily, concerned with 
direct , unreflectinG experience ; he believes that the principles of in-
duction and " philosophical probability" are only to be accounted for by 
/ pre-rational, unreasoning experience. He realise8 that v1e do not spend 
much of our tiJnc ma.l<ing i nductive inferences (in any explicit :::;cnse). or 
even in verifying ordinary statemm ts of fact . On the contrary vre take 
far more f or granted Y!i th complete confidence ·!;han w~ would ever c;lrcam 
of que stioninG, and ther efore of verifyinG", and there is no evidence t hat 
our confideYtce and certainty are f ounded on the collection of past instances 
wil,h a view to prediction . I n fants arc not adepl;s of inductive inference . 
Huwc ' s theory is ryteant to account for the firm and prev<mi unt certain-
ties of daily life , and the fact that any attempt to j notify , o r to find 
rulco rrhi •.h co vern , these certai ntie s i s post facto . Ilc io · less concerne d 
t o describe the principles acr::ording to v1hich, say, an experiment is made 
:i.n a .l.a1)oratory , tho.n with r;hy t he experi1ncnter opens t .h.J door and rialks . 
Gtruit;ht in riithou (; looking to see if t he floor is ctill the r e ; or nhy, 
for cxa nplr.: , 0111.: j umps in::>t<l!.rtly an.U. u nt hinkinc ly out of t he no.~' of a 'bl·iclc 
full :i.n;; f rom a s caffold , or ~natc i1cs a vase ar;ay fro1 ,1 t he cucc of the table . 
1hwlo ' n a~count of bon \'le ar(~ thus a t homo in the ~·torld in a c;en• ~ti c 
· <.:.cccnm L, w:1 accot>nt of hov1 \'IC cowe t 0 1JC tllll::> at ho1nc . Tt :L:; n a.t11 r al.i ctic 
~.' d. incic<:.•:i qua::;i - n:cc;hanical . That i:.; to say, it -; v . ~. 0 <.',!1 a·,; ~;ou; Lt f 0ul.lded on 
til..: :>Uf'l(; csr·l,w.:i.ntiu :..: ,·; : 1i_ cit • L lu ~Jets out to a.:: count for ; i : L us0umuc :::l1ut it 
ha:..: to c.:xplain . 
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of necessary connc:xion is ·causal ; the belief in causality i s the effect 
of other processes of as::>oci a tion. He presents, honevcr , a different 
sort of doctrine in his account of the rele of i magination , belief, and 
judement in consti tutint; identities ( thines and selves ), i n " peopling · 
the v:orld", and maldng sense of it . 
Russell' s "Analysis of J:ind" has been subjected to se vere cri ticimn 
on various grounds. Jiy r e a son for dealing \"Ti th nome aspects of i t after 
Hur.1e ' s "Treatise" is that i t illqstrates wi·lih ·unusuul cl n.ri t y one of the 
mai n t endencies of empiricisiil v1hich is also to be f ound in I!'mre a nut-
uralism or scientimn which includes an premises of its a rgument tho findi ngs 
of contempor!lry natural scim co . No doubt his neutral mon ism cannot be 
fully dealt with apart from an extended treatment of logical at omism. I 
have confined my attention , hov;ever , to his treatment o:f experience in 
·ter ms of nutur al or quasi- natural even ts or proce~ses , to which tho account 
i toelf a<1d j_ to a uthor oucht to be in principle rcduciblt~ . It bears a close 
r esembl a nc e to one ::>i de of IJw•Jc ' s doctrine , and its flac;ra.>J.t and explicit 
churactcr :Lo for my pur pos e i tc virtw~ . 
!.':Y dizcuo:,;ion o f i'l.;fCr ' ::; " Foundations of Empirical Knov1ledsc " is i nt end-
c<l t o Ghori t ha t s <r•1Se- datum doctri ne s are s ecr e tly ::;cnsa t i on doctrines • 
Yihct:w~r one main t ains t hat stutemcnts in ordinary lan{;1Jagc :::;houJ.d be 
.._ . 
~.ran s-
f o.emablc :i.nto statcmc.n to i n the sensc-dutu.m lanc;uagc , or r1h ct hc r one :::;ay::; . ~ 
that ·;rhate vcr one " expe riences", inclddins halluci nations, should be anal-
I ar[;Uc that 
lar1c,uas e cannot be di::H3ociu:l;ccl f r o:n uctual cxpe ricucc , un<.l tl111t tlv~rr; i s no 
dat um of c:xpc r:i. e:ncc of t l1c kind r cq.t ire d f or snell dvc t rlncs , t h ou;-_;h it i s 
~----------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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prima facie true that in senoe- expcrience somethinG is civen. For 
furth~r illu::;-tration of the difficul tie a concernina the extra- logical 
parts of lo[;i.cu.l constructions I tal;:c for exwaination a section of 
Nelson Goodman ' s " The S·trnctnre of Ap·!_)earance:' . .. 
I.a8i;ly , I examine some aspects of Tiyle ' s "Concept of ::ind ." I try 
to show that cxplanu:Uon in termo of disposiw)~G is causal explanation 
and that, though Hylc does not recoeni:.:;c this, it under]j_es his or:tcnnibly 
behaviourlst account of mind ; that his concept of mccha.ni:Jin in old- fashioned 
and inadequate , and that hio a ccount of the criteria for sayinG that 
behaviour ic intelligent tends to support a modern mechani:::;tic theory. 
I aloo argue tha t hi~ ana l ysis of the loe-ical gramrnar of words is in-
se~)arable from thv r uflexive analysis of experience , 'that r eflexi ve a·:;are-
nens i~ constar::tly taken for cranted in Tiyle ' s appeal::; to t he r eader ' s 
experience , o..ud tha t; t his is in flat conflict · \7l th hi::: acc0un"u both of 
sclf- knon leuc;c: and of lmowledce of othe ro . Finally , I examine his account 
of i mu.0inu.tlon o:l; ::>orne leneth , and finu ito essential d0fect to lie in t he 
failure to pu::;h r .-:flcxi ve analysin further . 
1 have ::m:;~c::;tcd that from D.ylo ' ::; acconnt of ':r:w.t he i c doinc, one Inicht 
;,np!1o:.;c h r; YlJ.3 cow::crned ·:1i.th the iuionc of the: T·:1rw-li;.h lV.!l(;llD{:n in the ::;~.me 
>laJ r .G o. phi lolo~;:i.:;t or :_srun.nQ.rln.n, o.nd thu. l; thnuch h~ in LI •J in~ more ti1o.n 
ti:i:.; , hr:: n~...-vcr hi•1 ,.,~lf !'la.!~''C it clcu.c r:lw.~ r.torc . , 
Tlylr- , o.ft('I' p·1 i.nt i.n;::; out that 
:i.n ·:: lJ.i. t.:h t !10 rnc u 1i nc of the nurds i3 duly r copcctcd , ·i nc'Lr;·l;r;rl that curre c·tnc oc 
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or. incorrectness of this ·kind v1as not his concern. He mmt on to say 
that "recently the bad habit has arisen of using the t e r ;n 'lan.:;"ltacse ', as 
if it ncre ru1 i ne:r..haustible source from which r.1iraculously sprang opinions 
and belief s, or thou.ght.s , and that is of no use ." (La Philosophic Analytique 
P. lOO). 
But if people do this, Rylc must be 'held in part rc ~;_?onsible , f or in 
\' his account of senca·l:;i on , for example, ostensibly the question io : "WhD.t 
is the ri:;ht way to talk in En(;l:i.oh ru1d what are the r:ieht EneHsh idioms?n 
and not : tt Arc the r e s ensations of the kind scnuati onalis t doctrines ussert 
t hcr 0 arc? '' Ryle :i.s in fact concerned with this lact qnestion, but one 
would not knov1 t his from his account of what he iG doine. 
Uy debt to Sartre and Herleau-Ponty cannot be adequate ly i ndicat ed in 
parti cular r ef 8r :;nccs , and that is v:hy ::.:o f ev1 v1il l be found. Their in-
flucnce on my trcatmcn t of one ' c 0\'111 body, thE:' rcflexi ve . consciousness , 
spoken experience , ima~:i.nation , n...nd be i ng in the world, is s o pervasive 
and cxtcn::;ivc , t ha t I am inca;:able of sn.y:tnc; rihere it bcJins or cndc. This 
i::; no 1:; a s t udy of t hei r doct.rinc s bnt a crit_i f1UC of cmpir :Lci3m in t e rms 
. 
v;hi <~h , I hop3 , cmpirici~;tc lllay easily un<.lc rsta~l<.l . 
In a :lcJ.i tion t o tho collectr::d \·:orko of Ilus::;erl , publi::;hcd by :~artinus 
i!:i. j hoff , I have f oun tl t h\) Fr ench trans lations of thr.: " T.<lc(m" (H. R. F. ) und 
of t ho " Loc;i cchc Untor ::mchnncon" ( P. U. F. ) of con s:l. dcr~1lo a s sistance . 
!licocnr ' s note:.:; 'f;o h i s t runsJ.ation of the " Iclee n" i n pur.!; j.c;, tlt~r arc ve ry 
hel.pflll . I ha-.; c f ound Hu::;::;crl ' 3 lt' O Gt intcrc~st lnc c c•nnc nt0 on 'lumc and 




(Husserliana, Volume VII, Hart'inus Nijhoff). But the fundamental study 
of psycholog.iSJn i s of course in the "Logische Untersuchungen", and my 
treatment of naturalistic fallacies is based upon this. 
I 
Lastly, I VTould 
mention c. V. Salmon's s ·tudy ."The Central Problem of David Hume 's Philosophy" 
(Max Nicmeye·r,- 1929), an offprl.nt from Husserl_.~s "Jahrbuch f~r Philosophic 
u11d ph~omenologische Fors'chung" Vol. X., which boldly at·te1npts to disento.ngle 
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Chapter 1 
NATURE kND HUMAN NATURE, 
After Newton, natUral philosophy dominated metaphysics. The world of 
direct ex~rience, the lived world, came to be regarded as a collection of 
minor effects of the great machine upon one small but complicated part of it, 
the body, and apprehended by a mind which was essentially disembodied. These 
effects were the eo-called impressions or sensations. In Looke's doctrine, 
the distinction was made between the mind and its materials, the ideas, and 
between the ideas and their "original" or source, which he assumed to be ex-
ternal, physical objects. These objects affect the senses and "they from 
external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions", 
i.e., the ideas. ("Essav". , Bk II I 3) 01 • t t 
This neat scheme fell apart on one main ground: if ideas were the 
materials and the only materials of the mind, and if all relations includi ng 
causal relations were relations between ideas, no knowledge of the original or 
source of these ideas was possible. For the objects of physics, anatomy and 
physiology could be nothing but ideas. What Locke meant here and in other 
contexts, though not always, by "the senses" were those objects of anatomy, 
the external sense organs, the nervous system and brain. And what could 
they be themselves but ideas? 
~ 
But Locke's mos t far-reaching influence arose from his failure to stick 
to thi s doctrine, his failure to realise what it entailed, and his failure to 
r ealise that he had departed from it. "Sensati on" of ten means not the process 
whereby an idea is produced, but the idea itself. And the il ea and the 
sensation are frequently identified with the sensible quality of an object, 
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as we pclrceive it, for example .the brown of the table top. This confusion 
~ is not due at bottom to Locke's obvious and notorious carelessness about his 
terms , but to his inveterate realism. The theory of representative perception 
suffers from the entirely unphilosophical, but fatal, flaw that no one has 
ever succeeded in holding it. .The "holding" of the theory has generally 
been confined to the propounding of it. Once propounded, it is forgotten. 
Locke forgets it constantly. When he speaks of a sensible object about 
which our senses are conversant , it is quite uncertain whether he means our 
complex idea or the cause of it. And it 4oes not really matter which he 
means, except where he is formally propounding the distinction. Whichever 
he formally means, what he invariably has in mind is the sort of thing we 
can see and touch - a chair, a grain af wheat , a lump; of gold. It is useless 
to ask Locke: is a chair a complex idea or its original ? Officially, his 
answer is: the chair differs from the complex idea, which it JrOduces by its 
affection of the senses, only in its lack of colour, warmth or coolness, smell 
and possible other simple ideas. These ideas are caused by the secondary 
qualities in the body, which have no resemblance to them but are defined as 
the power to produce them. 
How could Locke have failed to see that the distinctions between the 
original and the idea and between primary and secondary qualities are un-
tenable? Only by ignoring them. This seems a paradoxical thing to say , 
for it is obviously an essential part of his doctrine ~d the part which his 
successors fell upon. Locke ostensibly makes much of it, and when he forgets 
it occasionally calls himself to order and make·s obeisance to it. But when, 
for example, Locke says , "take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts , 
each part has still solidity, extension , figure, and mobility; •• • and so 
divida it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain still each 
of them all those qualities", it is an actual, visible, tangible grain which 
he is obviously referring to. Is this grain, which he might hold in his 
hand and look at, the thing itself, or a complex idea? It could make not 
the slightest difference what his answer was. It makes not the slightest 
difference when he says "quality" where he ought to say "idea" or "sensation" 
where he ought to sa;y "idea" or "quality". His incorrigible realism makes 
them interchangeable. 
As Hume was to point out, "the philosophical system acquires all its in-
fluence on the imagination from the vulgar one." Its advantage "is its 
simila.ri ty to the vulgar one; by which means we can humour our reason for a 
moment, when it becomes troublesome and solicitous; and yet upon its least 
negligence or inattention, can easily return to our vulgar and natural notions." 
(Treatise, P. 213 and ' P. 216) Locke's vulgar and natural notions are every-
where evident in the text of the "Essay". But so are Hume 's in the "Treatise", 
and his system, as we shall see, stands upon the same foundation. 
The sensations in the mind, for Locke, are equivalent to knowledge of 
sensible qualities or to "perceptions of things" possessing these qualities. 
For Locke, however, the mind was not identified with its ideas or sensa-
t\. 
tiona. In subsequent sensationlist doctrines it was, though imperfectly and 
without consistency. The term "sensation" suffered from a hopeless .ambiguity, 
~ 
and still does. It was both a physiological occurrence and a conscious or 
·experienced occurrence. Even when it did not mean both things at once, it 
passed easily and freely from the one meaning to the other. 
This confusion is entirely natural, and is one of a number of related con-
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fusions which are still common at the present day. Central to the confusions 
are the bodily sensations - pain, cold, heat, hunger, shivering, itching, 
tension, etc. These are felt in, or on, the body in direct experience. 
They are conscious experiences, i.e., we feel them, and they are bOdily ex-
periences, i.e., they are located precisely or vaguely somewhere between top 
and toe. When we attend to them or when they force themselves on our attention, 
they are experienced as the figure, but most of the time they are the back-
ground to our activities. Such sensations, however, are essentially ex-
perienced, and we can always attend to them. But the body is an object as 
well as a subjects I can look at my hand lying on the table beside the paper. 
The confusion starts when our knowledge of anatomy or physiology is super-
imposed on our direct bodily experience. Human anatomy and physiology are 
about the body, of which one's own body is a specimen. To do anatomy and 
physiology is to learn about the respiratory, circulatory and digestive systems, 
the autonomic and central nervous systems and brain, the skeletal structure, 
etc. One learns that one has an oesophagus, two retinae with 6t million cones 
each, bronchial tubes, ductless glands, etc., just as one has skin and toe-
nails, and that electrochemical impulses are conducted by the nerves - one's 
own nerves, for they are in one's own body, aren't they?- and so on. It is 
natural to think: "All that goes on in me", for of course what one normally 
means by "me" is partly at least this body here, one's own body. 
One thinks then of one's body in terms of anato~y,~physiology, biochemistry, 
and even physics, and if one pleases as a system of systems of homeostatic 
or feedback mechanisms. It is simply a specimen of its kind. I could 
examine my own skin under the microscope, read my own E.E.G., just like anybody 
else's. Let us call the body in this sense the organism. No doubt the range 
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of individual variation is in some respects very wide, but any two adult male 
organisms of an age, for example, are closely isomorphic in structure and 
function. 
One arrives at this view by a natural development of ordinary naive realism, 
~ according to which the body is real in the sense that it can be seen and 
touched, just like the table or chair. Like all such things it has an inside, 
and the inside is as physiology and anatomy sa.y it is. Just as there are 
tables and rocks, so there are· organisms. 
But if one's own body is an organism, one's bodily sensations, one's bodily 
ex~rience, have to be occurrences in the organism, since they are in one's 
body. But this is not so: no such occurrences are describable in terms of 
the organism. Occurrences and processes in the organism are correlated with 
bodily sensations, but whereas these sensations are directly experienced, the 
occurrences in the organism, which are of extreme complexity, can only be dis-
covered by elaborate experiment and inference. Sensations are in the body 
but not in the organism. The organism is entirely an object, an object for 
investigation and experiment. 
What is investigated, however, is not one's own body in the primary sense. 
What is meant by the exJr ession nroy own body" is my embodiment. Whatever 
else I am, I am this body, and whatever else I mean by "I" I do mean roy own 
body, whereby I am in a place, somewhere, situated. nHere" means nwhere I 
~ 
am bodily". All my activities are conducted in or from the place where I am, 
and when I move, I move bodily. There is a world for me primarily because 
I am always bodily situated in the midst of it. 
What I see is seen from where I am. I see with roy eyes, I move them, 
-6-
screw them up, try to see. more with them. When I laugh, I laugh bodily; 
the laughter shakes me. When I talk, I talk with my throat, tongue, teeth 
and lips. When I am thinking, part of the time I am talking to myself, or 
making faces, or frowning, or curling my toes, or moving the pen across the 
paper, and these ~re not accessory, unconnected activities but all part of what 
I am at when I would say I was thinking. I am thinking bodily in a still 
more obvious way when I play viciously to my opponent's weak backhand on the 
tennis court .• 
Though most c£ the time I am taking my body for granted and p1.ying no 
attention to it, having habits and skills on which I count, it takes only a 
moment's reflection to describe some typical aspects of bodily experience, to 
sa:y roughly what it means to be embodied, and what the expression "my own body" 
primarily means. What it does not mean in this sense is an organism. Like 
all human activities, the investigation of the organism is conducted by em-
bodied selves. Hypothesis and theory remain idle till someone confirms or 
fails to confirm a prediction, and this is done almo~ seeing with his eyes. 
A schoolbook on e!_ementary physiology is called "How your body works." 
The distinction is simply not made in popular language. But it can be made 
very simply with reference to this title. How my body works in one sense is 
~ how I work, for I work bodily. But a book on that would tell me little or 
nothing. The title, however, obviously refers to the physiological on-goings 
"' in the organism, some of which can be correlated with my bodily experience 
and activity, my. own body. 
This distinction between the body and the organism is not a distinction 
between two entities, nor between a physical entity and its representation 
11in the mind" . It is a di stinction between the body as self or subject, and 
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the body as objeot. The pain is in the . subject but not in the object. The 
toothache can be in the upper jaw of the subject, the caries in a tooth on the 
lower jaw in the object. "Here" is where the subject is. The subject does 
physiology with his eyes and hands, but up to a point he can regard his own 
body for this purpose as an object, measure his blood-pressure, test his 
reflexes, and many other things, as he might another body. 
The distinction is not an easy one to make, for even in direct experience 
the body is. to some extent an object - for instance one can see a good part of 
it, though always more or less from the same angle, unlike the other things 
about it. But in any sort of aotion or activity it is not an object but a 
subject its morements are mine. In no sense is it true to say it obeys me 
I am my own body. Volitions followed by bodily happenings belong to the 
domain of philosophical fiction. In aotion, the body is experienced as my 
power to do this and that. Things are seen as within reach of my arm, my 
arm is the paver to reach them. 
This essential ambiguity, as Merleau-Ponty calls it, of the body, whereby 
it i•s me, my own body, a subject, on the one hand and an organism, an object, 
on the other, this essential ambiguity has led to endless confusion, and it 
is no doubt because many philosophers and others have found it intolerable 
that they have attempted to deny one aspect or the other. Most of them have 
chosen, subtly or crudely, to deny the body as subject. though in the nature 
of the case they co.uld never quite succeed. "' To attempt this, they had to 
deny that experience, bodily experience, could really be as it obviously is, 
or attempt to maintain that it came to be as it obviously is from a genetic 
condition which would be consistent with their premises. This original ex-
perience was, like the state of nature, a myth. But it survives in attenuated 
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form into the 20th century. Why did most philosophers agree to regard the 
body as essentially an object, a thing in the world with all the other things? 
Natural philosophy, and above all Newtonian mechanics, had become the very 
type of genuine knowledge , of experimentally verifiable law. What other 
knowledge of the body could there be? 
If this is the type of knowledge, my subjective bodily experience , the 
experience of seeing wit~ my eyes, of walking, running, writing, reaching for, 
of carnal passion , can never be a matter of knowledge. Of any description 
of my embodiment, my bodily .experience, it can be asked : How do you know this? 
How can this be verified? What is the proof? If knowledge ~ knowledge of 
the objective world, experimentally and publicly verifiable, there is no 
proof. The only evidence of seeing is to see , and the only evidence of the 
bodily exp3rience of running, writing, etc. is to run , write, etc. I can 
improve in a literary way my description of bodily experience, make it more 
detailed and analytic , but to ask for verification of the kind in question is 
an absurdity. I can desoribe it carelessly. I can tell lies about it. 
But in the sense demanded I cannot verify it. For verification in the sense 
demanded always presupposes it. 
Someone has to read the thermometer or the E. E. G. , observe the explosion 
or the rat in the maze, and write down with his hand, or dictate with his tongue , 
teeth and lips , the results. If I ask him hew he knows that what he describes 
' did happen, his only answer can be "I saw it". I know what he me ana, because 
r know what it is to see , to see with my own eyes. My embodiment in a sense 
is a priori: it is a condition of the possibility of objective knowledge, of 
knOfi' 1 edge of the 
"(' 
<J%anism - the body as object - as much as of anything else . 
... Reference to bodily experience is JRrt and parcel of the common language; it 
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cannot be otherwise understood. It means what itt does mean, because ex-
perience is as it is. 
Behaviourism makes use of thi s common understanding of what it is to see, 
to be hungry, eto. , but. thinks to be "scientific" by never referring to it 
or by putting these wor ds in quotation marks. Linguistic behaviourism in 
some of its forms purports to regard l anguage solely as an autonomous domain 
of objective phenomena. Ryle's procedur e , as I shall t ry to show , requir es . 
him to treat the self as another other. The JrOblem of other selves and 
their embodied eiperience is thus dismissed : all selves are others and all 
others are objects. Ryle is saved in pr~otioe by his good sense , but his 
good sense is oft en at odds with what seems to be his philosophical doctrine. 
In regarding the body simply as an object, philosophy was still left with 
the mind , and it was a disembodied mind. In earlier doctrines the soul at 
least inhabited or informed the body and moved i t . The Cartesian doctrine 
of the body as a mchanism left nothing for the soul!'· to ' do except think; 
the body would do what it did regardless, so long as it had a ro urce of power 
and 'until the parts wore ·out. Descartes ' physics r equited only configuration 
and motion, and his physiology was derived from his physics , but what he called 
the fire- el ement, which in its pure form was the "animal spirits", fulfilled 
the role of a source of power. Descartes' theory of soul and body is complex 
and difficult and it continued to develop to the end of his life. Whether J 
"' one takes it to be occasionalist , epiphenomalist , or interactionist depends 
~ in part on wnat stage of its development is in question. There is no doubt , 
hrnever , what interpretation was generally put upon the famous dualism in 
spite of his insistenc'e on the quasi- substantial unity of soul and body in 
ordinary experience :- the body was purely a mechanism, whatever might be the 
... 
• l ' 
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nature of the soul. 
In accounting for the occurrence of the ideas, Locke takes the mechanism 
for granted. But just as his doctrine of representative perception is largely 
ignored in practice and his careful distinction of quality, sensation and idea 
abandoned, so his account of body and soul and consciousness is largely a 
straightforward, and admirable, account of ordinary experience in ordinary 
language, and the body in this context is certainly not a mechanism. Locke's 
reason for asserting the obvious with splendid vigour and wit was that it tends 
to be denied. Ryle at his best has the same sort of virtue. 
Bodily sensations were regarded by Locke's successors as the very type of 
"original" sensation. Berkeley in his youth was far more of a sensationalist 
than Locke , and if one r egards, as one m~, his mature doctrine as consisting 
essentially in verbal legislation, r emained one to the end. For the original 
separation of al l the ideas which together we call an apple co'uld only be 
" deduced from the separation of the external sense organs and some physiological 
theory. Colours and sounds were taken by Hume to be originally "of the nature" 
of sensation , like bodily pain. All the observable qualities of things which 
in the ordinary w~ we see in the things were "really" or "originally" sensations. 
Thus all experience must consist of sensations in various relations. 
The doctrine was derived from physics and physiology. But the postulated 
atoms, of which bod~ly sensations were the pure type , were asserted to be given 
"' 
in experience , to be our immediate objects or data, or since that might seem 
implausible,at least to have been so given "originally". Each of them was in 
itself independent of any other . But if this were so, all knowledge , all 
science, including physics and physiology, could be only of objects which were 
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ultimately reducible to sensations in various relations. Part of the ~ime, 
this was Hume's view. It followed that bodily sensations were not criginally 
experienced as bodily, for the body like all other objects was reducible to 
sensations. Thus was the ladder kicked aw~. 
Hume never entirely abandoned the physiological theory and often explicitly 
asserts it. But he confutes the representative theory to which it naturally 
leads and is often essentially Berkeleyan. He saw that what he called Nature •> 
could only be what he perceived, imagined and believed. But he never frees · 
himself from the metaphysics of natural philosophy. He is Newtonian, not 
only in his assumptions about the world, but in his approach to that domain 
of Nature which is human nature, whose nature it is to apprehend Nature in a 
certain w~. In his "official" doctrine of association, nearly all of our 
so-called knowledge is the mere effect of quasi-mechanical processes. "Nature, 
by an absolute and uncontraillable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well 
as to breathe and feel." (Treatise, P.l83) Probable reasoning, which · for 
Hume comprises all empirical knav ledge, is "nothing but a species of sensation." 
(Treatise, P.l03) 
Hume means many things by "Nature". He thinks of Nature as essentially 
beneficent , ensuring our well-being as it were in spite of us. He speaks of 
Nature as others speak of God, and this is more than merely the eighteenth 
century habit of personification. Nature is Providence . But Nature is also 
~ 
the Nature of Newton's natural philosophy. Yet even in his strongly Newtonian 
in~roduction he w,rites: "All the sciences have a relation to human nature; 
and however wide any of them seem to run from it, they still r eturn back by 
one passage or another. " (Treatise, xix) But he can hardly have realised 
how far he would travel from his view of human nature as a part of Nature . 
-12-
Nature, the natural world, he later concludes, consists of fictions of 
the imagination. Such are the objects of Newtonian natur al philosophy then 
but Hume does not say that. But the self is also a fiction , for all. identi-
ties are fictions . Selves are not human nature but in a sense products or 
creations of human nature. They are among the constituted objects of the 
mind or consciousness, essentially assimil able when their jdenti ty is analysed 
to other fictions constituted by the imagination and belief. 
All nature, natural objects, objects of natur al science , were constituted 
in this way. It is not difficult - in retrospect - to extract a doctrine of 
the transcendental, constitutive consciousness from Hume, but Husserl , so far . ' 
as I am aware, was the first to do so. His tendency to subjective idealism 
, 
was of course recognised. ~ut in the forefront of the picture stands his 
doctrine of Natur9, Nature the beneficent - made like God in Hume's own image, . 
but also Newtonian Nature with its sub- dOmain human nature, the impressions 
and ideas and the quasi- mechanical principles of association. Hume is con-
sidered , and rightly considered, the forerunner of 19th century sensation-
alism, psychologism, positivism, and - in a different way - introspectionism. 
Yet his doctrine of belief, imagination, and judgement which "peoples the world" 
(Treatise, P. l08) for all its inconsistencies and varieties of expression is 
di stinctive and perhaps the most original thing in his whole work. The world 
as constituted by the imagination and belief has two intimately connected 
aspects: one is the system of memory and personal iden,ity, and the other is 
the system of things in their causal relations. The essence of all the various 
fictions is identity in change. They are all ascribed to the imagination and 
belief. The imagination and belief, the constitutive consciousness , are not 
in nature, but are the correlate of nature. It is easy to go farther and say 
. ., 
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there is a world only for a consciousness. 
Hume never said anything like this, but it is hard to avoid his invitation 
to say it. He has little to say about the faculties , propensities, dispos i tions 
and activities which he constantly and casually attributes to the mind, even as 
he develops his quasi- mechanical doctrine of association. He takes the mind 
for granted in much the same way as he takes Newtonian nature for granted when 
he ~ talking about the impressions and treats them i n the Lockean fashion as the 
natural effects of physical causes. He both undermines the metaphysic of natural 
philosophy and continues to assume it. His analysis of causality makes it 
meaningless to ask the cause of the occurrence of impressions and ideas, for 
they, and they alone, are what we call causes and effects. , 
existence, " representing and J;epresented. (Treatise , P.211) 
There is no "double 
Hume assigns a position of supreme importance to the scim ce of man, "the 
only solid foundation for the other sciences", even as he insists that he is 
applying "experimental philosophy" ( the method of Newton) to "moral subjects". 
"The e ss ence d: the mind is equally unknown wi t h that . of external bodies and it 
must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities 
otherwise than by careful and exact experiments , and the observation of those 
parti cular effects , which result from its different Circumstances and situations." 
(Treatise , Poxx- xxi) 
This could be a programme for experimental psychology, for human as a 
" 
branch of animal psychology, and Hume 's short chapter "Of the r eason of animals" 
i s in keeping wi th this view. But then ther e would be no gr ound at all for 
regarding the science of man as the only solid foundation for t he other sciences. 
It would s i mply be one scim ce among othe rs. \Vha-~ever sense one gives to the 
.. 
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word "foundation" the relation of psychology and the social sciences to physics 
and chemistry cannot be so described. The problem of knowledge and of the 
relation of consciousness to its objects would remain.untouched if the science 
of man were a science like any other science. Every psychology, ha,wever, 
leads to the problem of consciousness and thus beyond itself. Rats or other 
creatures may be described entirely in terms of their movements, however 
artificially, but unless I observe them and note what happens no experiment 
has been made. It is only because I believe that others actually see (are 
conscious) too that I accept numerous experimental findings which I have not 
myself made. The seeing or observing is not part of the experimental finding: 
only what is seen and observed is that. The seeing or observing are subjective: 4.. 
what is seah or observed is. objective. But without seeing, nothing wound be 
seen, no observation would be made, and no hypothesis tested. 
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Chapter 2 
IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS 
Hume's emphasis on experiment means that he is going to stick to the 
evidence and not to go beyond it. He will not impose "conjectures and 
hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. " (Treatise P. xxii ) 
It is because the doctrine of impressions and ideas is not regarded as a 
hypothesis but self- evident, that it is never fully formulated and always 
remains radically obscure and ambiguous. For the sensation doctrine , as 
we shall see , is not its onl y source. No less important: · for his doctrine 
of complex1 impressions and ideas is t~e mental image which is "in the mi nd" 
but not in the world and to which the complex impression is also assimilated 
as an "internal and perishing existence . " (Treatise, P.l94) The mental 
image is hypostatised, as it so often i s , as an intra-mental entity, and the 
complex impression is simply the more forceful and vivaci ous original of it , 
but nonetheless an int~a-mental entity itself. This is what Sartre calls 
the illusion of immanence, the belief that the objects of consciousness are 
in consci ousness , in the mind , as if the mind were a container. 
the word "contents" in this connection probably derives from it. 
The use of 
The simple impressions of sensation, though they have a curious bearing 
on Hume ' s doctrine of mathematics and crop up from time~to time in other 
contexts, may be largely neglected fo r my purpose . But they are i mportant 
in one respect . They are simples, without parts , extensionless, or in other 
terms minima sensibilia . All compl exes are mere sums of simples: a whole 
is the sum and nothing but the sum of its parts. In any given complex, the 
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simples are finite in number. Divisibility is not infinite. It follows 
that any impression or idea is determinate in quantity as well as quality, 
since it consists of a definite number of simples. The only importance 
this doctrine has is that, though Hume perfectly well recognises that deter-
mination of quantity is not accomplished by counting the simples but by 
measurement according to a practical standard, he continues to assume that 
ideas or mental images, no l ess than the impressions of which they are copies, 
have a definite size. What he does not realise is that neither impressions 
nor ideas as such can be measured at all, and that it is absurd to assert that 
they are determinate in quantity if the quantity is in principle indeterminable. 
The height of a man can be measured but not the height of the mental image of 
the man, tho~gh the image be of a man of that height. 
There is a further complication in the doctrine of impressions which is 
clooely connected with the hypostatisation of the image. Though Hume 
frequently identifies impressions with qualities or properties of things in the 
same way as Locke and ~erkeley - colour, taste, smell, texture, visual &~d 
tactua~ shape - he is also convinced for much the same physiological reasons 
as Berkeley that "our sight informs us not of outness", i.e., that any visual 
impression i s in two dimensions, or at least "originally" in two dimensions. 
(Tr eatise , P.l91) It is a flat patchwork of colours. Hence that impression 
which would correspond, for example , to the appearance of the si de of a house 
in the field of vision is held to be determinate in size, This view l eads 
to what I shall call t he i llusion of r eal appearances. For any appearance of 
the house is s i mply t he wa;y it t her e l ooks to me here, the way I see it. But 
Hume 's doctri ne of the visual i mpres sion hypostati ses the l ook of the house and 
hol ds t hat this js det erminate i n quantity or size . But , a s I shall argue, 
only the house can be measured i n any way and only it can be sai d to be of 
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determ:in:rtD size in any dimension. 
Hume's the~ry of impressions and ideas ~ not like some sense-datum 
theories which purport to be just another way of talking about what in the 
ordinary way we say we see or hear or feel, and which are to be justified 
simply by their convenience, utility and unambiguousness. For Hume , we 
believe we see things, bodies, material existents. But these are not what 
is given. We take our perceptions to be our only objects, " and suppose, 
~that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real 
body or material existence." (Treatise, P.206) The bodies and the im-
pressions are the same: the bodies are simply what we believe the impressions 
to be , but there is nothing but the impressions. 
Yet Huroe maintains paradoxically that "all sensations are felt by the 
mind, such as they really are, and that when we doubt, whether they present 
themselves as distinct objects , or as mre impressions, the difficulty is not 
concerning their n!lture, but concerning their relations and situation." 
(Treatise , . P.l89) 
I say "paradoxically" for we obviously do not feel them as they really are -
we take them for bodies . Again Hume states: " For since all actions and 
sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness , they must necessarily 
appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. Every 
thing that enters the mind , being in reality a perception , 'tis impossible 
<\ 
anything should to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that 
even where we are ·most intimately conscious , we might be mistaken." (Treatise, 
P.l90) 
The common injunction not to take Hume too literally is a bad one. It 
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is not his expression but his doctrine that is difficult. In these passages, 
the difficulty is of a fundamental nature. If sensations were felt as they 
really are, how would the vulgar ever take them for external bodies? By reason 
of "their relations and situation." Sensations are what they are and what they 
appear, irrespective of their relations to other sensations. Relations are 
purely external. But the vulgar are not conscious of some of their sensations 
as such; they ·suppose them to be bodies, and in this they are , in a sense, mis-
taken. The sensations as they r eally are are "known to us by consciousness." 
Consciousness in this context must, I think, be the reflexive consciousness, 
and Hume seems to be asserting in Cartesian fashion that it is certain and in-
dubitable. 
What Hume is doing is alleging the evidence of our direct, intimate con-
sciousness in favour of his doctrine of impressions and ideas. He identifies 
the sensation with what the vulgar take to be the objectively real qualities of 
bodies or material existents. Whereas, as he alleges, the vulgar take their 
perceptions to be their o~ly objects, he takes what, for example, the vulgar 
call the colour of a thing to be a sensation of which we are most intimately 
conscious and about which we cannot be mistaken. Such a sensation is what it 
is and what it appears to be . It is a determinate colour, and it is nothing 
but a colour. It is a pure quality and it is presented as such , irrespective 
of its relations. Where does he get these pure sensations or qualities? They 
are simply the abstracted qualities of things. Anything may be analysed without 
remainder into it~ qualities. These abstracted qualities he identifies with 
what he insists are the presented or felt sensations, of which we are most in-
timately conscious and about which we cannot be mistaken. The problem then 
concerns their relations and situation , that is, how these qualities or sensations 
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are supposed jointly to compose a body or material existence. 
The doctrine of impressions and ideas can only be understood historically 
as the late and sophisticated product of two centuries of physical, physiological 
and philosophical theory. To cite the evidence of our intimate consciousness 
is pure sleight of hand. What we are alleged to be intimately conscious of is 
actually deduced from this elaborate body af theory. It is perhaps unduly to 
rationalise Hume ' s position to say that he persuaded himself that what must, 
according to the theory, be presented to consciousness, ~ presented to con-
sciousness. The difficulty was that the vulgar di d not know it: they thought 
their sensations were qualities of bodies - the grass was green 'J the sky was 
blue, the sack heavy, the ditch foul-smelling. 
This being so, Hume, try as he might to stick to the direct evidence , had to 
fall back on the scientific premises of the doctrine , though without always 
realising what he was doing • He had to say that "colours, sounds, etc., are 
. 
originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure 
that proceeds from a fire", ( 'rreatise, P.l92) where the meaning of "originally" 
. 
is clearly "when we first have them." The evidence for this could not be di rect. 
It could only be in terms of the theory from which the doctrine originated. 
But the physical theory took the physical w:> rld for granted, and it was the 
belief in the independent existence of body, of the physical world, which Hume 
undertook to account for on the basis of the alleged data. 
" 
Not only were the 
data deduced from the physical the ory; they were no longer data, for what the 
vulgar saw was not·, for example , the pure quality red, but red in a perceptual 
context , for example , an attractive shiny red surface over there and out there. 
For Hume , ther e was the pur e quality red ; the "shininess" would have to be 
analysed as streaks of white as if what was presented w~re a painting; and the 
attractiveness was a sensation of pleasure caused by the impression of sensation 
and projected upon it. There would be absolutely no intrinsic connection between 
the red and the white and the pleasure as they might be supposed to have occurred 
separately, originally. Harne's theory was to account for experience as we 
actually have it, for, that is, the vulgar consciousness, on the premi~e that 
what was given were sensations. 
It followed from the doctrine of impressions or sensations that the senses 
were the faculty of receiving, or apprehending, or just having sensations, nothing 
else and nothing more. This concept of the senses is no less far removed from 
actual experience than is the concept of a sensation, of which it is the strict 
correlative. Our actual sense experience consists not s i mply of passive bodily 
sensati ons, but of looking, listening, touching, handling. The pure sensing of 
i the sensations is at best a hypothesis, but there is no evidence for it in ex-
perience; the "evidence" is that of the external sense organs which receive and 
transmit impressions, according to the then theory. Whenever Hume wants t o 
appeal i n a concrete way to the reader 's experience it is never to his experience 
of impressions and ideas as such that he appeals, for obvious reasons. And when 
Hume introduces the distinction between impressions and ideas, in order to say 
what he means at all, he has in effect to treat impressions as identical with 
material existences , independently existing, or with observable qualities of 
such things. He thus puts the alleged vulgar belie f !h reverse : the vulgar 
take their perceptions to be their only objects ; Hume takes the objects to be 
his perceptions . 
VIe will "readily perceive" the difference between the impression and the 
idea, he confidently asserts. We do readily perceive it because the distinction 
-21-
he makes is that between seeing and imagining material existences. "When I 
shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations 
of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is 
t; 
not.<be found in the other." "I can imagine to myself such a city as the~ 
Jerusalem, ••• tho' I never saw any such. I have seen Paris; but shall I 
affirm I can form such an idea of that city, as will perfectly represent all 







SEEING AND !MAG INING 
If we did not see things and imagine things we would never know what Hume 
meant by his distinction between an impression and an idea. But in a sense we 
still do not know - we knew what the distinction corresponds to but we do not 
know what is meant by an impression or an idea. The only way to show that 
we have impressions and ideas , or that there are impressions and ideas , would 
be to start from the vulgar consciousness and indicate that feature or element 
of what we experience which would be called an impression or :idea. Any fruit-
ful analysis of sense experience should start from sense experience , not from 
physics or physiology or what else we have learned about the world by means of 
sense- experience, nor from the observed behaviour of rats or monkeys or infants . 
Actual sense experience as we have it could never be deduced from any such evi-
dence - all such evidence presupposes and depends upon our own sense- experience. 
To SaY, this is also to say that the attempt to :identify pure data, the immediate 
data of consciousness, is futile and nugatory. If there were a pure datum of 
consciousness we would be conscious of it: it would be actually given to con-
sciousness . All alleged data prove to be merely identifiable elements or 
features or characteristics of things, products of analysis . 
The method I shall use is that of reflexi ve analysi~ . Any description of 
experience , and not me r ely of what we exper ience , is reflexive. A description 
of a table would not be a description of experience ; but a description of seeing 
a table would be. In other words, such a description would not merely describe 
something, an object, in the world, but the way in which one is conscious of it . 
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Seeing, for example, is not reducible to what is seen, though it is in-
separable f rom it. It is the subjective correlate of what is visible. But 
for reflexion I could not meaningfully say that I see anything. Reflexion is 
commonplace and indispensable, and any kind of waking consciousness or exper-
ience may become reflexive. (I am inclined to think that to reflect while 
dreaming is to wake up.) What is frequently meant by "consciousness" is the 
reflexive consciousness, and this is one reason why the term is so ambiguous 
though not nearly so ambiguous as "unconscious" . But consciousness or ex-
perience need not be reflexiveo I can be absorbed in a task and all my attention 
can be devoted to what I am at. I am of course seeing what is before me all 
the time, but it is it and not the seeing that occupies me. But my seeing 
it is implicit in its v~ ibility, its being seen, and I can make this explicit 
and be aware of seeing it. It is not the seeing alone that I am aware of in 
reflexion, for there is no seeing without something seen. What I am reflexively 
~are of is my seeing something. 
Phenomenology is reflexive description and analysis. It ~ not description 
and analysis of any objective aspect of the world, but of our experience of the 
world. No general account of phenomenological analysis can do more than provide 
prelimi nary orientation. The JrOOf of the pudding is in the eating. One 
word about the "epoche", the putting in parentheses of the natural attitude and 
the natural thesis of the world, the assumption that there is a world, Hume's 
natural belief. This attitude or thesis is not suspen~d, for it cannot be 
su.spended. But it is itself analysed reflexively. As I shall show, the analysis 
of seeing and imagining cannot be made except in relation to the natural thesis 
of the world , nor could any dis tinction be established between seeing and 
imagining. Sense experience is inseparable from the natural thesis of the world , 
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Hume ' s vulgar consciousness . There is no other sort of sense 
that of the vulgar consciousness. 
Sense experience is experience of things in the world , one ~rld, by 
different senses. We do not construct one object or one world out of correlated 
data supplied by different senses. Our experience m of touching, seeing and 
smelling the very table which we see; the same table is touched , seen and 
smelt. The vulgar consciousness or the natural attitude are not only vulgar 
and natural but provide, overtly or covertly, the basis for all arguments which 
criticise them or hold them to be in any sense unwarranted. It is not possible 
not to believe in the visible, tangible, spatia- temporal world. Evidence is 
of this or that, what is or is not the case, what ther e is and what there is not , 
but the thesis of the world is independent of any particular fact or·any par-
ticular existent - it is in .the world that what is or is not the case is as-
,; certained. That any fact can be found out and established presupposes a world. 
To attempt to make the distinction between seeing and imagining without 
r eference to things in the world is impossible. To attempt this is to attempt 
to analyse experience while trying to ignore actual experience . That is why 
the only feasible sense-datum theory would be simply another way of talking 
about things in the world , except that one could not talk, as Ayer virtually 
shows in "The Foundations of Empirical Kna.v ledge" . 
Hume ' s distinction between impressions and ideas is made in t erms of their 
force and vivacity. If an i dea were forceful and vivacious enough it would be 
an i mpression, ( Hume 's mechanism of sympathy depends upon t his principle whereby 
an idea can actually become an impression. ) He illustr ates the difference by 
means of the difference between seeing and imagining his chamber. But the 
I I 
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difference does not lie in the force or vivacity of the chamber, which may be 
brightly or dimly lit, smoky or clear. Furthermore we can see it unobservantly, 
abstractedly, without taking any special notice of it, and we can imagine it 
vividly and in detail. But to imagine it vividly is not to see it, and to 
see it apathetically is not to imagine it. 
The chamber being granted, however, the distinction is easy to make. We 
can only see it or any part of it when we are bodily in it and looking with 
our eyes open. We oan,if we will,examine it in more and more detail, dis-
covering more and more . It is revealed; we do not invent it. We need not 
wonder what some detail is likes we look and it is re~ealed in its unpredictable 
particularity. When we imagine it, we do not need to be bodily in it, and if 
we are, it is easier to imagine it with the eyes shut. We can never-discover 
anything about the chamber this way, though we may try to remember more detail . 
There is a limit to what we can imagine with any confidence that we are imagining 
it as it is, i . e ., as we would see it to be if we were actually in it and looking 
round it . We can at will imagine it as other than it is, and cannot be certain 
that some particulars we imagine are such as it really has. If someone asks 
us questions of detail about it, there are some we cannot answer. We can al-
ways give an answer, but it can be wrong. The only way to know is to go to 
the chamber and look. 
To make this distinction with reference to the chamber is to make H in 
the only possible way. 
... 
In the natural attitude there is a world of visi ble , 
tangible things w~ich we can and do see and touch directlyo We are in the midst 
of it, wherever we happen to be , being ourselves embodied, and we see what we 
see from where we are with our eyes. To see :is to have direct access to the 
things in the world , to find what is ther e and not invent it . It is all there 
already even when we can't make out what we want to make out, when we can •t 
see it properly. We know what to do when we can't see anything properly-
get close enough; then if the light is good enough we'll see it; or if not, 
we can try to touch it, feel what it is like. Some things we see will not 
yield to this treatment: we cannot see more of a rainbow or mirage by getting 
closer. We can see where the rainbow ends, but only from another place, not 
from where it ends. Even so, we have discovered something about the world 
that is the way rainbows are, and how else should be discover this but by 
seeing, by going and looking? 
The things that we have got to know by seeing how they are, we can imagine 
as we saw them, but we can also imagine them as other than we saw them, as 
changed, And we can never be certain that they were as we now imagine them, 
nor that they are now as they were when we saw them: to know that, we would 
have to see the tnings themselves again. But if they are s~ill there at all, 
they are as they are, there to be looked at, if we could get within sight of 
them, and if th~y are not there at all now, there will be something else there 
anyway. By the thesis of the world, we are where we are in it and can only 
see so much from where we are, but imagine whatever we please . Without 
positing things in the world, no di stinction can be made, for to see something 
is t o see something which is there to be seen, visible. The seeing and the 
thing itself are inseparable. This point is often made about the primary 
meaning of i;he verb to see . One cannot be said li teral'ly to see something 
which does not exist and which is not there wi thin one ' s range of vision. 
When we imagine something we ma;y posi·t it as existine- elsewhere , as absent, 
as not existing at all, or as "neutral" when we do not posit it either as ex-
isting or as not existing. (Cf. Sartre : L' Imaginaire , P. 35) In any case 
., 
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it is not bodily, visibly, tangibly present , to be explored and discovered 
and examined. Imagining is a way of making quasi- present what is posited 
as being absent. One of the difficulties about Hume's analysis of this in 
terms of natural belief is that though it covers the case of imagining some-
thing which we posit as existing elsewhere in the world, it does not cover 
the case of imagining, say, a purely imaginary building, which is yet imagined 
as a building - an object of belief and not simply a complex idea. 
Leave the actual things in the world out of account, and this whole dis-
tinction between seeing and imagining collapses. But Hume ' s distinction 
between impressions and ideas depends entirely on this familiar distinction. 
There have to be things, real things , in order to make it. But what we call 
a thing independently existing is not simply a complex impression or idea, for 
these are " internal and ~rishing existences" as he Ja. ter calls them. They 
are "in the soul" , not in the world. It :is for th:W reason that Hume does 
not elaborate the distinction between seeing his chamber and imagining it , 
for though his aistinction is entirely parasitic on this one, he does not mean 
4 to bring the chamber into it at all. Hence his distinction between the imp-
ressions and ideas in terms of the vague and unsatisfactory force and vivacity. 
The chamber is an identity and all ~entities are fictions based upon our 
"broken" but resembling perceptions. The distinction between the impressions 
and :Xi eas is supposed to be made independently of the fictions, for it forms 
an essential part of his account of the creation of the~ictions. 
Hume never gives examples of impressions or ideas as s uch. Not only in 
the early sections but throughout the book, all his example s are of things in 
the world - mountains , houses, trees , his chamber, table, books . He has no 
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choice, for to speak meaningfully he must speak of the things which we see 
or imagine. But when he speaks of impressions and ideas without giving any 
examples, then they are not things in the world. Nor are they always merely 
intra-mental objects - they are often both objects and the consciousness of 
them. This ambiguity is inherent in his use of the term ~erceptiori1 which 
can mean the perceiving or the perceived or both at once. In the last case, 
the consciousness of the object and the object of consciousness are identified. 





THE ILLUSION. OF IMMANENCE * 
What leads Hume to treat i mpressions and ideas as things when he is 
giving illustrations but as internal and perishing existences when he is 
not? Both impressions and ideas are called perceptions and there is no 
hard and fast distinction between them. An idea corresponds to what is 
. ' 
now called a mental image . It is easy to regard a mental image as some 
sort of entity. But it obviously is not in the world like a table or a 
chair or even a mirage or a rainbow • It is spatial if it is visual, but 
. it isn ' t one of the things in the common space, spatially related to all 
the other things in the world. It is not situated anywhere . But it is 
an image, isn't it? It must be somewhere , musn ' t it? But not in the world. 
In the mind? Well, the mind is not of course a place, but there are minds, 
aren't there? So it must be in the mind , an intra- mental object , an in-
ternal and perishing existence. 
Images come and go, the argument might continue, and when they go they 
are no more , they do not exist. They are exactly as they appear - there is 
no more to them than appears, than we are aware of. We are aware of a mental 
image or there is no mental image, and we are entirely aware of all of it. 
Hume partly recognised this essential point, which oth~rs have sometimes 
failed to recognise - there· is no more to the image than one actually imagines. 
One can go on describing what it is of and imagining more and more of that ~ 
This chapter is based upon the analysis in the first part of 11 L'Imaginaire11 
which Sartre optimistically calls "Le Certain11 • 
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the characteristics of the thing - and a natural illusion for those who 
regard an image as a picture is to suppose that i t is the image they are 
describing, and that there is more in it than they happen to notice at any 
time. But "in" the i mage there is 'nothing that one is not , as it were , 
noticing. How could there be? It would literally be a thing or a picture 
then ; one would be seeing it. 
We cannot be mistaken about anything in it , for "this wer e to suppose 
that even wher e we are mcs t intimately conscious , we might be mistaken" . We 
can make mistakes about things; we cannot make mistakes about mental images 
they are, one might think, exactLy as they appear. But they are very like 
what we see . They can be quite detailed. Exact copies, one might s ay. 
But fainter , sketchier. Hence, they differ only in force and vivacity, "not 
).n nature". And as an i dea or mental image is an object , but only an intra-
mental object , an internal and perishing existence , so is an impression: it 
is just more forceful and vivacious . 
When Hume speaks of them as objects , though he uses the word in mor e than 
one sense , he is not necessarily confusing them with things in the world 
(objects of belief), for he does indeed r egard them as the immediate given 
objects of consci ousness , and in a sense the only objects , which , however , we 
take to be external , continuing existences , things in thP. world. But it 
is not only by r eason of the language that , in giving examples , he has to 
r efer to things in the world. The fundamental r eason is that an idea or 
image :i3 always an idea or image of something, whether the something actually 
exists or do es not exist , whether it is a fiction or a mere possibility or a 





"I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that 
city, as will perfectly r epresent all its streets and housesoin their r eal 
and just proportions?" (Treatise, P.3) Hume is here talking in the 
natural way, according to the thesis of the world, describing what it is to 
see and mat to imagine Paris. But on his v:ie w of impress ions and ideas 
he has no right to be doing this, for an impression simply is what it is and 
what it appears to be, and so is an idea; they are objects in the mind, not 
in the world. In m at sense could they be of anything? They would have 
to be representations of it, and this Hume emphatically rejects; there is 
no double existence , r epresenting and represented. 
And Hume himself is perfectly well aware that on his theory there is 
strictly no sense in which an i mpression or idea can be of anything. He 
does not realise thaot by the same token an idea could not be an idea of an 
im!X'ession and one could never know that ideas were copies of impressions. 
For one could never remember impressions as such but only have present ideas 
"of memory". "Of memory" would simply mean "more forceful than other ideas"~ 
But he knows that an impression or idea cannot strictly be of anything. Hence 
"to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing; 
the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of 
which in itself it bears no mark or character." (Treatise, P.20) It is like 
a picture of a landscape, which is just a patchwork of colours on canvas. His 
account of the "idea of existence" follows 
0 
accordingly :"' 
0 "There fu no ~mpr~ssion or idea of any kind , of which we have any con- I 
I' 
(1 
sciousness or memory, that is not conceived as existent; and 'tis evident , 
that from this consciousness the mos t perfect idea and assurance of being is 
derived •••• The idea of existence, then , is the very same with the idea of what 
- 32-
we conceive to be existent. To reflect on anything simply, and to reflect 
on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when 
conjoined with the idea of an object, makes no addition to it. Whatever 
we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the 
idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form." 
(Treatise , pp.66- 7) . 
What exists is impressions and ideas and nothing else. The idea of an 
object and the idea ~ an object - the idea-object - are the same thing: the 
idea is itself the object and the only object. That :is the theory which all 
' his examples confound. 
The things in the world, his chamber, mountains, trees, the buildings 
and streets of Paris, all that in the ordinary way we say exists , are objects 
~of belief, i.e., ideas enlivened by belief or assent. But all ideas in Hume ' s 
terms ·exist, and it is not in point of existence that one idea di ffers from 
another . His problem r emains unsolved: how we can have an image of anything 
when the i mage is . it. What I image has its place in the world; it is not 
my image, though i believe i t exists ; my image is of it , or in other words , 
I am imaging it. Not for a moment do I take my image of the Pan- Am building 
for the Pan- Am building. Bu·t that is certai nly what I am imaging; I mean 
that very building in New York; it is of 11 that I have an i mage. It does 
not help Hume in the slightest to say that the reference of an idea to an 
object is an extraneous denomination; no such reference would be possible on 
his theory. On. his theory, you could not imagine the buildings of Paris , 
for your present lively ideas, enlivened by belief, would be the buildings 
of Paris . Your enlivened image would be not of them , but them. I3ut the evi -
dence of r eflexion is decisive: when I image the streets of Par.is , and when I 
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imagine myself .ther e , the thesis of the world is effective , and what I mean 
is that very city 4000 miles away, not my image. The i mage is not an en-
tity. When I (here) imagine Paris ( there), I am said to be having an image, 
but this is only one way of talking. If an image we r e a picture it could be 
looked at , but one can never look at it ; all one can do is to imagine more. 
Hume ' s doctri ne of i mpressions and ideas has its source in the theory of 
sensation. "'Tis certain , that the mind , in its perceptions, must begi n 
somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas , 
t here must be some impressions , which without any introduction make their 
appearance i n the soUl . As they depend upon natural and physical causes , 
i the examination of them wou ' d lead me too far from my present subject , into 
the sciences of anatomy and nat ural philosophy ." (Tr eatise , P. 275 ) The 
..t:omplex impression "as it makes its appearance in the soul" is assimilated to 
the mental image ; it is simpl1 more forceful and vi vid . If one r egards the 
mental image as an intra- mental entity or object, it is easy to r egard what 
it is of as being that which it resembles, of which it is a copy, and hence 
to r egard thi~· original as be ing also an intra-mental entity , an internal and 
perishing existence . An impression then is just a l i vely mental image. 
The ordinary dis·t inction between seeing (or touching or hearing) and 
imagining, according to which an identical obj ect can be seen or i magined , is 
a distinction between two types of consciousness of an object , two ways of 
" 
"intending" it , of having it in mind. Hume , ha1ever, puts the distinction 
into the substitute intra- mental object s . I can see St. Paul ' s or I can 
imagine St . Paul ' s . For Hume, in the first case ther e is a lively object, 
and in the second case a. l ess lively one which is like it . (How it could be 
• 
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known to be like it, Hume never explains.) There are two objects , not onez 
what is called seeing goes into the one , and what is called imaging or 
imagining goes into the other. But though Hume in this way identifies the 
object of consciousness and the consciousness df the object, as the very word 
"perception" in hi s usage implies, he also retains a mind or consciousness 
" which is not identified with the object , and in terms of which the distinct-
ion between seeing and imagining is also made. He has thus two parallel 
distinctions: (a) in terms of the for ce and vivacity of the object, and (b) 
in terms of the liveliness with which we apprehend it, the manner of our ap-
prehension. (Treatise, P.96) 
Hume, as I have said , takes the mind for granted, even when he is reducing 
personal identity to "nothing but a bundle or collection of different per-
ceptions" . The propensit~es, dispositions, acti vities, and operations of the 
mind are repeatedly invoked. How these are to be reconciled with the quasi-
mechanical principles of association, whereby Hume attempts to account for as 
much of experience as he possibly can, is nowhere explained. \'lhere the 
principles o:f, association are employed, the mind - if there were a mind would 
be a purely passive, r eceptive, contemplative consciousness . Even the passions 
- the impressions of reflexion - when regarded from this point of view would 
occur to an essentially unmoved, unimpassioned consciousness . But it is evi-
dent that Hume does not al. ways conceive the mind in this way. It has "command 
over all it.s ideas" , (Treatise , P. 624) it is enlivened ty an impression and 
"enlivens " an idea. And identity is the product of the imagination. But 
Hume expounds no theory of the mind or consciousness, but only of the intra-
mental objects and the obj ects of belief, the ficti·tious identities c£ the 
imagination • ... 
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This is one of the most important sources of ambiguity in Hume ' s. theory; 
the object of consciousness and the consciousness of the object are identified 
in the perception, but there i s still a mind or consciousness left over of 
which the perception is an object. It :is entirely uncertain whether Hume 
recognised any· distinction between a lively idea and the lively apprehension 
of an idea. At any rate, he treats them as interchangeable and this is per-
fectly natural . To apprehend something in a lively manner is to apprehend 
something lively. The intenti onal act or noesis and the intentional object 
or noema correspond. But Hume never actuall y makes this point, and it would 
be far-fetched to extract a doctrine of in·~entionali ty from his work. It 
would be completely at odds with his doctrine of imp'ressions and ideas and 
the principles of association, and with his view of the mental image as an 
entity or intra-mental object, a sort of picture having no essential relations 
to whatever it might be thoughtto picture. 
Hume ' s descripti on of any idea or image is in effect a description c£ a 
thing in the world, which he assumes in the common sense way to be fully de-
M 
t erminate , and just~the thing can be reduced to the sum of its abstracted 
qualitie s o.nd dimensions, so also can the image - it is nothing but its "pure" 
qualities and these are t he immediate data of consciousness. One cannot be 
in error about these - t hey are ent irely as they appear. He never ceases 
to identi fy t he det er minat e , objective qualities of things with ~at is im-
mediately gi.ven in di rect experie nce, for t he t hings in t he world, the fictions , 
are entirely r educi ble to the immediate data. 
Some qualities , such as visible shape and colour , which are obviously 
not t he same quality, raise a serious problem for Hume , for t hey cannot be 
r eear ded as separate i mpressions . Flying i n the face of his distincti on 
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between them, he insists that what is not separable is not distinguishable , 
and then goes on to show that it is - by means of comparioon of things alike 
in colour but not in shape or alike in Shape but not in colour. He simply 
contradicts himself, for what is not separable in this case , quite plainly 
is distinguishable. Why does he insist again and again that what is not 
separable is not distinguishable? He identifies what is given with the 
qualities of things in the world, regardless of the fact that these different 
qualities are singled out or abstracted in predication and are not given , each 
of them, so to speak, on its own on a plate . Two of these qualities are ob-
viously shape and colour, but no less obviously there cart be no impression of 
uncoloured shape nor of unshaped colour. So there cannot be any distinction. 
But there is. Having d~nied it, he has to make it. (Treatise, P.25) Hume 
would never land himself in such a position if he did not have to. He had to 
do so , because he always assumed with Berkeley that what was given were the 
qualities of things , and these he identified with the impressions. But , if I 
may repeat the point yet again, whenever he takes an example of an impression 
or idea or describe s one , it is a thing he refers to and describes. But some-
times he also means an appearance of a thing, and of this I shall have more to 
say , for as I shall show it is far more plausible in some r espects to identify 
the mental image as a copy of an appearance of a thing, than as a copy of a 
thing. 
But fir~t, the mental image itself , which i s his fundamental model. It 
is regarded as an intra- mental object . But if one asks how one mental image 
is distinguished from another or how it is idm tified , the answer has to be 
in terms of what it is of. This applies no less to the purely imaginary 
than to images of existing things or people . The distinction between an image 
I·' 
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of Lyndon B. Johnson and an image of Dean Rusk is the distinction between 
L. B.J. and Dean Rusk. If one asks how high an image of L.B. J . is, there is 
no answer , for it is only things in the common space that have a measurable 
and determinable height, breadth or depth. An image of L.B.J. is "spatial", 
but it has no height for it is not in space. The space is a quasi- space and 
the height a quasi- height. So also for the temporal characteristic. . An 
image of L.B.J. at the Democratic Convention last August is not last August , 
nor is a bodily image of the heat in the hall. The time of the image is a 
quasi- timeo The questions "when?", "where?", "how tall?" and so on can only 
be asked of what the image is of . There is no difficulty in saying or guessing 
the dimensions ~~d the date of what I am imaging - these are the date and -
dimensions, which one may read about in the newspapers. I may get the date 
wrong or the dimensions wrong, but for them to be wrong there must be the 
i correct date and dimensions. But the image has none - it is "quasi-" through 
and through. One cannot be wrong or right about its .dimensions. To image 
a small thing and image a huge thing is not to have a small image and a huge 
image . The difference is in the things. The image , as Sartre says, is a 
consciousness of ••• , an imaging, an imaging consciousness, and since it is 
just an imaging there is nothing " in" the image but what one actually images. 
Hence it cannot be examined and scrutinised as a pfuture can be, for there is 
nothing to scrutinise or examine . 
One cannot ask how distant the image is ; for there" is no answer to the 
q1:1.estion "distant from wha·t;?" In an image of someone at a distance the dis-
tance is imaged like everything else; one can have an image of L.B. J . at 
50 yards, but not an image at 50 yards of L. B.Jo If it is an image of a 





an image at six feet of a picture , not a picture of a picture. It is of 
course partly because pictures , which are things, are also usually of things, 
that mental images are regarded as a kind of picture : to image something is 
to picture it, to quasi- see it. And indeed the fact that pictures, sculptur es 
and models are of things probably underlies all doctrines which make the ob-
ject of consciousness a representation of something, including of course the 
doctrine of representative perception. 
The only reason for making a distinction between imaging and imagining in 
this context is that one can image , for example, someone ' s face nowhere in 
I_ 
particular, at no particular distance and in no particular situation, but one 
can also imagine him sitting in a chair across the room talking and oneself 
sitting at a certai n distance from him. That is to say one imagines a sit-
uation with oneself in it looki ng at someone else. In making up a story, 
one imagines also the situation in a wider sense-the scene imaged gets its 
significance from this. In imaging someone at some distance, the imagined 
situation gene rally includes oneself, the imaged "over there" is in relation 
to the imagined "he re". One imagines oneself bodily in a certain situation , 
though as in seeing something from a certain position, the consciousness of 
one ' s own body is implicit, or non- thetic. (cf. L'Imaginaire , P. 23) 
Imagining a situation and imagining that something is the case can amount to 
t he same thing. " Imagining'' of course has other meanings too; it can , for 
4\ 
exampl e , mean "believi ng falsely". But that does not r eally affect this 
analysis. 
One need not , however , i magine any situat ion or context or place in order 
to image someone or somethi ng , , or t o image a smel l or t aste or "feel" or a 






feature of his face clearly: one may be quite unable to recall the colour 
of his eyes, for example, or what his teeth are like though one is imaging 
him with a broad grin. Mental images are not "determinate in quality and 
quantity. " Furthermore, vividness may be entirely independent of detail , 
being essentially affective , as I shall try to show at a later stage. 
Whether one is seeing L. B.J. or imaging L.B.J., it is the same man that 
one is seeing or imagining. If it were any sort of simulacrum or picture 
that one had before one in imaging, how would one know it was a simulacrum 
or of whom it was a simulacrum? To know this one would have to remember the 
original and to remember the original would be just to have that or another 
simulacrum. This is essentially the difficulty that Hume is in when he 
asserts that ideas are copies of impressions. The ans~er to the question 
"what are you ima.--sining?" or "what is your image of?" is not simply dete rmined 
by the .form of the question. If one :is imaging a certain person it could 
not be anyone or anything but that very person one ~ imaging. Only the 
view of the image as a mental occurrence , a mental picture or scene on the 
stage of one's inner theatre which one introspects could hav~ led people to 
suppose Qtherwise . One means the very person one images , and that person 
is certainly not in person on any stage "in one ' s mind". That person may 
not be wher e one imaeines him and of course , in the case of a memory i mage , 
not at the time one imagines him. He may be dead thoueh one imagines him 
alive or as he was when alive . 
~ 
But the image is not an occurrence inde-
pendent of the meant ii entity, the object or person , which is imaeed. That 
is Hume ' s theory, and later Runsell's theory; the identity is a construction 
out of intra- mental occurrences. 









or person i~age~. The positing of the object as existing elsewhere , as 
absent , as no longer existing, as non-existent, as possible or "neutral" is 
essential . To image a dragon , to imagine a situation that might have been 
but was not , or is not yet but may be , is to posit them as non- existent or 
not having been or yet to be. That is to say, one assumes the world in 
which some things are and some things aren't, some things and events have 
been, have happened , and some things haven't . One ' s true beliefs and one ' s 
false beliefs equally presuppose the world, which is as it is , independently 
of what one believes. The thesis of the world is that the world is as . one 
knows it but there is much mere to it than one knows . All that one imagines 
or images assumes the world , and the thesis of the world is based above all 
on our being bodily in the midst of it , inhabiting it. To be in the world 
is to be situated in r elation to what else there is or was , near or remote in 
time or space. 
A theory which , like Hume ' s, takes a mental image to be an entity , hy-
postatises a kind of consciousness of things, and makes this hypffitasis what 
i we are conscious of. But what we are conscious of is simply wha.t we imagine 
the thing or person or situation . There are no intra- mental entities ; all 
there is is in the world . 
To r emember or r eca.ll :is to be conscious of what is past. But in the 
Humean a.nd similar later theories one cannot literally do this , for what is 
"' 
past is no more ~nd whatever one is conscious of must be present now. Past-
ness has the r efore to be, or be r educible to , sono characteristic cf what is 
present ; the passage of time has , as it wer e, t o be r epresented by dates stamped 
on what is present . The " present" itself becomes an enti r ely nue;atory concept. 






the objects of consciousness, what one sees or imagines,is in consciousness, 
in the mind, an intra- mental entity. But what one is remembering, thinking 
of, imagining, does not need to be now any more than it needs to be here. 
In any case , these words have no meaning except in relation to "then" and 
"there". There is only one answer to the question what I am imagining when 
I imagine my flat in Edinburgh, and only one answer to the question what I 
am remembering when I recall a party in it four years ago. If I were not 
here and now, it would not be there and " ago", as I think of it. 
One need never speak of mental images at all. I suspect that the ex-
pression is inherited from introspectionist psychology and philosophy, according 
to which there were two domains in which events occurred and could be ob-
served : the world and the mind. The natural way of talking is to say one 
imagines something or fancies something. But the view that when one "has 
an image", one is contemplating an intra- men tal entity is deeply rooted. When 
one denies this, one is often taken to be denying that people have mental 
images. One man, for example, will assert emphatically that in doing a cal-
" culation he reads the answer off the slide rule i n his head. This is not 
only a ~gitimate use of the English language ; it is an excellent description. 
But' there is no slide rule in his head , nor is he literally reading off the 
ll .. •\ !> .. .r..\ 't·• "\ 
slide rule . He is imagining t he slide rule, the setting, and what it would 
read .- This is a perfectly ncr mal way of doing mental calculations ; some 
people imagi~e a blackboardo To think in i mages is nol to contemplate or 









THE ILLUSION OF REAL APPEARANCES 
The impressions that Hume has in mind are for the most part visual , and 
such an impression has to be thought of as a flat patchwork of colours at no 
distance . Owing to his constant reference to things,impressions are also 
identifiable with qualities of things , e.g. the redness and shine of an apple , 
and there is no doubt that Hume thought of them in this way quite often. But 
strictly, as he makes plain when he insists that "our sight informs us not of 
outness" , the visual impression is a flat patchwork. What it corresponds to 
is the visual field or more narrowly to one appearance of a thing, in the visual 
' 
field . It is "determinate in quality and quantity", not only_ of a definite 
colour but of a definite size, and shape . 
The mistake which he makes is not confined to those who have held that our 
sight informs us not of outness . It is simply the belief that the size and 
shape of an appearance of a thing are determinate or determinable . Once again 
the trouble arises from, or is at least accentuated by , regarding an appearance 
as_ if it were a picture, and the camera has if anything tended to confirm the 
illusion. A determinable JB ngth, breadth or height is a rre asurable dimension, 
and such dimensions are defined operationally by specifying the standard and 
the procedure. There is no problem, apart from the technical, about measuring 
things. The length , breadth or height of any familia~ thing may be measured 
qy some invariant standard w~in certain limits of accuracy, whether this is 
done by stretching a tape measure along it , or indirectly by theodolite and · 
triangulation , or by some other means . Shape may also be specified geometric-
ally by the additional measurement of angles and curves . And so by other means 
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for volume , weight, density, specific gravity. This is what quantitative 
determination means . It is nonsense to say that a quantity is determinate 
when it cannot in principle be determined, and that, as I shall shov, is 
precisely what is alleged when appearances of things are held to be of de-
terminate size . When something is measured in the standard way, the result 
in feet and inches or in metres and centimetres is said to be the length or 
breadth or height. Whether the thing is 50 miles away or close at hand, no 
matter how anyone sees it or how it looks, these are its . measurements which 
may be verified. . That is what objective ne asurernent, quantitative determin-
ation, means • (It can of course be vastly more complicated and indirect than 
._- roy simple ~xamples suggest, but my point is not affected.) 
Measurement is taken so much for granted, that people of ten talk happily 
about real and apparent size without realising that they are talking about 
what , in a peculiar sense , are inconunensurables ; the sense being that one of 
them is not mensurable. The size of a thing as seen is always an apparent 
size. To see the real size of something is to estimate how big it actually 
is from the look of it, from the apparent size, taking account of the distance 
and comparison with other things of known size. The notion of real or actual 
or objective size is incomprehensibl e without reference to measurement. The 
estimation of height and distance depends on practice and experience , and no 
doubt , since some people are hopel ess at it , on some kind of flair . With 
"' practice , on familiar territory, it becomes prompt and rapid ; a look is enough. 
One can then say, loosely , that one sees the r eal size . Similarly the prac-
t ised eye can see the weight of a bullock . But no one, so far as I knO'l , 
speaks of the r eal and apparent weights of a bullock: i t would make just as 
good sense , and would indeed form an exact parallel to the way in whi ch the ex-
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pressions "real size" and " apparent size" are commonly used. A standard. of 
measurement can be very rough, one's own height , for example. If one is of 
average height and one finds a man when close at hand "much smaller than he 
looked" it is not difficult to see what standard one is using from long habit. 
Since things look bigger when they are nearer and smaller when they are 
further away , in a certain sense - perspectivally, it is sometimes supposed 
that the actual height of the appearance to an observer at any point is de-
terminate, that is , that it can be determined by measurement. But this is 
not so. If one holds a ruler at arm ' s length, closes one eye, and "measures" 
a distant tree against the ruler , 0ne has measured neither the height of the 
tree nor the height of the appearance of the t r ee . One could roughly measure 
the tree in this way if one knew the distance from the eye to the ruler and 
from the ruler to the tree . Very r oughly! But merely by holding up the 
ruler and looking at what the tree "measures" against it , one has not measured 
anything. Has one then measured the he ight of the appearance of the tree to 
someone standing where on~ is standing? Again no. For if one holds the rul er 
at half arm ' s l ength, it measures less on the ruler than it does at full arm ' s 
length. And if one thinks t~ specify that the ruler must be held at full arm ' s 
l ength , what one is doing is treating the tree as if it were a picture of a 
tree on which the ruler is laid. But the tree is not at arm ' s length , nor is 
the appearance of the treeo If the tree or the appearance of it were a picture .. 
and the ruler laid on it , the dis t ance from it of the eye v10uld make no difference 
to ·the measurement. The appear ance is no·~ a picture , but even to appear to 
measure it, one must treat it as if it were a pic·~ure at a specified distance 
from the eye . This distance is entirely arbitrary. This kind of "measurement " 
is indeed used to get the proportions rie;ht for a drawine;. But one is not 
measurine; the appearances. One would be if they were pictures at a certain 
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distance from the eye . But they are not . One can measure the two lines 
drawn on the blackboard to produce the ~~ller-Lyer illusion: they are found 
to be equal . One cannot measure the . apparent inequality and say how much 
longer one appears than the other. Similarly, one cannot measure the angle 
of apparent convergence of the lines in the Zollner illusion, nor how much 
bigger the moon appears at the horizon than at the zenith. 
The assumption that the size and shape of appearances ar e determinate or 
determinable makes some discussions of the constancies of size and shape · 
strictly unintelligible. It is sometimes supposed that the relative sizes 
of things as we see them could be compar ed· with or measured against their 
relative sizes as these are projected on the retina or on a photographic plate 
where we are ~tanding. This is of cour se a fallacy: they cannot be compared 
for there is nothing to compare. What we see as we see it, is not another 
picture . or an image like the one on the retina, but simply the thing itself 
as we see it . That is all an appearance is. All sizes of things as we see 
them are apparent sizes. 
An appearance, like a mental image, is nowhere. It is not an object, 
and not , as Kant would say, determinable as an object. The house I look at 
over ther e through the window is so determinable - its dimensions, the materials 
and their properties. But not the appearance of the house . The two sides 
of the house and the roof I can see from here are not the appearance : they 
" are the parts of the house that are visible from here. They are determinable 
as objects. To determine the appearance one would have to find it , and where 
is it? Not wher e the house is , not where the eye is, not on the retina, and 
nowhere in between. But there is an appearance? Only in a sense analogous 
to that in which there are mental images. The appearance of the house is 
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simply my seeing the house, how I see the house, the house as I see it, how 
the house looks to me , the look of the house. There is an appearance in the 
same sense as there is a look. But all that comes between the house and me 
is the ground arid the other things on i t - two trees, a wall , a shed ·and some 
' grass , possibly a haze. 
But isn ' t the appearance , it may be asked , smaller from here than if you 
were standing on the grass? Translated, this question runs: Doesn ' t the 
house look smaller from here than it would if you were standing on the grass? 
There are two answers to this . (1) Yes, that's because I ' m further away from 
it than if I were standing on the grass. (2) No, it looks the same size but 
further away than if I were standing on the grass. To give one answer and 
think of the other is to find it no less true . 
It is obviously true that things look smaller the further away they are -
at the ·limit they can be mere specks on the horizon. It is no less true that, 
for example, the Pan- Am building in New York can still look enormous '· and in-
deed peculiarly enormous, at a distance of six or seven miles. But things 
look the way they look, the way we see them. "The way they look to us" and 
"the way we see them" are correlative and interchangeable expressions. The 
things as we see them, the way we see them , is the way they look to us. That 
is what appearances are , the looks of things. An appearance cannot have a 
determinate size or shape , because i t is not a thing. Nor is it anywhere, 
nor in two dimensions , nor in three . One may say indifferently that one se~s 
or observes the thing, or the l ook or appearance of the thing, but the look 
or appearance of the thing is mer ely the way the t hing looY.s as one sees it. 
Looks are not de·terminable as obj ec·ts , for they are not objectn . 
The view that "our sight informs us not of (l.i3tance or outness ( so to speak) 
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immediately and without a certain reasoning and experience , as is acknow-
ledg ' d by the most rational philosophers" leads almost infallibly to the 
illusion of real appearances. The appearance thus hypostati sed is easily 
assimilable to the hypostatised mental image , which is indeed at no distance 
whatsoever , since it is not in space at all, but which is regarded as a sort 
of pict ure , and of course pictures are flat. Hume constantly assumes that 
visual per ception was "or;iginally" in the flat, not in depth, but never ex-
plains how depth is derived from br eadth and height , nor how breadth and height 
I 
could be per ceived at no distance at all . The problem is not to know what 
it i s to see i n depth - that is the way we do see - but what it would be like 
not to. !fuat could "s eei ng two- dimensionally" possibly mean? How could we 
see in two if we didn ' t see in t hree? By this, I do not mean how we could 
, 
see things or patches si de by side or one above t he other if we did not see 
one before or behind the other , but how we could s ee them side by side if we 
were i n the same flat plane as t hem. Where would t he plane be? 
Hume , perhaps be cause he r eali sed the absurdity , never menti ons babies 
in this connecti on, though i t is very hard to imagine what wo- dimensional seeing 
If 
could refer to except the way babies might naively be supposed to see . . The 
power and ability t o see , to f i xate , develop in t he f irs t few months after bi rth. 
At what point an infant can r easonably be sai d to be seeing ·t hi ngs i s not very 
easy to deter~ine . Sight continues normally to devel op ther eafter . But i t 
• is entir ely meaningless t o say that an infant sees two-~imens.ionally , ever. 
Though the dist i nction i s simple , the conf usion is often made between seeing 
i n dept h and judging distance accor ding to some lll3 asure or even sayi ng whi ch of 
t wo distances is t he l onger. Judging di stance is very t ricky. Seeing i n 
._· depth is no·t . To see :is to see i n depth. To see anything is to l ook at it , 
r 
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fix it , attend to it , make it the form of the Gestalt . To do this , it has 
to be at a distance . If it is too close, it cannot be seen - you draw your 
head back to get a sight of it. To see something is to see what it is or to 
try to make out what it is. When something moves in the margin of vision, 
what we see is movement; to see what it is, we must look and fix it. One 
isn ' t seeing anything properly when one is day-dreaming with the eyes open -
except intermittently - for to see anything is to look at it, attend to it, 
whether it is a broad landscape or some particular, feature of it. 
7 
Whatever 
is seen is seen at some distance . 
The distance to the house I see is determinable just like the height of 
the house. 'JuRt as the dimensions of the house may be measured , so may the 
ground between the house and me. But the look of the distance cannot be 
measured any more than the look of the house. What I see is of cour se the 
ground , the two trees , the w,a.ll , the shed, ranged between the house and me , 
and covering a certain distance : let me call that the distance for short. 
For the house to look as it does , the distance must look as i ·t does. To see 
the house as we see it , we must see the distance as we see it, and to see the 
distance as we see it , we must see the house as we see it. One does not see 
cr tiu.. o(,;,;t&e ... u-
the house and the distance but the house at a distanceAto the house . The look 
of the house and of the distance , that is to say, are parts of a whole , of a 
configuration , or ensemble or Gestalt . Their relations are internal, not ex-
ternal : Lhey mutually imply each other. That is why or1\J can give two answers 
to the question: Does the house look smaller from here than if you were standing 
on the grasn? \'/hen one says "yes" , one is attending rather to the look of the 
house . \'lhcn one oo.ys "no", one is attending rathe r to the look of the distance . 
There is of course no contradiction for the loolc of the houoc or the distance , 
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the appearances, are simply the way we see the house at a distance or the 
distance to the house. 
In estimating what the distance is, there is no doubt at all about the 
importance of "reasoning and experience". Open- air people can judge distances 
well in their own territories, whether in temporal ("time to walk" ) or spatial 
terms , but not in other territories where the atmosphere is clearer or hazier, 
the trees more or less numerous , and so on. \7hat one learns is what things 
look like when they are, say, a mile away under various conditions in this 
territory. An actual distance as measured cannot be compared with an apparent 
distance but only with what you judge the· distance to be. The look of the 
distance , tne distance as you see it cannot be compared with anything but only 
with anothe r look, any more tl~ the height of the hous~ as you see it can be 
compared with the measured height of the house. Some people achieve remarkable 
accuracy in estimatin8' heights, lengths and distances. It is as if they could 
see the mileage. But unless one has occasion to make such estimates for one 
purpose or another , one just does. not do it . One sees things in reach or near 
or f urther or far away. But beyond the reach of the arm it is not easy without 
deliberate practice to guess how far . One has to calcula·te how far it is even 
to the wall of the room. But one sees where the wall is and the floor from 
here to the wall . One can only measure t he distance, not the distance as we 
see it, not the appearance of the distance , ~tlL~r~ld~~ 
" not the look of the floor from here to the wall , but only the floor itself. 
If I seem to· have laboured the point that to see is to see in depth, my 
excuse must be that it is frequrn tly forgotten . It is rarely denied ; peopl e 




of ~bsurdity wh~ch crops up in discussion of the constancies: the suggestion 
that real and apparent sizes can be compared. Another example is the suggestion 
that the depth of the circula~ rim of a bowl as drawn by a normal person rep-
resents a compromise bet~een the circularity which he knows it to have and 
the retinal projection . This kind of view really amounts to the old judge-
mental, intellectualist theory of perception, possibly transferred to the 
"unconscious" and therefore beyond the reach of argument. What the normal 
person draws is an attempt to represent the bowl as he sees it, the way it 
looks. Essentially the same point crops up in discussions of how the words 
"circle" and "square" come to be applied to so many different "apparent" shapes , 
i . e., skew projections of circles and squares. To understand this "problem" 
at all one has t o assume that these diffe rent shapes are all in the flat. If 
that wer e so it would be quite i mpossible to i magine how the different shapes 
could ever be r ecognised as circular or square . But these words are simply 
not applied to skew projections of circles and squares. They are applied to 
things seen in depth. I could not see the penny lying flat on the window-sill 
six feet away if I saw it head-on. There is no skew projection af the penny 
as we see it , nor was there ever. What we see is a penny at an angle . 
To see thi ngs in depth is to see them from where one is and therefor e as 
~ havine another side which is out of sieht. I-t; is not necessary , and it is 
indeed implausi ble to suppose tha·t children who drav1 a face in profile with 
' " bot h eyes staring straigh·t out o.re doing anything but trying to represent the 
face as they see it . The face ·is seen as having another side with another eye 
corre sponding to this one. The representation of what is visible in more or 
less 'photographic" :rr oportions has to be learned somewhat laboriously. But 








children to do naturally. 
The standard blackboard illusions are appearances of a kind which we 
normally never consider illusory partly because we do not go around measuring 
the sizes of things we see and comparing one size with another. The Mr;ller-
Lyer illusion admirably illustrates a commonplace: that measurably equal 
lengths or areas on one surface can look very different. This fact is of 
course constantly exploited in architecture. To cite a very simple example, 
the wall of a building may be given height by putting tall narrow windows in 
the ground floor and somewhat shorter ones above. Though the wall is square, 
it will look taller than it is wide. If the apparent inequality of the lines 
,,, 
in the Mull~r-Lyer is to be called illusory - and in a sense it is illusory -
it is important to remember that a vast proportion of our perceptual experience 
is also illusory by the same token. The r eason for doubting whether one ought 
to call it illusory is that it is normally quite reliable and lets us down 
mainly where measurement is required, e.g., when we buy a pair of curtains that 
look the right size for our window. Two measurably equal rooms can look quite 
different in size according to the d1cor. The same room can look cramped or 
spacious . The decorator l earns what makes rooms look bigger, taller, or wider; 
the dressmaker learns ~at slims fat women , narrows broad shoulders, etc. , One 
of the commonest illusions is that the eyes are in the upper half of tho head. 
Another is that the legs are very much longer than the arms. 
"' Hypostatised appearances ru1d images and the illusion of immanence all belong 
to the same kind of doctrine , in which what we call things have somehow to be 
constructed out of t hese hypostases regarded as data. 
be r egarded as a datum, a 
ceptual experience. All 
pure datum, or rather only our 
/ ;-{)tt'J/i':-;-... 
one can ~9/~~-t~ ~' -·1'talyse that . (;( i~J 
~v 
In my view nothing can 
on&oing, actual per-
On this view, the 
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appearance of a thing is the look of it, the way it looks to me, the way I 
see it. Without the seeing and . the seen, me and it, there could be no 
appearance. This not only seems tautological; it is. To see is to see 
something from somewhere; to see it as one sees it is to see it as it looks. 
One cannot see anything except as it looks. This is not tq deny, but to 
affirm and insist, that it looks , or may look , different when one has learned 
more about it , which mostly consists in looking and examining. But to r egard 
the look or the appearance as an entity is to make a false hypostasis. The 
appearance is nowhere . Nor is the image anywhere. 
Whether one is seeing or imagining, one is where one is bodily. In 
seeing, tpe object is present; it is it one sees and one sees it where it is 
from where one is oneself. But in imaginingJ it is not bodily present to 
one ' s own body , one ' s mn eyes . One images it as one saw it , though it is 
not present to be looked at, to be explored and examined. One imagines it 
the way it looked , the configuration, the situation, the physiognomy. In 
remembering a pretty girl , one may have forgotten - if one every noticed - the 
colour of the eyes, the length of the nose , how far the hair came down the 
neck; one cannot look, for there is nothing to look at. But one remembers 
the expression, the smile , the charm , the twinkle in the eye , the walk - the · 




THINGS AND APPEARANCES 
The objective characteristics of anything are the determinable, veri-
fiable characteristics, to be determined by standard procedures under standard 
conditions , which are never completely specified. But is a thing not re-
ducible to all its appearances - all the looks of the thing? No: neither 
to one of t he appearances, nor to all of them, whatever "all" mi ght mean. 
But it is apprehended or constituted as one thing through the appearances, 
the diverse and changing appearances. 
Let us take for example a house. There is no look, no appearance apart 
from the way I see the house , the way it looks to me . As I walk round it, 
the look changes , but the house is like the ground under my f eet : it stays 
where it is and does not change position. It is because it stays where it 
is that the appear ance changes as I move . If the front did not "close up" 
as the side comes into view and "broadens out" , I would not be moving bodily, 
nor seeing i n depth. I never cease to see what I see there in depth as a 
house , which stays still while I move . If the appearance were not changing 
as I move , the house would not be staying where it is. It looks different 
from different places , but it is by virtue of looking di fferent that it stays 
the same . I do not just see an oblong shape from straight in front , and a 
~ 
narrowing quadrilateral shape with two parallel and two converging boundaries 
when I move to one side . I see an oblong shape head- on and an oblong shape 
at an angle , staying wher e it i s as I move to one side . 
If the oblong wer e not for eshort ened when looked at from one side it would 







ance, the look of the house, had not changed , the house would have moved , 
or I would not have moved. One ' s own movement over the ground as well as 
by turning the head and body and eyes are an essential part of perceptual 
experience. Movement is in depth and what · one sees is in depth in the same 
space. Things ·would not be seen in depth if they did not look different 
from differen·t places. 
Theories which reduc~ things to their appearances usually treat the 
appearances as flat projections on photographic plates , in spite of the fact 
I 
that a house or a tree , for example , never look flat except when seen in 
silhouette or through a fog, and even then are seen at some distance . It 
is never explained how a third dimension can be derived from two . To treat 
appearances as appearances in depth, on the other hand , is already to treat 
them as appearances of things having another side as well as the visible one . 
The first condition of determination is abstraction , conceptualisation. 
It is always in some r espect that a thing is determined: length, weight , 
volume , mass, melting point, boiling point, acidity. Determination need not 
be quantitative, but it is always, as i t were , dimensional : ·the use of litmus 
to determine acidity is an exrunple . But in the last resort a determinable 
characteristic ia measurabl e directly or indirectly . It is a dimension , de-
fined operationally . 'fhe primary qualities were such dimensions , and the 
distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities was at bottom bet-
ween those which had been found reducible to measure and those which had not. 
"' But det ermina·tion alw~s depends in the last r esort on direct observation. 
To measure the len{;th of a wall i n the ordinary way the tape must be held 
against one end of the wall and ·seen to be against it , or held parallel to it 
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and seen to be parallel to it. The only means of deciding whether any 
measurement is correct is by checking and re- checking, directly or indirectly. 
But what is measured is not the look of the measure and the wall, but the 
wall by the measure . 
In giving an account of perceptual experience , chiefly in t erms of seeing, 
my purpose so farhas been partly to show that the notion of raw data occurring 
to a disembodied consciousness (or in later versions just occurring and assoc-
iating) is unintelligible in relation to actual experience and at best wildl y 
hypothetical as regards infantile experience. To be a body, an embodied 
self, is to be in space in a world of things. From the standpoint of the 
older physiology, and following it , the older psychology, sense experience was 
I 
I 
essentially reducible to the action of a physically determinate environment 
'i 
I on the several specialised senses. The resulting data had no intrinsic con-
neotion and had by regular concomitance to become associa·ted . The theory has 
long since los t its supposed physiological basis : the effect of any stimulus 
is complex and has to be understood in t erms ultimately of the whole organism. 
But quite apart from that, actual sense experience could not be deduced from 
any physiological theory. This experience is of a world which is accessible 
to sight and touch. A thing we see is at a d~tance; we can move towards it 
and touch it. We do not have data to be correlated , associated , and brought 
. 
together into things . The same thing is accessible to sight and touch . The 
tangible is seen and the visible is t ouchedo 
Strict da·ta doctrines cannot sey anythinB' about actual perceptual exper-
i ence, about the experience of seeing, touching, hearing, movi ng about . Nor .I 
can ·they, for example , make the i mportant distinction bet,.,ccn touching and being 
touched, or between me r ely having one 's eyes open and actun.lly looking at things , 
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or between the figure and ground of a Gestalt . They cannot officially and 
explicitly admit that perception is indissolubly ·connected with embodimmt 
and movement , with being in the world , in the midst of things, being "here" 
as a body and seeiug things "there". Data cannot be seen and touched , for 
to see is to see with one ' s eyes , and to touch is to · touch with some part 
of one's body. These facts are smuggled in surreptitiously by classifying 
data o.s visual , tactual and kinaesthetic , as if visuality, tactuality, and kin-
aestheticity, were properties of the data. (Consciousness or awareness, if 
it is admitted, is essentially disembodied and passively receptive .) I say 
11surreptitiously" for . while it could not be admitted that a datum was visibl e 
without admitting that it could be seen , and therefore invi ti.ng the question 
11Where?", it is evidently supposed that it can be plausibly said to be visual 
without being ever actually seen or !'lee- able . 
As I have al:ready r emarked , the mind and its activities and propensities , 
which figure prominently t hrouehout the "Treatise" , do not form part of the 
" system" though the system could hardly be described without r eference to them. 
Again, whenever Hume appeals to the reader's experience as he frequently does, 
his appeal is to reflexion, but he has no explicit doctrine of reflexion. 
What must be taken to be his most considered account of belief as it is given 
in the Appendix (Tr eatise , Pp.628-9) identifies belief with the manner of con-
ceiving an idea, and is of course a reflexive description. Similarly that 
" "the i~nagination has the command over all its ideas'' could only be known re-
flexively . The same point could be made of other passages throughout the 
'"rr eatise". For any descri ption of experience of the world, of subjective 
experience , as distinct from the objective determination of things , is r eflexive. 
Everyone , every day~ offers reflexive descriptions. " I see" is reflexive , and 
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this is not simply a matter of the pronoun : my evidence that anyone else 
sees depends in the last resort on my seeing and this can only be known re-
flexively by actually seeing. So commonplace and indispensable is reflexion 
that it is commonly denied , as for instance by Ryle who employs it constantly 
4. in "The Concept of Mind". 
Hume , as I say , has no explicit doctrine of reflexion but some of the most 
perplexing things about his doctrine have, I think, to be 
failure to recognise.it . The most important of these is 
attributed to his 
the ~ntification of 
the consciousness of the object and the object of consciousness in the "perception", 
the hypostatised appearance and mental image, in which seeing and imagining 
coalesce with the object seen or imagined. But for Hume , the hypostati sed 
impression or idea is itself an object of consciousness. The sense in which 
it may be so regarded is that in which we may be reflexively aware of seeing or 
imagining somethingo To be aware of a mental image as such is simply to be 
reflexively aware of imaging something. 
To Hume ' s hypostasis of the mental i mage and the appearance may be traced 
•~ that version of his doctrine of belief which states that it E the liveliness 
of an idea. This distortion of the language reflects IIume;s identification of 
the imagini ng and what is imagined. Whereas "belief" would in ordinary langUage 
be ascribed to the subject or consciousness , it is here apparently ascribed to 
the object or rather identified with the liveliness of t he object - the ide.a. 
" But the perceptions are themselves also r egarded as objects , and his subsequent 
account of belief is that the mind is enlivened by impressions and itself en-
livens the attendant ideas . 




"impreSSl.On Of reflexion", that is to sa;y, with a feeling or passion Or senti-
ment. Hume for obvious reasons ·never refers to these as objects, but he 
does regard them frequently as identifiable and distinctive events or occur-
ren~~s, which may be, as it were, observed. Each passion is specifically 
different from the others and is recognisable as such. What I have said of 
the impression of sensation, that it is at once consciousness and object, is 
also true of the impression of reflexion. 
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Chapter 7 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE PASSIONS 
In Hume ' s theory of' knowledge as it is presented in the third and fourth 
parts of Book I , the independently existing world, the world of nature , con-
sists of systematically related fictions of the imagination , objects of belief, 
and the occurrence of .the impressions and ideas cannot therefore be ascribed to 
natural causes. But in the first two sections of Book I , and especially in 
Book II , the physiological theory on which the doctrine of impressions and 
ideas was based, emerges clearly, and this theory of course presupposes a 
physical world. 
To illustrate , here is a quaint example from Book I , where Hume i s account-
ing for the mistakes arising from the relations of contiguity and resemblance 
among ideas: 
" ' 'rwou'd have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, 
and have shewn , why upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run 
into all the contiguous traces , and rouze up the other ideas , that are related 
to it . But tho' I have neglected any advantage, whi ch I might have drawn 
from this topic in explaininb t he relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here 
have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes that arise from these 
r elat ions. I shall ther efore observe, that as the m~d is endow ' d with a 
power of exci t ing any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches t he spirits into 
that r egion of t he brain , in which the i dea is plac'd; t hese spirits always 
exci te the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage 
that cell , which )elongs to ·the idea . . But as the i r motion is seldom direct, 
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and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason 
the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related 
ideas in lieu of that , which the mind desir ' d at first to survey. This 
change we are not always sensible of ; but continuing still the same train 
of -thought , make use of the related idea, which is presented to us , and em-
ploy it in our reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded. This 
is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally 
be imagin 'd, and as it wou'd be easy to shew, if there was occasion. " (Treatise , 
P.60-61) 
The same physiological theory underlies Hume 's causal theory of the passions; 
the impressions of sensation are physically caused and themselves cause the 
impressions of reflexion: 
"Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such a s without any 
antecedent perception arise in the soul , from the constitution of the body, 
from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external 
organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some 
of these original ones , either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. 
Of the first kin<:l are all the impressions of the senses , and all bodily pains 
and pleasures: Of the second are the passions , and other emotions resembling 
them. 
"'Tis certain , that the mind , in its perceptions , must begin somewhere ; 
~ 
and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas , there must 
be· some impressions , which without any introduction mn.ke the.ir appearance in 
the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical causes , the examination 
of them wou ' d l ead me too far from my present subject , into the sciences of 





to those other impressions , which I have. call 'd secondary and reflective, as 
arising either from the original impressions, or from their ideas. Bodily 
p~ns and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and con-
sider ' d by the mind ; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, which-
ever you please to call it , without any preceding thought or perception." 
(Treatise, P. 275- 6) 
Bodily pa~ns and pleasures are both in the soul and in the body. From 
the physiological standpoint which underlies his doctrine the same can be said 
of all impressions whatsoever. For "every impression, external and internal , 
passions , affecti ons, sensations, pains and pleasures, are or iginally on the 
same footing; and that whatever other differences we may observe among them, 
they appear, all of them, in their true colours, as impressions or perceptions ." 
(Treatise , P.l90) Though he generally reserves the expression " impressions 
of sensation" for the primary impressions , the secondary impressions are in 
effect sensations too. Hume sometimes distinguishes between the emotions and 
the passions or between the sensations of the passions and the passions , whose 
character is determined by "the general bent or tendency" (P.385), and it is 
evident that what he means by the passion of pride , for example, is the cir-
cumstances of its occurrence as well as the occurrence itself. But all the 
impressions are f elt, and how should they be felt but bodily? But if so, 
~ow are wha.t we call "bodily pains and pleasur es" distinguished from the other 
sensations? 
Hume never expounds the physiological theory on which he r elies , but it 
seems to be essentially similar to the one which Descartes presents in "Les 
Passions de l ' Me" . The passions are caused by the movement of the animal 







In the wider sense, passion is opposed to action, w1d some ideas , which for 
Hume are copies of impressions, and which are called by Descartes "imaginations" , 
are strictly speaking passions . But Descartes on the whole takes passions in 
exactly the same ·sense as Hume. They are "perceptions, or sentiments , or 
emotions of the soul , which are r elated especially to it , and which are caused, 
and sustained, and fortified by some movement of the spirits ." (Art . 27) . 
Sentiments are sensations , as Descartes makes clear in Art.28 : "One may also 
name them sentiments , because they are received in the soul in the same fashion 
as the objects of the external senses and are known by it in the same v1ay" . As 
he goes on to explain in Art . 29, other ''sentiments" we relate to external ob-
.. ·jects such as odours , sounds and colours, and others to our own body , such as 
hunger , thirst and pain . But since "the soul is united to all the parts of 
the body conjointly", a sentiment is evidently in both soul and body, or "in 
the soul , or in· tbe body, whichever you please to call it" . 
Thus from the physiological standpoint, Hume ' s view is near enough to 
Descartes '. Perhaps thi s is to say no more than that physiological doctrines 
from the time of Descartes to that of Hume have a family r esemblance. But 
it is likely enough that Hume had read Descartes' treatise , and that he r egarded 
all sensations as being in a sense in the body , though only some - the bodily 
pains and pleasures - vH~re r eferred to the body . ( In his other doctrine , I 
repeat, the body is,like any other body, a fiction of the imagination, and the 
imagination is as it were a pure disembodied consciousnc;'s .) 
A furthe r passage which casts some light on t he matter occurs in Book IL, 
part 2 , Section VIII , " Of malice and envy. " As I shall show , it is of interest 
from several points of view . In i t , Hume discus8es the effect of compar ison, 
or contrast , in sense perception. He begi ns by r emarking that men "always 
l l 
judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value". 
It might seem difficult to say what in his terms this last phrase "intrinsic 
worth and value" could strictly mean. This tendency to judge of things by 
comparison, he says , "is an original quality of the ~oul , and similar to what 
we have every _day experience of in our bodies •••• Any gentle pain, that 
follows .a violent one, seems as nothing ••• a violent pain, suoeeding a gentle 
one , is doubly _grievous and uneasy. " 
The next paragraph is worth quoting as a whole:-
"This no one can doubt of with regard to our passions and sensations. But 
there may arise some difficulty with r egard to our ideas and objects. · When 
an object augments or diminishes to the eye or imagination from a comparison 
with others, the image and idea of the object are still the same , and are 
equally exte~ded in the -r e tina, and in the brain or organ of perception. The 
eyes r efract the rays of light , and the optic nerve s convey the images to the 
brain in the very same manner, whether a great or small object has preceded; 
nor does even the imagination alter the dimensions of its object on account 
of a comparison with others. The question then is, how f rom the same impression 
nnd the same idea we can form such different judgments concerning the same ob-
I 
j ect , and at one time admire its bulk, and at another despt se its littleness . 
'Phi s va.riation in our judgments must certainly proceed from a variat ion in some 
perception; but as the variation lies not in the immediate impr ession or idea 
"" of the object , it must lie in some other impression, that accompanies it." 
It will be r eme1;1ber ed that when Hume i nsists that our sit;ht i nforms us not 
of outncss , he ins i sts that " properly speaking, ' tis not out body we perceive , 
when we regar d o~r l i mbs and members , but certain impressions , which enter by 





pressions and to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain 
as that which we e.xamine at present. " But the only evidence for believing 
that our sight informs us not of outness is of the kind cited in the above 
passage -" the image and idea of the object are still the same, and are equally 
extended in the retina, and in the brain and organ of perception." 
There is a further curious point about this passage . Hume is seying that 
an impression can look bigger or smaller by contrast, though an i mpression 
strictly is as i ·t appears, and is of determinate size. This paradox is a 
natural error r esulting from the illusion of real appearances. The hypo-
statised appearance is treated as if it were a thing, and like a thing it can 
look bigger or smaller. 
Hume 's explanation is that the emotion is confused with the object. " ••• 
no object is'presented to the senses, nor . image form'd in the fancy , but what 
is accompany ' d with some emotion or movement of the spirits proportioned to it; 
and however custom ~ay make us insensible of this sensation, and cause us to 
confound it with the object or idea, ' twill be easy, by careful and exact ex-
periments, to separate and distinguish them." Not content with this more or 
l ess plausible view, Hume is then carried away and proceeds to suggest that 
"every part of extension , and every unite of number {i. e . the "real" unit or 
minimum sensibile) has a separate emotion attending it ••• and though that 
emotion be not always agreeable, yet by its conjunction with ot hers, and by 
its agitating ·the spirits to a just pitch, it contributes to the production 
of the admi ration, which is always agreeable ." · A great object i s attended 
a. 
withAgreat emotion, a small obj ect with a small. When a great succeeds a 
small , it "rise~ beyond its ordinary proportion" and "we naturally imag-lne 
that the object has likewise increased •• • Those , who are acquainted with the 
·' 
netaphysical part of optics , and know how we transfer the judgments and 
conclusions of the understanding to the senses, will easily conceive this 
whole operation." (Treatise , PP.373- 5) 
MY reason for dealing at some length with what many might consider the 
worst part of Hume ' s doctrine is that much of the better part rests upon it. 
Hume makes no deliberate distinction between the body as an object and the 
body as subject ,. someti~es treating it as the one and sometimes as the other 
without realising that there is any ambiguity. The confusion of perceptual 
and bodily experience with physiological and physical fact and theory is as 
common now as it was then. ~~ essential contention is that one cannot make 
sense of either unless they are distin~ished. 
Hume , I believe , is right in regarding the passions as bodily and right 
in thinking that emotion or affect is never absent from perception, in spite 
of the . fantastic physical account which he attempts to give of.this. His 
doctrine of the passions is of course mainly concerned with the more complexly 
conditioned social passions and sentiments : it constitutes the prolegomena 
to his the ory of morals , with ~hich I shall not be deal ing. The point I am 
concerned with, however, is fundamental in his whole doctrine of the passions 
a."ld of morals . For Hume , percepts cause affects; it follows from this that, 
among other things , all the passions , including the moral sentiments , are 
mechanically caused anrl likewise the moral judgments which express tilem. 
But the foundations of this whole structure lie in physiology , where the 
t erm "impression" originates . Hume , as I have said , identifies the "impression" 
VIi th what would ordlnarily be called the appearance or looJ\. of sofllething, and 
makes of this an cnti ty and causal agent . HumG believes that the passion is 




were , in the form of a value which may be predicated of it. There is no 
evidence for this in perceptual experience. As I shall argue , we see what 
we see as we see it , values and all . The only evidence Hume has for his 
view is of the kind which I have tried to illustrate above - evidence drawn 
from physiological and physical theory . At best, this would be an account , 
not of experience , but of its causes , how ·it comes to be as it is. But 
even as such it will no·~ do , for no evidence of the looks or appearances of 
things is to be found in physical or physiological theory, but only in per-
ceptual experience. 
As I shall show, in the illusion of r eal appearances the colour, size 
and shape are held to be real because they are believed to be determi nate. 
As I have argued , and shall argue further, not even the size and shape are 
determinate in the sense demanded by the theory. They are of equal status 
so far as this is concerned with the values. The physiological theory 
required that the values be left out of the external impression - the real 
appearru1ce - hence in Hume ' s doctrine the impression or object derives what-
ever quality it may have apart from size , shape and colour from the emotions 
or passions it causes . The impression or real appearance in itself has ·size, 
shape and colour, but not pleasantness or unpleasantness , menace or invitation , 
warmth of colour, grandeur, fracility , grace or splendour. As the r eal 
appearance is an illusion , this theory of projection, wher eby it appears to 
have some qualities which it does not really have, is deubly so . 
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Chapter 8 
!l'HE DOMAIN OF VALUE 
If appearances are the way things look, the way we see them , qualities 
and values belong to the appearances. What one sees is the things , but 
one sees them only as one sees them - from a place, at a distance, looking 
big or massive or threatening or inviting or beautiful or ugly . One is 
not looking at the appearances they are not there to be looked at - but 
at the things, which appear in a certain way and have a certain look; they 
are in certain surroundings , part of a certain configuration. That is the 
w~ we see them , the way they look, and that is the appearance, the look, 
and the expression they have. 
But, it may be said,_ we do not literally see the splendour, grace, etc., 
of Salisbury Cathedral . No, I r eply, in a sense you do not see the appearance 
at all ; you see the cathedral . But that is the way you see it - clothed 
in the splendour of sunshine , just as you see it looking slender and graceful •. 
But , it may be said , to say something is splendid, or graceful , or beautiful 
is to make a value judgment . Yes , I say , whatever you see as you see it may 
be expres sed in a statement or judgment - bigness , smallness , distance , dul l -
·ness , huge~css , repulsiveness. But surely, it may be said , to say something 
is bi.e is not to make a value judgment . To this I cannot say yes or no, but 
must say : isn't it?. 
A man who is s i x foot five is big and a man who is f our foot ten is small : 
the for mer is much above t he normal height , and the latter much below .it, 
accordinG to their measured he iGhts . .Again , you may say St . Peter ' s is very 





three times the size of St . Paul's- or whatever the measured propor tion is. 
But the hugeness of St. Peter's as you look at ~t across the square is not 
a matter of comparative measurements. Nor is the hugeness of St. Paul ' s 
as you turn a corner into a narrow street and see it looming up and perhaps 
tilt your head back to see the top of the dome. 
But , it may be said , you judge that it is huge because you have to tilt 
your head back , and the other buildings are small in comparison . Yes, I 
reply, but this account is somewhat misleading. I do not compare what I 
see wi th the size of the other buildings and the width of the street and the 
cars and people in it , and then, taking into account the fact that I have had 
to tilt my head , judge (i.e. conclude): this building must be huge . I am 
in a situation , a configuration which includes the street , the buildings and 
St. Paul's, and I am in it , a part of it , neck, eyes, head and all . If I 
weren ' t ., then of course St. Paul ' s would not look huge . But I am, and it 
does : it looms up of a sudden and I see it as I see it - huge . If I then 
sa;y "it ' s huge" or me r ely "big", what sort of judgment is this? It is cer-
tainly not an objective judgment of fact . 
Size , proportion and scale i n t his context are matters of the look of things . 
A building would look different in another setting, and that includes looking 
bigger or smaller . It might make one scene and ruin another ; dominate , 
dwarf and bully its neighbour s or take a seemly part in the ensemble . Size 
in this context is a matter of the way the buil ding l ool< s , or the VTay we see 
it', and we don ' t o.ll see it the same way. " Huge", "enormous" , "tiny", "giant", 
"dwarf" all belong fairly o·bviously to this kind of talk . So, much of the 
time , d<? "big" 'and " small". The same of course goes for heaviness and 
light ness of weight or softness and loudness of sound; these expressions do 
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not primarily refer to any sort of measurement at all : a thing feels heavy 
in a sense analogous to that in which it looks big. 
It is becaus~ of their secondary meaning in connection with measur ement 
and comparison of measured quantities and sizes , that one might suppose 
otherwise in the case of "big" and " small". This secondary use may be called 
their conventional use .~ Size , scale and proportion in the primary sense 
are inseparable. The size of a building is a function of its setting, its 
relation to the other buildings and the landscape or tovmscape. The only 
other meaning of size is measured size. Size in the primary sense is what 
is called a value in architecture and the visual arts , and it is not easy to 
make the distinction between a value in this sense and a quality. In the 
case of colour , one might think to distinguish between the quality red, 
say - and the value in the picture - fieriness, say. But this is quite 
arbitrary. At any rate , size is a value or a quality in the same sense as 
colour or shape : a distinguishable aspect which is not, however , separable 
from the others but is an organic part of the whole appearance , the way the 
thing looks , the way we see it . 
To alter the size of one building is to change the proportions of other 
buildings to it and sometimes to each other, to make them look bigger or 
smaller . To change the colour i s also often to change the size . But what 
one sees , as one sees it , is not usually analysed in this way : when one sees 
"' 
an enormous building, though this i s very much a matter of s etting, proportion 
* Toer e i.s some sort of parallel , though I would not care to pr ess i t 
too far , with the use of "good" to express appr oval or commendation 
and i t s conventional use according t o set standards and criter i a . 




and scale , the building is the figure and the rest the ground and the 
enormity is apprehended as a quality of the building. Hence we may be 
surprised by a change in its appearance , when so far as we can di scover 
it has remained objectively unchanged: the demolition of a nearby building 
or the felling of t r ees can do this. 
It is difficult to distinguish aesthetic values from values in the 
above sense , for the analysis of the aesthetic value of a building, a 
4. 
scuLpture , a park or a painting, for example , is in terms of such values 
as these , which are integral parts of the whole . Nor is it eaRy to make 
the distinction between a ~ description of the way a thing looks and an 
aesthetic judgm"!)nt. To say a building is big is not , except in a special 
context , to make an aesthetic judgment. But to say it is soar ing or tow-
ering or massive is to ve~ge upon it ; to say it is slender is almost to 
say it is graceful, and this woul d commonly be regarded as an_ aesthetic 
judgment. 
If anyone wants to insist with Hume, for example , that utility or fitness 
for purpose is the major part of the beauty of things and forms the basis 
of aesthetic judgment , I would certainly not say him nay , but rather insist 
that there is much in this . We are doers as well as perceivers and it is 
as doers that we often perceive . Nor do we all s ee things the same way -
they do not look the same to all of us or to any of us all the time. The 
" 
"conquest of nature" had not proceeded far enough in centuries earlier than 
the nineteenth for men to see t he Alps as anything but a horrid waste of. snow, 
icc and rocks where little could be grown , though perhaps a useful barrier 






Alps with new eyes ; they looked different, and part of the attraction , I 
would surmise, was that there was no utility or fitness for any sort of 
serious purpose ~bout them. A matter of contrast, or comparison, as Hume 
would say, of their pure , unsullied, useless white and the dark, Satanic , 
very useful mills . I make this short foray into socio-aesthetic history 
in order to insist that however we come to see things as we do , we do see 
things as we do , and this is the way they look. Nor can we ever see them 
except as they look. 
Let us now turn to the expressions of things. Things as we see them 
can have an expression o~ physiognomy . Sometimes one wants to make some 
sort of distinction between the expression and the look and sometimes not. 
Let me say evasi vely that it is when a look expresses something that I want 
to call it an expression. The most obvious case of expressions are those 
on people ' s faces. A face always has an expression; its expressions are , 
as it were , modulations of its characteristic look. Blankness and impas-
sivity are of course expressions too . But no less o~viously landscapes , 
buildings , streets, r ooms, furniture and ships have expressions as we see 
them, or can have at l east - it depends on the vtay you look at them and 
smug, uneasy , smiling, open , clcs ed , secretive, confident , rl.lkish, r affish 
r 
I 
for many of these the same words are used as for facial expr essions: cold , 
.warm, hostile , grim , friendly, welcoming, comfortable , complacent, proud, 
and so on. The expressions again are modifications of' the charact eristic 
A landscape i s seen as expressing moods . Animism and the pathetic 
r· ;:r·- r:i.onc•.::- , 
fallacy are well- f ounded in perceptualA especially in childhood, and perhaps 
one should add' i n some types of womanhood . Places are sympathetic or un-
sympathetic . One is at horne or not at home in a new place , as one is , or 
--- --~ 
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not , with new people . If Mr. Gradgrind says "Gibberish:", it is because he 
is concerned with facts , determinate , objectively ver ifiable facts about 
things, not with the looks and expr essions of things. But even Mr. 
Gradgrind can only see things as he sees them , as they look. Looks and 
expressions a r e not things or facts . 
Some philosophers want to deny these commonplaces, while admitting they 
are commonplaces. The grounds on which objections are raised to the kind 
of thing I have been saying are: (1) that the expressions of t hings are 
illusions ; that things do not really have expressions; (2) t hat the ex-
pressions of things are -the projections of our f eelings ; (3) that the smug-
ness or gr imness or other expression of a thing is not at any rate a per-
ceptual phenomenon : what is perceived i s shape, size and colour, not smug-
ness or grimness or cheekiness. 
To (1 ) I reply: as determinate objects , reduced to their properties and 
measurable dimensions , things have no expression. Neither .do they have a 
look, an appearance. But we see them as we see them, from wher e we are , 
in a certain light , con·text and configuration, and as they look to us, with 
a certain expression. 
To (2) I r eply: a thing cannot look as it does look except to someone 
who is lookine at it, for its look is the wey it looks to someone , and the 
expressi on bel ongs to the look. Tbe projection theor~ of which one form 
i s to be found in Burne - "the propensity of the mind to spr ead itself upon 
a. 
external objects" - is not in its elf an objection : it i s.(theory which 
attempts to account for the expressions of things , to say.how they come to 
have or seem to have ~xpressions . I shall offer some objecti ons to this 
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view later. 
To (3) I repl y : if we do no·h ~ the smugness or the grimness , or the 
grace or elegance , hov' is it that we think the thing looks smug or grim or 
graceful or elegant , and say it is smug, etc. ? If the grace or grimness 
is not visibl e , how do we apprehend it? If it has an elegant shape , say, 
is the shape seen but not its elegance? But , it may be said , the shape is 
there object~vely ; it can be determined, described and .measured. That is 
indeed so, I r eply, but not the shape as you see it , the look of the shape, 
and as you see it it is elegant or otherwise. 
The objection underlying (3) is generally founded on some doctrine of 
the sensationalist or datum type. To explain how a doctrine so implausible 
so far as our actual perceptual experience goes should have been widely be-
lieved , I think one must look at the quest ion historically. 
Let us go back to Plato ' s discussion of sense- perception in the Thcaetetus. 
What is apt to surprise the modern r eader are the puzzles about size and number 
at l54C. "When you compare six dice with four , we say that the six are more 
than the four or half as many again ; while if you compare them with twelve , 
the six are fewer - only h:llf as many - and one cannot say anything else." 
Theaetetus agrees a.nd Socrates asks : " Can anythine become larecr or more 
otherwise than by being increased? What wil l you answer?" 'rhcaetetus 
answers "no" to this question .. ·{ IS"Lt::P). ·· 
Socrates continues 055A) : "Looking at the first of them , I suppose we 
shall assert that nothlng can become gr eater or less , eith0r in size or 
number , so lone, as it r emains equal to itself. •• And SeCOJ1dly , that a thing 
to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away is neither i n-
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creased noc diminished, but always remains the same in amount ••• And 
must we not say , thirdly , that a thing which was not at an earlier moment 
cannot be at a later moment without becoming and being in process of becoming? 
... Now these three admissions , I fancy , fight among themselves in our 
minds when we make those statements about the dice ; or when we say that I, 
being of the height you see , without gaini ng or losing in size , may within a 
year be taller (as I am now) than a youth like you , and later on be shorter, 
.,· not because I have lost anything in bulk, but because you have grown. For 
apparently I am later what I was not before , and yet have not become so ; 
for without the process of becoming the r esult is impo ssible , and I could 
not be in process of becoming snorter without losing some of my bulk." Of 
such puzzles , Theaetetus says , "Sometimes I get quite dizzy with thinking of 
them." 
But the problem f o r the modern reader is to know what Theaet etus's 
problem is. It arises from regarding size and number as qualities of things 
on the one hand and as r elations between things on the other. As qualities 
they cannot cho.nge without the thing "becoming" . As r elations they can 
only the other t erm mus t "become". As Cornford r emarks , the difficulty 
"exists only for ·one who thinks of ' large ' as a quality r esiding in the thing 
t.hich is larger than something else , with ' small ' as the answering quality 
r esidi ng in the smaller thing. " When compared with something larger it will 
lose its quality " large" and gain the quality " small". "" Cornford notes t hat · 
i n· the Phacdo Plato regards tallness as an inherent proper ty of the tall pe rson. 
He adds that tallness was co1nmonly ranked as a physical excellence wi th beauty , 
health and streng th. It was a property on t he same footine a s ho·c or white , 
and not a r elation between the taller re rson and the shorter . ( " Plato ' s 
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Theory of Knowledge". P. 43- 4 ). 
It is natural to dismiss the problem, since obviously all size is relative. 
But so are all other properties: the colour of anything , for example , i s 
relative to other colours. One blue is bluer than another blue (greenish-
blue or purplish-blue ) , and one white whiter than another white ; and of course 
contrast intensifies colour. Similarly heat and cold are r elative . And 
these are regarded as properties of things in ordinary experience . But so 
in a w~ is size : a building is big of course by virtue of its surroundings , 
but we naturally ascribe this property to the building - the figure - and 
forget the ground. 
It is only in terms of measurement , objective determination, tha:t the 
problem disappears , for then we are no longer concerned with the mere look of 
things , the way we see ~hem , and size and quantity become explicitly r elative 
to a standard measure o Obviously nothing is "in itself'' big or small . But 
just as obviously, some things are huge and some tiny as we see them; that 
is the way they look. The modern tendency, in thinki ng of size and quantity, 
is to forget the looks of things and to regard all bigness and smallness as 
matters of measure , of r elation to a standard. Since the sixt eenth century, 
objective determination has meant the r eduction of quality to measurable 
quantity . The first candidate for such r eduction long before then was size : 
length , breadth , hoi ght and volume. It is easily forgotten that size was , 
" and is , a qualit y in the first place o The assumpt ion is that all t hings are 
in.themoelves fully determinate - all qualities are determinable by reduction 
if 
to measurable dimensions , evc1~this has not actually been accomplished . 
The doctrine ·that; the r eal is the r ational in its rna:; t prevalent and indeed 
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triumphant form has for its corollary that the rational is the measurable . 
But this is not the world as it is lived and experi enced dir~ctly , the world 
of values where things have a physiognomy, a look , and look different - bigger 
or smaller - at different times and bear expressions: the world as we per-
ceive it . Though everyone all the time lives and moves and has his being 
in this world, it was not much studied. Hume ' s account of it was tailored 
to what was scient~fically "known" and as we have seen the " impression"· is in 
origin a physiological concept. .The procedure of physics required the ex-
elusion from consideration of residual quality and value, or at best their 
relegation to the status of secondary effects of the physically real upon 
organic bodies . Direct experience , it was thought, could be causally ex-
plained in physi cal t erms. 
Of the impressions, it will be recalled , .Hume says: "As these depend upon 
nn.tural and physiqal causes , the examination of them would lead me too far 
from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy." 
(Bk.2 , Ft.l , Sec . l , P.275) . He assumes that the causal r elation could be 
shown· even if i t never had been, and the impressions would be natural events 
causally connected with other events and processes. This is of course a 
natural assumption . For ex&~ple , colours as we perceive them are associated 
with reflected light of different wave lengths . Hume ' s account of the senses, 
especially of the visual sense , takes the impressions of sense to be th~ effects 
of physical causes, and to be ,like everything in nature"~eterrninate in quantity. 
These are ·the data of consciousness and as they are really - fully dete r1:1inate -
so they appear. 
But our perceptual experience is not of impressions , but of things at r est 




these are· what its laws are about - bodies, bits of stuff. If these were 
not constituted perceptually in the first place , there would be nothing to 
determine quantitatively in any dimension. Abstraction is abstraction 
from the concrete. The illusion on which Hume ' s and other similar theories 
of perception is based is that our perception of things may b~ accounted for 
in terms of physical laws , laws which are first of all about the things which 
we perceive - bodie·s, gross matter. 
Taking the physical and physiological processes discovered by observaUon 
and experiment for granted , the theorist tries to complete the cycle or close 
the circle and account fo~ experience. But the datum of experience is not 
a physical event. So it must be a mental event. The theory then merely 
'succeeds in making the notion of physical bodies unintelligible; we first 
took these to be the thi ngs we see and went to work to reduce them to their 
quantitative dimensions . We finish by holding - if we make the matter ex-
plicit - t hat t he bodies ' we have thus r educed are not those we suppose we see. 
Our seeing and what we see are then identified and the r esultant entity is 
called a perception or mental event , physically caused. Hume i s both the 
vict im of this doctrine and t he r ebel against i t, but even. as the rebel his 
premises are those of the doctrine. 
Jn his and similar later doctrines , t he looks of things are hypostatised 
as perceptions or percepts , and things are held to be inf erred entities , posits , 
postulates or objects of belief. But as I have tried to show , things a r e 
con'o ti tuted visibly through their appearances to an observer in depth per-
ception , neither inferred nor postulated , but seen s taying in pooition as ~e 
move about them or moving and turning as we stand and lool< at the m. 
;1 
The sup-





that no one can ever remember having made it. But everyone who sees , 
actually sees things in depth, and sees t he places beyond them from which 
he could see their hidden sides . 
In the Humean type of doctrine , the perception of sensation as given is 
in a peculiar sense a pure percepti on or sensation. Just as shape and size 
were nothing but shape and size , colour was nothing but colour. The quali-
ties of colour apart f r om the colour itself, so to speak , were removed : cold-
ness , warmth , harslmess , richness , gaiety , mellowness , limpidi.ty. All t hese 
values were theoretically absent from the colour sensation as given. Fur ther-
more , though col our was always extended, it was never admitted that it always 
had a t exture , for textur e was tactual and had to be explained by association. 
Colour was colour and nothi ng else . Red could have no look but red. It 
could not be angry or fi ery, nor advance as blue r eceded . Thus the hypostatised 
appear~ce or lo<'k did not even correspond to the l ook of. t hings but was an 
abstraction from it , for fieriness of colour like el egance of shape corres-
ponded to not hing in t he external physical causes of the stimulus. 
But everything that had been taken out of perception had to be somehow 
accounted f or . Synaesthesia was ascribed t o the mechanism of associat ion and 
subsidiary unver i f i able hypotheses invoked t o accomplish this . other aspects 
of per ceptual experience were ascr lbed t o a secondary mechani cm , t he mechani sm 
of pain, pl easur e and t he passi ons , which ext ernal sensation br ought into pl ay. 
"' Apart from bodily pain however , pai n and pl easure wer e not sensations ; sen-
sa'ti ons we re plea..san.t or painful but pl easure and pain wer e not sensat ions . 
What could they be ? The answer was qualiti es or properti es of sensations . 
But all qualities or properties of anythi ng were sensat ions or r educibl e to 













the doctrine nor could they even be caused, for only the sensations or passions 
were caused and. ple~sure and pain were not sensations or passions . 
For actual exp·erience and the analysis of it had been substituted a 
hypothetical system which· would at best explain how it arose ori~ino.lly, 
though this could never be verified. But Hume , like so many of his successor s, 
I 
purports to be describing our actual experience , and of course he often does 
I 




so - when he ·forgets hi~ system or continues to say what he wants to say in 
makes his often acute observations in the ordinary language. They thus stand 
and fall quite independently of his theory of the passions. The illustrations ! i 
of the mecbrud.sm of sympathy are a case in point ; they may stand though one 
reject the mechanism. 
The passions inHume ' s theory arise from the sensations , which must come 
first : · percept before affect , as in some versions of the modern stimulus-
response theory. There is no basis in experience for this assertion of the 
causal pri ority of the percept . The examination of experiertce reveals some-
thing quite different ; that perception is affective through and through and 





AFFECTIVITY AND VALUE 
') 
To see is .to look at something, to make it the figure in its contextual 
background. One notices, looks at , one thing or group of things rather 
t han another; or qne thing catches one ' s attention rather than another. 
Why? Why d~es one look at one thing rather than another ? Why does some-
thing catch one ' s attention? To say it is interesting is to say one is 
interested , at least for the moment. What is bizarre, striking, lovely, 
anomalous , huge or ugly, for example , is interesting. One is interested , 
struck , arrested, puzzled, melted, frozen, bewildered, repelled, attracted, 
at ease or on edge . But there is no ready- made or standard epithet for 
most of the thing~ which are interesting or for the ways in which one is in-
terested~ One ' s long-term interests of course l ead one to notice some 
things rather than others, but the sense of " interest" I am after is the more 
general one, which also includes casual , short-term, idle and momentary in-
terest . 
Bangs and flashes fo rce one ' s attention willy- nilly, producing the "startle 
effect 11 as it is called . So also a push in the back or a bang on the head 
produce effects on us , or even someone waving a hand in front of our faceo 
In these cases we are acted upon rather than acting. They are to l ooking 
" 
and listenine as being thrown is to leaping. But l ookine. listening and 
touching are explo'ratory and sel ective. What I want to suggest is that 
selectivity is affectivity and its correlate i s value . f!iy aim is limi ted to 








menta and about values ; an:y treatment in my r evised terms of the moral 
values with which Hume is largely concerned is beyond the scope of this work. 
Selection is pref er ential , visually as in other ways. What we notice 
is what is noticeable , what is worth a look. Sometimes , as i n a dentist ' s 
waiting room, one is not looking for anything in particular; one's eye 
lights on one thing and another - perhaps a picture , a calendar, or a chair 
is curious or intriguing, but not the wall- paper or the carpet or curtains . 
At other times , one wants to find out something and only what is relevant to 
that is of interest. Scenes and situations are perceived in terms of our 
purposes and preoccupations and desires . 
I use the terms "affective" and " affectivity" rather than " emotion" , 
"passion" and "feeling", because they include not only "thc meanings of these 
commoner words but also the continual ebb and flow of one ' s curiosity, interest , 
delight , ·desire , satisfaction , dissatisfaction , irritation and so on. When 'I 
one is calmly at work - writing, say - there is no range of standard ter ms 
for th.e phases of the ebb and flow. It may be mild or it may be more strenuous. 
When , for example , one is having to s truggle to express an argument , one fe~ls 
t ension, hope , disgust , despalr . But when one is moving smoothly on , one is 
not in the ordinary sense feeling emotions, but one is calmly pleased with the 
way it is going, and this undisturbed feeling of progress , achi.cvement is no 
less affective. The way we apprehend the present stage of a task as incomplete , 
rnu.ff ~d , muddled , or coming alone, shaping up, lightening, is the way we 
feel about it , !.hew~ it l ool<s to us , and of course a task is only a task to 
us , to oomeone , to a potential doer. The requircdncss as we apprehend it is 
the correlate of our project and they cannot be separated . Our situation is 
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the wa:y we see it; it is a situation only for us, ordered and organised in 
relation to our des~res , projects, and interests with potentialities and 
promising features, obstacles and barriers . It is in terms of our being· 
in the world as an embodied consciousness that feeling, emotion or affectivity 
have to be understood. 
Though Hume seems to start from the view that there is a definite range 
of distinctive, nameable passi ons , he realises in effect that these are only 
the more striking and overt phases of affectivity. He does suppose that the 
passions are caused by perceptions and indeed that they are themselves secon-
dary perceptions. I wish to main·tain that perception - in my sense : hearing, 
touching and seeing is affective in the first place, through and through, 
and that the correlate of affectivity is value , at the perceptual as well as 
at other, or "higher", levels . Hume supposes that the passi on is an observable, 
identifiable occurrence ~ since it is a sensation or impression; though it 
only occurs in certain circumstances it woul d be what it is in any circumstances , 
its relation to other tmpressions being merely the relation of external assoc-
iation . But no such passion "itself" can be found. Feeling is someone ' s 
fee ling about something in a situation; it is inseparable from what may be 
expressed as a value predicate of the objec·t;. But it is distinguishable , as · 
Uie consciousness of the object is to be distineuished from the object of con-
sciousness. 
"' If the passion "itself" is not to be found, how do we know we are angry , 
f~r example , or delighted or afraid or uneasy? 'l'he answer sometimes given is 
ti1at we know this in the same way as we know that anyone else is a.YJ.gry , or de-





together constitute and define these different emotions. Though this view 
is finally untenabie , the reasons which have led to its adoption are important 
and interesting. There are two main reasons. 
In the first place, to know that one is angry, for example, to recognise 
it as anger , is to know the meaning of the word, to have a concept of anger , 
and to know when to use it. We learn the meaning of "anger" not simply from 
being angry but from beine told we are angry or in a temper , from seeing others 
whom we are told are angry , and from the reactions of othe rs to our anger. 
Much the same goes for all the other passions - and for dispositions , propen-
sities and character traits. In the second place , we can be angry without 
knav ing it and others can know it long before we do we may deny it angrily. 
To be angry is not to know one is angry , and the same eoes for all the passions , 
emotions and feelings . Feeling is not to be identified with recognising, 
realisine, knowing, or being aware of what we feel . 
It is natural therefore to· conclude that we recognise our own anger in the 
same way , or very nearly , , as we recognise the anger of othe rs ; by the ob-
servable symptoms and behaviour. On this view, all tha·t is missing in Hume 's 
account is a description of the sympt oms and behaviour in addition ·to what he 
gives an account of - the characteristic ci rcumstances in which they occur . 
Ther e would be no question of the passion " itself" as a further component. 
Ancer v1ould be a name for a certain range of observable cymptorn:J and behaviour. 
It would be reducible to overt, observable happenings. To know r;omeone \'I as 
angry would be to observe his flush or pallor, his trembling, glaring, shouting 
in a certain tone , to which might be added some physiolot;lcal facts . To know 
that one was oneself nn(Jry would likewise be to observe these phenomena or 
some of them . A:nc;~r would thus be a state of a certain kind of object , the 
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kind known as a per son or , paradoxicall y , a subject. 
In behaviourist descriptions , t he observer or describer is left out 
of account . If he were not , he would not be observing but observed. But 
since the assumption is that only what is observed , objects , can be meaning-
fully spoken of or described , there are in effect no subjects but only ob-
jects , no selves but only others, no observers but only what is observed. 
Thus one knows one is angry in the same way as one knovrs others are angry. 
This has , of cour~e to be r egarded as a loose way of talking;' one should 
not say " one knows", one should say : Subj ect A i s observed to be angry by 
the same criteria as Subjects B, c, D, etc. "Subject" in this context means 
"object" what is observed - though it seems to be applied only to human ob-
jects , not to rats or monkeys . 
It is quite important to realise that this is not Hume ' s view· of the matter , 
nor can his view be revised at all plausibly in this direction. For Hume , 
the passion itoelf was not the situation or the circum~rtances in v1hich it 
occurred , nor yet the externally observable .behaviour and symptoms (which would 
of cour se for Hume be reducible to impressions of sensation .) And to this 
extent , I think llume vras rieh·li : to know what anger is , what it means to be 
angry , one mu$t be anc;ry or have been angry, just as , to know what it means 
to see , one must see or have seen . Anger belongs to experience , conscious-
ness , subjectivity. It is not a characteristic or reducible to characteristics 
"' 
of any observed object whatsoever , or , for example , to the chcm i ~· :d s Late of 
the bloodstream ancl s i milar criteria. 
How then i s 1.t posoible that , on the one hand , one rr·ay not know one is 





be angry at someone for his conduct is to see him or think of him as mean , 
or disgraceful, or disobliging, or dishonest , or heartless, or irresponsible 
or infuriating. It is to see or think of him angrily. We are not seeing 
or thinking and being anery . Our seeing and thinking is angry, or our anger 
cl.s the way we see or think of the odious , outrageous object of our anger. 
To be angry at is to be conscious of - to see , imagine , think of, have in 
mind - in a certain way. We may not J.r...nov1 we are angry, may not realise or 
recognise our anger, because our attention is absorbed in the infuriating 
object of our anger. The sense in which we may be said not to know we are 
angry is the sense in whi ch we may be said not to know we are seeing it or 
thinking of it : the consciousness of the object is in this case non- reflexive. 
But as our seeing it is implicit in its present visibility, so i s our anger 
in its infuriatingn~ss and all the implicitly anger- making predicates we 
might ascribe to it. But we can be r eflexively aware of seeing someone or 
something and of being angry at him. We r e cognise we would l ove to clout 
him, but we are observing, looking at , perceiving only him ; we cannot perceive 
Dur perceiving, nor perceive our desire to clout him. But we know we do 
perceive him and that we have a strong desire to clout him. In this sense 
Df "know", knowing is not objective or based on observation of the patient~s · 
sy~ptoms . The object of our anger r emains the object , even as we become 
'lware of our anger, or our fee ling and attitude towards hirno 
Bu·t as we see with our eyes , bodily from where we are~ so we are also 
bodily angry. \'le glare , clench our t eeth and our fists perhaps , go hot or 
cold , shout , adopt a bodily attitude. \'ihcn we become aware of this , we are 
s"till not percei 11ing or observing as we might someone ·else ' s clenched fists 







we are glaring furiously, that our cheeks are hot , without any observation of 
fists , eyes , or cheeko. And I need hardly r epeat that we are not aware of 
any physiological effect or occurrence , though if we know some physiology we 
will know that such effects are in operation. 
Anger is not voluntary : t hat is why it is called a passion , or used to 
be called a passion . But we live it, assume it , suffer it , act it out , or 
suppress it. It is not a third person, objective process or series of occur-
rence s . We can be as it were possessed , but we let ourselves be , let our-
selves go, l et i t rip. To give it rein, to throw a f it , r epresents a choice 
of conduct ; we do not lose control , we abandon ourselves to i t , act it out. 
If we wer e not r eflexively aware of being angry, the notions of self- control 
and r estraint or lack of them would be meaningles s . To act calmly , unclench 
the fists , breathe mor e deeply is already to be less angry. To do otherwise 
is to be angrier - to work oneself up. 
Because we arc bodily angry , or ~lad , sad , merry , etc., and may not know 
it, James ' s paradox may seem persull;sive : we are sad because we weep or merry 
because we laugh. The ordinary view regards the feelina as prior to the ex-
pression ; James ' s vicw r everses the order arid i .t arises out of his dualism . 
For James , until· ·he launched his attack on the concept of consciousness , the 
body \7as simply the organism, the object of physiology , and a bodily event 
was simply o. phy~iological event . One ' s own bodi ly sensations and feelings 
"' 77CrC all events in COnSCiOUSness , causally connected VIi th physiological OCCUr-
renccs and proce~ses . A self or subject , that i s to say , was not a body. 
Hence weeping could happen and make us feel sad . 
But our experience as I have tried to argue , is essentially as embodied 
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subjects. We are embodied, or if you like we are our bodies . In experience , 
feeling may precede expression or they may be simultaneous , but both are 
bodily. To weep is to be sad, to assume one ' s sadness, not to snap out of 
it , to surrender to tears , to indulge one ' s feeling: again it is a choice of 
conduct. If we don ' t want to , we don ' t need to . Every f eeling has its bodil y I I. 
expression , its expression in conduct , its range of possible developments . 
Feeling and expression are best conceived as matter and form : they are not 
separable , for the matter is expressed in the fo r m, as what we mean is in the 
words we use and has no separate existence . Willy- nilly, we express our 
feelings and attitudes in posture , sesture , and face , if not in words. Not 
to express them is to suppress them. 
One of the reasons most often advanced for a behaviourist account of how 
one knows one is angry or joyful is simply that sometimes one is , but does not 
knoYI it, . while others do know it . This vi~w is, I think , reinforced by saying 
that one is then unconsclously angry or unconscious of one ' s anffer . To be 
consciously angry is to r~alise one is angry, to be unconsciously angry is not 
to r eali se it . But it does not follow from this English idiom that we know we 
are angry from objective symptoms and behaviour or that anger is ~imarily a 
name for an observable 3taLe of a subject or for a kind of behaviour . Tacitly 
assumed in this kind of account is the disembodied observer who is not what 
is d> ser ved - tha signs , symptoms and behaviour - but who apprehends and in-
terprets the bodily sen3ations and manifest movements , i~entifyine empirically 
and inductively the state of ane0.r in "subjects" Vlhich are more properly called 
;:>bjects . 
" 'rhe ehost that haun ~s this and similar views :i.s the diccmbodied epistemo-
logical subject ; anger i.s reduced to events in the thi.rd person. Aneer is not 
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a feeling, a passion - though no doubt there are feelings and sensations -
but an objective , factual state of an object. Just as you tell that water 
is boiling by the bubbles and steam, so you tell that the kind of thing called 
a person is angry by his red face, loud voice, violent gestures and glaring 
eyes, etc., and these and other symptoms are all that anger is. That is 
~1hat "anger" means . Anger is simply a compendious way of referring to a 
collection of _associated phenomena. One may, though one need no·t , add the 
physiological description , as one might add the physical in the case of the 
11ater. Thus when I say I am angry I mean that this thing is in a publicly 
~bservable state . 
On this view no one would actually feel angry and nothing would be ex-
perienced as infuriating. Subjectively one could never actually be angry 
)r at least one could never know it. To know it, one would have to observe 
the·thing, the object , the so- called self. 
The common English idiom in which one is said to be consciously or un-
consciously angry, conscious or unconscious of one's anger , by no means implies 
:;uch a view. It is another way of making the distinction between realismg 
lnd not r ealising that one is angry. But one does not observe the signs and 
Ldentify them collectively as constituting anger. We become r eflexively aware 
Jr" being angry, as we become reflexively aware of seeing or hearing or thinking. 
\s one can be said to be unconsciously angry , so one could be said to be un-
"' ::onsciously seeing something, or hearing or thinking. Most seeing is in this 
:;enbe unconscious , that is to say, VIe are not reflexively aware of seeing some-
thing. What is meant by consciousness in this context is the reflexive con-
sciousness , or self- consciousness. 
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Non- reflexively, however , seeing is essentially conscious , a consciousness 
of something. And to be angry , is to be angrily conscious of, to experience 
angrily , to see angrily , think angr ily, etc . Reflexion is explicitation, 
realisation , of one ' s experience or consciousness of something , of one ' s 
attitude , feelings , emotions , passions . Without it , these words would refer 
to nothing whatsoever. Reflexion or self- consciousness is perfectly normal 
and commonplace, not something that just phenomenologists go in for. But 
. some accounts of it are certainl y misleading".. 
It is often .spoken of as a consciousness of being conscious , as if the 
being conscious were an object . But when we are , for example , reflexively 
aware of seeing something, if we were not effectively seeing s:> mething we could 
not be aware of seeing it. ~at we see does not cease to be the object , else 
we would not be seeing. We are aware of seeing just that thing, not nothing 
in part;i.cular. To be aware of its present visibility is to be aware of seeing 
it. The snare - one of many - into which one falls in talking about conscious-
ness is that one ignores one ' s body. Bodily experience is not experience of 
a body as in , for example , the experience of seeing a table . One has to be 
a body to see a. table . Bod:i.ly experience is the experience of being a body, 
of being embodied , incarnate . The r eflexive consciou~ness or self- conscious-
ness is not a consciousness of a pure , disembodied consciousness , but of an 
embodied incarnate consciousness . To be aware of seeing is to be aware of 
seeing v;i th one ' s eyes , and of seeing that very thing o~er there and visible. 
And similarly , to r eali::;e one is angry at someone is to become aware that 
one is ten:;e , itch:i.nt; to clout him , e;laring, exploding, and tha·t one sees him 
as detestable , infuriatine , and that , for example , one r ecards Ids expression 





but of the way in which one is aware of him, of one ' s own attitude and re-
lat ion to him. One is a body and this awareness is of bodily experience , of 
the v1ay one is r egarding the object of one ' s anger . This awareness is re-
flexive . It is perhaps useful to illustrate the point about reflexive and 
non- reflexive bodily exper ience - or, if you like , conscious and unconscious 
bodily experience - in an example which has nothing to do with the emotions 
specially. 
As I write , I am sitting with the pr essure of the chair under me , arms 
on the table , f eet on the floor . Most of the time, I am not, aa they say, 
conscious of this . But it is implicit in what I am doine; - writing this. 
At any moment , however , I can be conscious or r eflexively aware of this , 
attending to the pressure , posture and movements I am makin~. Again , most 
of the time I am writing , I am not conscious of moving the pen over the paper 
for I am thinking of what I am writing, what I want to say . But again at 
any moment I can,be , and this is r eflexive . Nor moot of the time am I con-
scious of seeing the paper on which I write , for that would be distracting ; 
I am of cour se seeing it and seeing what I write , but I am not r eflexively 
aware of thio . But at any moment I can be . Again , I am not conscious of 
drawing on my pipe (much l ess of breathing) , nor of takincr it in my hand and 
shifting it to the o Lhcr side of my mouth . But again , I can be . 
Now t he Ene;lioh idiom I have referred to is a bit misle ad in&. For while 
it i s sometimes said, fo r example , of someone who is obviously in a rage that 
he is unconsciously angry ; it i s never said of anyone absorbed in a book that 
he is unconsci ously holding the book at a suitable ni stru1cc from his eyes or 
that he is unconociously sitting in his chair , or of someone absorbed in writing 
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that he is unconsciously pushing the pen acrpss the paper. I contend that 
this i'diom would be as appropri ate in the one case as in the other . In 
the terms which I think are less confusing, reading and writing or standing 
are all conscious activities but not necessarily reflexively conscious. And 
similarly for the feelings , emotions , passions , and attitudes - they are con-
scious but not necessarily r eflexively conscious . Reflexion is not obser-
vation , at least not in the ordinary sense~ It is only by being a body that 
one can observe anything from a~vhere. T~ be aware of oneself is to be 
aware of the body one is . The only sense in which one can literally observe 
it is the sense in which one can see a certain amount of it - but no one is 
going to suggest that that is h?w we know what we feel. 
One ' s body is in a sense a pri ori ; being a body is the condition of ex-
perience of thingD and other people. One is a body and when one is angry at 
someone . and regards him as infuriating, one is bodily angry. There is no more 
difficulty in being aware of this r eflexively than there is in being aware of 
the pressure of the chair under one . One ' s anger is not a set of physiological 
facts: one is not physiological facts . But one is one's body and to be angry 
or joyful or merry is to be bodily angry or joyful or merry - how else should 
one grin or laugh? When you are overcome with hilarity or mirth, it is the . 
mirth that shruces your body from stem to stern. If you had never been shaken 
with mirth you would never know what it was like, what mirth was. And so with 
aneer and with all other emotions . 
· But all feeling and emotions and passions are ways in which one experienc~s 
situations , peopl e md t hings , and what can be formulated as value predicates 
of these are the correlates of one ' s feelings - an awkward or trying or delight-
ful situation , a boring per son , a hideous obj ect . v:hen someone is scintillating, 
------ -----------------------· 
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aren't you alert, eager, hanging on his words? And when someone is tedious, 
don ' t you droop wearily? But it is bodily that you are alert or drooping, 
for you are not a disembodied mind . Naturally you are not taking notice of 
your attitude and feeling most of the time - your attention is devoted to the 
object. But there is no difficulty in taking notice and being reflexively 
aware of what you feel . 
The next question is how we know what others feel. I have suggested that 
feeling and .its expression are best conceived as matter and form, not as cause 
and effect . We express our feelings and attitudes in posture, gesture and 
face, if not in words . We know what others feel because we see the ir ex-
pressions , postures , gestures and conduct . As Ryle remarks , there is no 
"causal divination reinforced by weak analogical argument." We do 'not infer 
to the cause of the expression we see on people ' s faces when we want to know 
what they feel . The expression, the form , is the form of the matter. We, 
as it were, read- their expressions . We do not infer from the words we see 
and hear what their meaning is: it is in the words as matter to form . When 
an expression is cryptic and we are puzzled , there is nothing to go by but the 
expression . When v1e cannot under stand a sentence and try to i nterpret it , we 
are not inferring.to its cause . Nor are we when we do not know what someone's 
expre ss ion or attitude means or portends . Having understood it, however, we 
may well have to infer why the person in question is angry or sulky or sad , 
that i s , vrhat he is angry or sul ky or sad about . 
OnG of J-Iume ' s mo st celebrated dicta ]_. "' . <>• "'rhe minds of men arc mirrors to 
one ano ther ". But he insists that "no passion of ano ther dis covers itself 
immediately t o t he mind" . Passions are not expressed i n people ' s faces or 
conduct , according to Hume , they arc inferred f rom signs , the connection being 
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established by association. These external signs have no expression , no 
look, for they are simply complex i mpressions of sensation and nothing more. 
Hume ' s mechanism of sympathy cannot account for how we come to see an ex-
pression on a £ace. How does the expression get into the face? 
This question is akin to a more elementary question which a sensationali s t 
or datum doctri ne of perception must answer : how do the other qualities get 
into a c9lour? For a colour datum according to such doctrines is nothing but 
colour - not nice or nasty , not warm or cold, not glaring or garish or mellow , 
. . 
nor full-? odied nor sickly , nor glowing nor bilious. It is so to speak pure 
colour , in a peculiar sense of "pure". But pure colour in this sense is never 
actually seen , never given in experience . The concept belongs to physical 
theories of colour, from which of course values and qualities other than the 
colour itself have to be excluded. In a doctrine such as Hume ' s , colour in 
this sense is identified vii th the datum of our experience of colour. Hume 
never addresses himself to this problem, nor so far as I know do any of his 
successors who hoid sense- datum theories. In Hume ' s doctrine of sympathy , the 
idea of a passion ·, which occur s by association with such observed circwnstances 
as would occasion it i n our own experience , differ s from the passion only in 
vivacity, and becauce other s resemble us we in some measure f eel their passion. 
But as a ma·tter of fact we may read the .anger in another ' s fac '=l without feeling 
angry in any det;r ce a.t all , and we may do this even vti thou L kno.ving >That he is 
angry about. \That we f eel ourselves is a.'1other matt'er "bntircly. 
It r emains to. say a \'TO rd about the projecti on theory of value - that values 
are projected on thincrs by our feelings , or that values .£.£.£ projected feelines . 
If reclines arc what I ,., . tn.ke them to be ther0 is no sense i n vTltich they can 
possibly h0 projected on wha.t the feeling is about . They arc our fcelint;s , 
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not the feelings of what we have in view or in mind. But , it may be said, 
the qualities and values of things might still be projected £Lour feelings . 
The difficulty is to know what precisely this could mean. Vlould we for 
example see a colour, have a feeling and project , say, mellowness on the 
colour, invest the colour with mellowness? Or would we see a girl , have a 
feeling , and proje~t the prettiness on her , or invest her wiggle with seduction? 
There is no doubt about the feelings or about what the feelings are about . But 
we are asked to suppose that somehow or other - in what sense is impossible 
to determine - that the f eeling is prior to the prettiness . The o'rigins of 
this theory lie in the sensation or datum view of perception: what is given 
is colour, size and shape and nothing else. The hypostatised look of a thing 
or person is a look from which the values have been extracted. 
But , as I have said, we see things the way we see them and they look the 
way they lool<: . As o.n objectively determinabl~ object , a girl is not pretty , 
for then she has no looks . Only measurements in vari ous dimensions. 
--------··- ---- ------ --
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Chapter 10 
THINGS IN Ti~ WORLD 
One of Hume ' s purposes in Parts 3 and 4 of Book I is to refute the 
doctrine of r epresentative perception, to deny the double existence , re-
presenting and r epresented. · Always at the back of. hi s mind and sometimes 
in the forefront , however , is the physical and physiological theory which 
led to th~ doctrine of representative perception , the doctrine of sense-
impressions - affections of the external sense organs , conveyed by the nerves 
and animal spirit , and causi ng conscious sensations in the mind . These , he 
asserts r epeat edly , are known to us by consciousness as they r eally are . But 
his whole doc·trine of the senses is founded on the theory and has no foundation 
in actual experi~nce . The point may be illustrated i n his accounts of taste 
and smell and of solidity. 
If anyone says that he experiences a sound or smell as filling a r oom, 
Hume ' s reply is : you cannot , for t hese are i mpressions , arising from the senses , 
internal and per ishing' existenceo , and are in the mind . But probably realising 
the difriculty , he neve r asserts that the smell is in one ' s nose or tho sound 
in one ' s ear s . He prefers to as sert that they are no,·rhere. 
11 
• •• and I assert , that this is not only possible , but the greatest part 
of things do and munt exist after this manner . An object may be said to be 
nowhere , nhen its parts are not so situated Yli th respe~t to each other, as to 
form any figure or quantity ; nor the whole with respect t o other bodi es so 
as to ano>"fer t o our notions of contiguity or distance . Now this is evidently 
the case with all our perceptions and objects , except those of s i ght and feeling. 
A moral r eflection cannQt be pl.ac ' d on the right or on the left hand of a passion , 
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nor can a smell or a sound be either of a circular or a square figure . These 
objects and perceptions , so far from requiring any particular place, are ab-
solutely incompatible Vlith it , and even the imagination cannot attribute it 
to them ••• ' ' Tvlill not now be necessary to prove , tha·~ those perceptions, which 
are simple , and exist nowhere , are incapable of any conjunction in place with 
. . 
matter or body , which is extended and divisible ; since ' tis impossible to 
found a relation but on some common quality. ... Thus supposing we consider 
a fig at one end of a table, and an olive at the other, ' tis evident , that in 
forming the complete ideas of these substances, one of the most obvious is 
that of their different relishes; and ' tis as evident, that we incorporate 
and conjoin these qualities with such as are colour ' d and tangible. The 
bitter taste of the one , and sweet of the other are supposed to lie in the 
very visible body, and to be separated from each other by the whole l ength 
of the table. This io so nmable and so natural an illusion, that it may 
be proper to consider the principles, from which it is derived." (Treatise , 
P.235) . 
Hume argues that this conjun~·tion in place of the taste, smell and colour 
is a relation added by the mind to supplement the relation of contiguity in 
the t ime of their appearance . But ther e is no more r eason to say the taste 
' ·is nowhere than to say the colour is nOYiher e . Taste is not colour , but t he 
parallel betvrecn them holdo to t his extent · t hat jus t as you do not see the 
" colour of the fig when you are not l ooking · at it, so ·you do ·not feel or taste 
the savour of the f i g when you are not eati ng it . Hume ' s rhetorical question 
whether the taste is in every part of the fig or only in some , simply establishes 
what we all know , that taste i s diffe r ent from colour, not thn:t the taste is not 
the ta::;te of the fig as the colour is the colour <£ the fig. You taste the 
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fig in your mouth : it has to be there for you to taste it. Vlhen it is 
in your mouth you cannot see it, but Hume would not argue that then the 
taste is somewhere but the colour nowher e. It would , however , be just 
as plausible to do so. 
Hume simply forgets that it is only by virtue of one ' s body that one 
has any expe rience of fi~s at all , that in order to perceive anything any-
where one has to be somewhere bodily oneself. His references to the senses 
are ·entirely unintelligible apart from the body, which is itself extended and 
in depth and is so experienced. 
the 
ment of/,. senses. 
But his ar~ment depends on the disembodi-
In his argument on the primary and secondary qualities in Book I , Pt. 4, 
Sec. 4 , Hume 's main point is that the primary cannot be apprehended without 
the secondary. But it is in this section that the primacy of the visual far 
Hume becomes explicit, a primacy which is of fundamental importance in his 
analysis of 2ausality. He ar~es that we can have no idea of solidity in-
dependently of a visible extension on the ground that the impressions of touch 
are simple impressions, and the f eeling is quite different from the solidity. 
This ar~ment is close to the one concerning taste , and Hume might say 
equally well that the sensation of touch was nowhe r e . Yet t o make this point 
· he t akes the body for granted: "An object , that presses upon any of our members , 
meets with r enistance; and that r esistance , by the motion it cive s t o tpe 
"' nerves and animal spiri ts , conveys a certain ~ensation to t he mind ; but it 
doec not follow~ that the sensation , motion , and resistance are any ways r e-
scmblinc ." (Treatise , P. 230) . His areument i s of cour ce directed agai nct 
t he s·t andard theory. But he is entirely t he victim of H , and cursorily r e jects 






with the hand, pressing, grasping, etc. in favour· of what really, according 
to the theory, happens - sensations in the mind, nowhere . 
He is to explain how we believe in bodies on the basis of a doctrine 
which would be inconceivable without bodie?, notably the human body ro1d sense 
organs , and which requires him to regard actual experience as somehow illusory, 
yet at the same time to assert bravely that of what we are most intimately 
conscious we cannot be mistaken - impressions . If Hume had taken Berkeley 
seriously; he would have realised that the body , the organism, the nerves and 
animal spirits are in the same boat as the other alleged external objects: 
they too have to be mere f.'perceptions and i t cannot be as a result of their 
independent operation that vre have perceptions , for that would be to accept 
the theory of the double existence, representing and represented, the percep-
tions and the real physical body. 
Hume r ecognises the difficulty at various points , but he does not over-
come it, for_he continues to refer to the senses and sense organs, directly 
and indirectly , though these expressions have no meaning apart from eyes and 
ears and hands and skin, from seeing, hearing, touching and moving. The 
"experiments" v;hereby he proves that our perceptions are "not possest of any 
distinct or independent existence" are experiments with bodies: "Vihen we press 
one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become double ••• " 
(Treatise , P. 210- 2ll) 1\.re the finge r and the eye perceptions? Not .for the 
moment . "' They are what we perceive ·t;he objects (or perceptions) with, parts 
of th<J body in fact . At other times , the finger and the eye and all the 
rest of the body are mere perceptions too . But they are nevort!1eless perceived 
l'l i th "the Genscs .": "Properly Gpeakine;, ' t.i.s not our body we perceive • •• but 
certain imprcosi ons , which enter by the senses ••• " (Treatise , P.l91). Even 
--·--- - .. -----
-99-
as Hume tries to r educe the body to impressions " on the same footing" with 
any other impression, there have to be senses and sense organs, a real body, 
for there to be any impressions at all , and this requires the double exis-
tence , representing and represented. Though his every argument that the 
immediate object of consciousness is an impression is derived from a consid-
eration of the body , Hume insists all the more strongly that the impressions 
are "knovm to us by consciousness"; what we call the body therefore can only 
consist of.such impressions. What we are immediately aware of is what , 
according to the physiological theory, we must be aware of; but if so , the 
body itself must be so reducible. 
The ti1eory is thus circular : the doctrine of ir::pressions is the outcome 
of a study of the body, but the body is itself reducible to impressions . The 
"we" to whom the i mpressions "must necessarily appear in every particular what 
they are , and be what they appear, " is a disembodied consciousness ; that is 
all "we" can be if the body be reduced to "our" perceptions . And so it is 
in most of Hume ' s frequent r eferences to the mind or consciousness and its · 
activities. But he never makes this explicit and falls back upon embodiment 
continually without r ealising it. How can a disembodied mind , which can 
itsel f be nowhere, have a "propensity to spread itself on external objects" 
as his doctrine of causality r equires? How can an i lllpression be "an internal 
and perishine existence"? Int ernal or external to what? ~rhcre is only one 
answer : the body. 
It i s the di sembodied mind , · hm ever , which Hume attempts to be quit of in 
his cel ebrated account of personal identity. The 1nind or self is composed of 
perceptions and "idf)n t i ty is nothine r eally belonaing to these differ ent per -
---~--~- -~- ------
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ceptions , and uniting them together ; but is merely a quality , which we 
attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination , 
when we reflect upon them." (Treatise , P. 260) . Who are the "we" who 
reflect upon them and what is the " imagination" ? There is only one answer : 
the disembodied consciousness . Again , . as in the case af the body , Hume 
tries to have it both ways, assuming and denying; we are conscious of our 
perceptions, perceptions are i n the mind or imagination , but the mind is 
nothing but perceptions ; it is composed of perceptions. 
His account of the self follows from the nature of the pArception as he 
conceives it •. To recapitulate: firstly ,' the perception is both object and 
consciousness , but secondly , it is itself an object of consciousness. Firstly, 
the mind is composed of perceptions , but secondly , perceptions are united in 
the mind or imagi.natiol,l , and "we" reflect upon them. Hume ' s account of re-
lation~ requires tho latter view: they are known by intuition or comparison, 
but it is not the ter ms of the relation which intuit or compare . 
Throughout Book I, Hume ' s concr ete example s all refer to things , not per-
ceptions . Now thi ngs, according to Hume ' s analysis in Part IV, are fictitious 
identities of the i mae inat ion . In Husserlian t erms, they are meant or in-
t ended unitie s or identities , noemata. Either thin is an analysis of YThat the 
vulgar mean by a t hinG or i t i s pointle ss . 'llhat Hume i s indeed accounting 
for i s tho di ::;tin~.:tion , for example , be·tv1een t he t able and rny seeing the table 
f rom di fferent angles yesterday, today and tomorrow, whi ch is t he vulgar dis-
t i nction . The table is t he identity , the seeings of i t are not . For the vulgar , 
the table is the 0bject , not t he seeing or i magining or thinkinG" of. Hwno of 
course }mons thi o :· "When we are absent from i ·~ , ·,. · :n'J.y i t still exists , but 
that v1o do not f eel it , we do not see it. " (Treatis0 , P. 207). 'Nhat he means 
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by a perception is not the t hing which we suppose to exist independently of 
our seeing or feeling it. Yet Hume insists that the vulgar t ake their per-
ceptions to be their onl y objects . This is simply not so. Percepti ons 
correspond to the different appearances of things , the different views one 
I 
has of them, and Hume in effect makes this very point in his reference to the 
"seeming encrease and diminution of obj ects , according to their distance ; by 
the apparent al t erations in their figure; by the changes in their colour 
and other qualiti e s from our sicknes s and distempers; and by an infinite 
number of other e xper iments of the same kind ; from all which we learn, that 
our sensible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or independent ex-
i stence." (Treatise, P. 211) . The point Hume is making i s amply made i n 
~he vulgar parl ance ; i t i s quite s i mply the distinction between the thi ng 
and the way I see it now from here. To say that the vulgar take their per-
ceptions to be their only obj ects is on the face of i t to say that the vulgar 
do not make the dis t incti on. But they do. The thing that I see now from 
here can be seen from· other pl aces , in other lights and circumstances - it 
has ot her sides. That is what we mean by a table or chair or hat or shoe: 
t hat sor t of t hing. 
What l eads Hume to give his peculiar and misl eading account of t he vulgar 
concciousness? He i s f i ghti ng on two fronts . He wants t o give a crit ique 
of the vul gar consci ousness, but he i s int ent on refuting the doctrine of r e-
presentative per cep t ion. In re j e ct ing the doubl e ex:L~ence, hc\'i ever , it is . 
n~rt the r epr esentati on he r ejects but what it r epresents - the r e al physical 
object . Pe r cept ions are intr a- mental enti t i es , ru1d strictly internal and 
perishi ng existences . But i n hio pol emic against the philosophical viev; , Hume 




resent nothing and there is no r eal thing. Perceptions are all there is , 
or at least all we can kncrr there is. Hence he is led into s~ing that 
the vulgar take their perceptions to be their only objects. He is himself 
the victim of the philosophical view and takes his only obj ects to be per-
ceptions. What the vulgar take to be objects - things - can only on his 
view be perceptions. 
"That I may avoid all ambiguity and confusi on on this head, I shall ob-
serve , that I here account for the opini ons and beliefs of the vulgar with 
regard to the existence of body ; and therefore must entirely conform myself 
to their manner of thinking and of expressing themselves . Now we have al-
ready observ ' d , that however philosophers may distinguish betwixt the objects 
and perceptions of the senses ; which they suppose co-existent and resembling; 
yet this is a distinction, which is not comprehended by the generality of 
mankind , \'lho as they per cei vc only one being, can never acsent to the opinion 
of a double existence and representation. Those very sensa·tions , which enter 
by t he eye or ear , are ·with them the t r ue objects , nor can they r eadily con-
ceive that this pen or paper , which is i mmediately perceiv ' d , represents 
another , which is different from , but resembling it . In order , therefore , 
to accommodate myself to the ir notions , I shall at first suppose ; that there 
is only a single existence , which I shall call indifferently object or per-
caption , according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose , understanding by 
" both of them what any common man means by a hat , or shoe , or stone , or <my 
other imprcosion , convey ' d to him by his senses . I shall be :.;ure to give 
warninG, •;;hen I return to a more philosophical way of ::;peak.i.nt; and thinking. " 
(Tr eatise , P.202 ) . 
!Iume hac of cuurne repeatedly follm cd the t er11d.nology Vlhich he here 
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somewhat portentously announces as conforming to the vulgar mru1ner. The 
ambiguity and confusion which he tri es to avoid is simply made worse. What 
any common man means by a hat or shoe is not what Hume means by an impression , 
those very sensations which enter by the eye or 'ear. If that were so , " im-
pression" and " thing" would be synonyms. But a thing is not the seeing of 
it. It need not be seen to .be: it is not an internal and peri shing existence. 
To call the singl e exis~ence indifferently object or perception is not to 
accommodate himself to the vulgar belief at all: it i s si mply to confuse 
the issue . What corresponds to a perception in the vulgar parlance is not 
the thing, but the way the thing looks to me here and n0\7 , the look of the 
thing; things can be seen from different places at different times in different 
lights ; furthermore , they can be handled, explored, examined , submitted to 
test and experiment, and this is the most obvious sense in which they are 
independent th0ir peculiarit i es are dis covered , not invented. But for Hume 
this is not a problem at all: the problem of independent existence is reduced 
to the p·roblem of continued existence when they are unperceived. And this 
follows from his i dentification, foisted upon the vulgar, of perceptions and 
things. 
"'Tis certain, that almost all mankind , and even philosophers themselves , 
for the greatest part of thei r lives , take their pe rceptions t o be their only 
objects ••• ' Tis also ce rtain , that t his very perception or obj ect is supposed 
' 
"' to have a continu ' d uninter rupted being, and neither to be annihilated by our 
atscnce , nor to be brought into exiotence by our presence . .1./hen \'TC are absent 
from it, we say it still exi sts , but that we do no!; feel , vte do not see it." 
(Treatise , P. 207) . 





is that what we ·see or perceive is a perception. A table , for example , is a 
perception. He is asking how we supp0se that "the interruption in the appear-
ance of a perception implies not necessarily an interruption in its existence ." 
rhe confusion is only explicable if one bears in mind that he is attacking the 
representative theory, and that of the double existence he has retained the 
representation, the simulacrum- table in the mind. This he takes to be what 
is ordinarily meant by "the table", and since it is oniy a representati on or 
perception one may speak of the interruption in the appearance of the perception 
just as· one may talk ' of the interruption in the appe arance of the table . 
He ignores the fact that what we ·call a table is in depth while what he 
~alls a perception is two- dimensional , flat . The perception- table would be 
~ore like a picture of a table. But he just forgets about this during his 
iiscussion of the broken appearances .and how we unite them. United or not, 
~hey would still all be flat , for Hume never explains ho1·: a third dimension 
~ets into the picture . The alleged perplexity arising from the broken appear- . f I 
mces is entirely Hume ' s . His problem is not for example , how I believe that 
;he book which I see continues to exist when I am not looking at it, but in 
~ffect how I believe an appearance to exist when it is not appeari ng, not an 
•ppearance, to which the vulgar , and only, answer i s : I don ' t. But this is 
rhat he makes out that trw vulgar do believe . 
Evcm hi s ac~ount of the philosophical viev1 is obscured thereby . By nay of 
:orrccting the vulgar opinion, he rcwarks " that all our l)e r ception::; are dependent 
m our oreans ••• f ·rom all vthich we learn , that our Genoiblc perceptions are not 
>OGsest of any distinct or independent cxj_stence ." (P. 211) . But this is the 
rulgar opinion : it amounts t o sayin~ that we do nqt see things Ythcn we are not 
.ooking at them, i . e., when they do no·L appear , and that they l ook d.i_ffercnt at 
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different times . He continues : "The natural consequences of this reasoning. 
shou ' d be, that our perceptions have no mor e a continu ' d than an independent 
existence ; and indeed philosophers have so far run into this opinion , that 
they change their system , and distinguish, (as vre shall do for the future) 
betwixt perceptions and objects, of which the former are supposed to be in-
terrupted , and ~ rishing , and different at every r eturn ; the latter to be 
uninterrupted, and to preserve a continu 'd existence and identity ." What 
Hume is here describing is prima facie· more like the vulgar view which makes 
t he distinction between the table which has a continued existence and identity, 
and my seeing the table at differ ent times and in different ways , and which 
is embodied in the very language . Having r adically misrepresented the vulgar 
view Hume attributes something very like it to the l e arned. 
All right , it may be said , Hume has been careless in hin exposition , but 
after all he doe3 give an account of the vulgar , natural belief in the inde-
pendent continuing existence of things . In the end, the thing - hat, shoe 
or stone - is the identity, the ficti on of the imagination. What he is 
accounting for in ·the end is the vulgar belief, and is it not a plausibl e 
account? 
It is plaucible certainly in the ::;ense that we do all believe i n the con-
tinuinc independent c x.iGtence of things . But I sec no r eason to suppo3e 
that Hume has been careless in his exposition in any matc>rial r espect . The 
confusion about what a percoption is, the ambieuity of the concept , is central 
to. his whol0 doctri ne , anrl forces him t o say the conflictinG and contradictory 
things he does nay . His account of the belief in the world and all t he con-
tinuine; things i.n it'is inccparable f rom thio confusion . For llume , we arr ive 
- ------------------
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~t the belief through the experience of contradiction and perplexity at 
the broken appearances and seek relief in the fiction from our uneasiness 
at the conflict between the identity of the resembling perceptions and the 
interruption of the appearance. Hume is forced into this fairy story by 
his premises which are derived entirely from the learned doctrine that the 
immediate objects of the mind are its own representations or perceptions. 
This masquerades as an account of our actual experience , and he insists 
repeatedly that these perceptions are kno\vn as such by consciousress. 
An account of experience must take it as it is, not as one might suppose 
on the basis of a physical or physiological doctri ne that it must be, or 
must originally be . VIe have no experience except as embodied beings. The 
belief in the continued existence of things would hardly be possible for 
beings which did not have experience of things external to and independent 
of themselves , which they could approach and examine and discover more and 
more about: 'vhat one discove rs in this way is experienced as being there 
already - we don ' t invent it. Again , I could not believe that ther e is a 
wall behind my back if I had no back , nor that there are things elsewhere 
if I were not here , that is to say if I wer e not o. body. Nor could I believe 
that things exist unperceived if I did not see t hem in depth, for to see some-
thing in depth is to see it a s having ano t her unseen side which I could see 
from a vanto.ge point beyond , for J can also move , and I can see where I could 
move to . "' An embodied being is always somewhere , and where he ic is identifi ed 
only in relation to where he has been , will be or could be, to o the r places 
where there are other t hings. 'ro cc.y I am here and nov1 is to say ther e is a 
world in space and tim~. When I move ·to another place i t woulU. not be anothe r 





It never occurred to Hume and it has occurr ed to few if any of the 
commentators that so far as perceptions are concerned some of the commonest 
adverbs and prepositions and place v1ords would be unintelligible: up , down , 
over, under , behind, before , left , right , top, bottom . All these words 
could have meaning only for an embodied being, situated and oriented in the 
wor ld. For a disembodied consciousness its perceptions could not have a top· 
or bottom, a left side or a right side - these expressions would be meaning-
less. This escapes notice only because Hume secretly supposes that the 
disembodied concciousness sees , i . e ., that it is embodied, a s his inconsequent 
references to the internal and external show, as well as his r ef erences to 
the senses. 
Again and again , Hume ' s argument is plausible because he , and with him 
the reader , tacitly assumes what he has no rieht to assume. For example , 
:1e says : "To be{;in with the senses , ' tis evident these faculties are incap-
3.ble of giving rise to the notion of the continued existence of their objects 
3.fter they no longer appear to the senses . For that is a contradiction in 
terms , and supposeo that Lhe sonaes continue to opcra·te , even after they have 
:;eas ' d all manner of operation." (Treatise , P. l88 ). If one forgets that 
'object" here means "perception", one may easily fail to notice Hume ' s con-
fusion of the object of the scnnes in the ordinary sense - the thing we see 
md the perceptlon or impression which r esults from the ctirnulation of the 
3ensc:; , and therefore suppo::.e that Hume is mer ely sayint! that a thine; is 
1ot seen wh~n it i::; no~ .seen , or t.hat we do not sec it when \·1e do not see it . 
·Iumc insouciantly trades ,on the normal meaninG of "o'ujcct of th t• senses" and 
then produces an arcumcnt which identifies this with the perception . But 




the body , the external sense organs , the nerves and animal spirits. The 
only way to avoid the charge of circularity, of assuming the findings of 
a science of the body to explain the belief in bodies , is to assert as he 
does "that all sensatioJ;ls are felt by the mind, such as they really are ." 
Vlhen made expl icit , his argument requires for example , that what is 
ordinarily described as seeing a table , should be known as it really is , 
that is , as a complex impression of sensation, in the flat and nowhere . 
'"'\ 
He insists that what is really given, the immediate object , is the perception. 
But of course we do see tables and chairs and that sort of thing. So tables 
and chairs are perceptions. Having thus identified the alleged ext ernal 
object n.nd the intramental entity, he has disposed of external and distinct 
existence, and his only problem is that of continuing existence to which i n-
dependent existence is reduced : 
" If our senses , therefore_, suggest any idea of distinct existences , they 
must convey the impressions as those very existences by a kind of fall acy 
and illusion." (P. l89) 
· When he comes to examine the question why we attribute a distinct and 
conti nued exist ence to some i mpr ession s and not to others and finds they 
have " o. peculiar constancy" , hi s examples are "mountai ns , and houses , and 
t r ees , which lie at present under my eye ." They " change not upon account 
of o;ny inter rupt i on in my seeing or perce iving them. " " All qui t e true , and 
t~e r eader r eadily accepts this i f he forgets that he is r equ i r ed to hold 
that v1hat he sees arc perceptions : that is the whole point of the art;Urnent . 
~~he 8o.;r-e coes for t he subsequent and celebrated pa s::;ace i n \7hich Hume, seated 
in his chamber , descri bes the reflcxions and reasonincs occasioned by the entry 
----------------------
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of a por ter with a letter .from a friend 200 l eagues distant. (P. l96) The 
reader may again very readily forget the poi nt : thi ngs , the porter and all 
are perceptions. So is who.t would commonly be called Hume - the large man 
sit-ting in the chambe·r . The "I " of the narr ative cannot strictly be anywher e , 
or if the "I" be nothing but the perceptions , it is also t he porter, the letter , 
the friend , and eve rything else it would commonly be said to think of or imagine . 
In another passage of the same kind , (P. l99) Hume ignores the paradox in his 
t erms of talking of the percep·tion of the sun or ocean, when t he sun and ocean 
~ perceptions , and r educes the questi on of the conti nued existence of the 
perceptions t o the continued existence of the sun or ocean. The question is 
conti nuously begged : the world and the things i n it are taken as premi ses of 
an argument which is supposed to show how we believe in things and a wor ld con-




BODY AND CAUSALITY 
"We may '17ell a sk , What causes induce us to beli eve in the existence of 
body? but ' tis in vain to ask , ~fuether there be bo~y or not? 
' 
That is a point 
which we must take for granted in all our r easonings ." (Treatise , P. l87) . 
Does Hume mean that we must take fo r granted ·the existence of body to 
~account for our belief in it? Or does he simply mean that the question 
whether there be body or not is unanswerable , and t he only qu8s tion is how 
we come to believe there is body? The l atter is the usual interpretation, 
borne out by his analysis of bodies as fictitious identities of the i magination. 
But I am not sure that this is all Hume means. The above quotation can be 
read as a r ecognition by Hume tnat his argument is circular, that he takes the 
existence of body for aranted in giving a causal account of our belief in body. 
It seems to me clear that he does do this , and the question is whether he 
recognises v1hat he is doin{J. His account of the belief in the causal relation 
is so flacrrantly a ca.uoal account that he can hardly have failed to r ecor3Tiise 
it ; t his seems to me to enhance the possibility that he explicitly intends 
to assume the existence of body as well as causalit y in accountincr for the 
belief in body. 
The ques tion is a fundamental one for the whole intr.rprr.tation of liume ' s 
philosophy . Tf he were takincr body and causality for Gr~tcd in accounting 
for· t he beliefs in. body and nccccsary connection , his aceoun t v1ould bv simply 
a ccic...ntific account , v1hich \'Iould leave the metaphysical and epi:.;ternolot;ical 
quentionn unLouchad. Now this tcmlcncy is i nher ent in hie <.:oncept of human 
na.tu r c a:; a p1 rt of nature , and his Newtonian model of cxpcrirne:nt and cxplan-
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ation. On th~s interpretation and only on this interpretation can Hume be 
said to give a psychological account of the belief in body and causality. 
In any of its modern meanings , psychology · is intra- mundane: it is concerned 
with given c:reatures , animal or human, in the world , and takes these creatures 
in the world and causality for granted. It is , or intends to be , a science . 
There are great difficulties in this view of psychology which I shall discuss 
later in connecti on with Ryle ' s '"fhe Concept of Mind": the principal one 
concerns the reduction of subjectivity , experience , to obj0ctive , causal ex-
planation . But my point for the moment is simply that if Hume ' s account is 
psychological in the modern meaning, it must be one which takes the world and 
causality for granted, and cannot be an account of the world and causality as 
constituted by belief and imarrination without circularity. 
It is largely useless to ask what sort of account Hume intends to give, 
for he makes no explicit distinction between science and philosophy. Natural , 
moral and mantal philosophy are distinguished by their subject matters and the 
peculiar difficulties which these respectively present . But they all deal with 
aspects of nature. Hume does suggest t hat the science of human nature is some-
how f undamen tal in his introducti on : "'Ti s evident , that all the sciences have 
a r el at ion , greater or lens, to ·human nature ; and that hov;evcr wi de any of 
t hem may seem to run from it , they sti ll return back 'oy one passat;G or o.nothe r ." 
(P. xix) 'rhey "l ie unde r the co{Plizance of men , and arc judecd of by t hei r 
powers and f acul t i es . " But i t is much mor e plausible tD i nterpret t his in 
modern t er;;w as the asse r t i on t ha.t psychology is the fundamental sci ence than 
as an assertion that epist emology and moral philosophy are differ ent i n kind 
from any ccience . 
r·.rctaphysics f or Hume wa.s ::;chool rnetaphy t~l~.;s . Dcicn~o , experiment, was the 
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But the fictions of the imagination , as he called them, are the 
things that science in the first place i s about - bodies . But Hume never 
makes this point , and never recognises that his science of man is not a 
science lilce the others , but a Fi rst Philosophy, no less than Aristotle ' s , 
and that he speaks truer than he knows when, in his attack on substance, 
he jokingly suggests that perceptions are substances. 
)/ ")/ -r« O V1'ot 1 ouo-'«. him they are - ~-~a, o'blo·~a. 
This is what for 
In Hume ' s account of causality , as in his acc.ount of the belief in the 
existence of body, "obj ect" means both " thing" and "perception" . Now£! 
hypothesi , ther e is no intrinsic, causal or necessary connection between one 
impression or :Ldea and another; each is as i·t is and as it appears , regard-
less of any other. The point about Hume ' s elaborate argument , however, is 
that the conclusion prescribed by the definition of impressions and ideas is 
~pplied to things . Furthermore , his account of the causal belief is a 
~ausal account. 'rhe causes of the causal belief are therefore either real 
causes, which could only be known by God, or they presuppose the causal belief , 
in v;hich case his argument is circular. 
If we take a bodily sensation as the type of an impression, which Hume 
invites us t o do , i t is evident that one sensation does not cause another 
sensation ; nor does anyone suppose so . · Tooth-decay causes t oothache , but 
tooth- decay is not a sensation . A pin ent ering the skin cause ::; a jab; the 
jc.b i.:..; a scn:..;ation hu t not the pin or t he skin. A{:,a:i.n , if we t ake ao cor-
respondin.:; to what Humc means by a complex imprcsc.ion v;ha.t I see as I see 
it from my window , or any part i.cular thine - a house or a tr('!C - the way I 
J0C i ~ mr;; , th L::; vicv1 or appr;arauce i:::; not a co.un~> or <lll effect of any other 







are effects, but none of them is the cause of any other.) One appearance 
or look of a t hing does not cause another appearance or loolc; t hey can 
never be more than successive , contiguo~s, and constantly conjoined. Looks , 
appearances, pepceptions are not things~ but hypostatised ent iti es . One 
billiard ball causes another to move, but the look of the one does not cause 
t he look of tha other : the terms of the causal relation are the balls , not 
the l ooks , that is to s,ay the caus al relation is asserted between two identities , 
/ 
fictions of the i magination inHume ' s terms, not between two impress ions or 
ideas . 
An analysi s of causality is condemned to futility if it does not take as 
. 
examples what we do r egard as cases of cause and effect. Hume again does 
what he accuses the vulgar of doing, confounding.perceptions and objects . But 
his analysis can o~ly be significant in so far as it is concerned with the 
motions , actionc and reactions , and changes of things , for t hese are what we 
take t o be causes and effects . Hume calls an effect "an object which begins 
to exist", and this expression reveals as clearly as anything his confusion : 
the object in this context i s not v1hat we call a thing, but a perception . 
When a stationary billiard ball begins to roll , a new per ception. begins to 
exist , in Ilume ' s terms . He nevertheless treats the new perception as if it 
we r e the thing. 'J:'hi ·s is essential to. his whole argument . 
Now most of his argument is concerned with causa1 infe r ence , infer ence 
from what is observed to its cause or effect on the basis of paot exper ience . 
It is very little concerneci '.vith observation and expur ic:ncc a::; SLtch , and wl th 
what we do observe and experience . The r eason for this ii.J that llurne has 
settled t hat matt er a priori : . all \'ie can ever r eJ.lly observe or experience 
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are contiguous and successive impressions. But he applies this dogma to 
bodies, thines. " tf.otion in one bc_>dy is regarded upon impulse as the cause 
of· motion in .anothe r . When we consider these obj ecto with the utmost 
attention ,; we .f ind only that the one body approache s the other; and that 
the motion of it pt•ecedes that of the other ; but without any sensible inter-
val. ' Tis in vain to rack ourselves with farther thought and reflexion 
upon this subject. We can go no farther in considering this particular I• 
inst ance ." (Treatise, P. 76- 7) . 
It is of course only if we take what is present to be u succession of 
impressions - which have paradoxically to be called visual - that we can go 
no farther . His areument requires one , though it is ostensibly about bodies , 
to be a purely visual observer, immobile , deaf , and preferably disembodied : 
that is the rule of the game . But there is no reason why we should play 
this artificial earne. 
There· might be some point in it if Hume were r eally playing fair : but 
to play fair one must either stick to bodies or stick to perceptions . Hume 
has confused them and · it is easy to shovr this . What i s that word "impulse" 
doing in the passage quoted? I t certainly applies to bodies . An impulse 
is a push; a push i s the action af one thing on another and to say such 
action is cau::;a.l is not to add anythine. One must r egard the phrase "upon 
impulse" as inadvertent 0!1 Hume ' s part . He means to deny tho:t !111Shes can 
" be observed , and to assert that only motion and change can be obcerved . But 
if' I put my fin:_;c r in front of a mo ving billiard ball or cannon ball I feel 
the ball pu~hing my finger and sec what I feel . Jlwnc or any oennationalist 
would. in :.;tantly dr.ny this : you carmo t see what you f"cl. But in doing so 
he has t o talk about eensa l;ions and impressions , no t about thine::~ , not about 
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billiard balls or cannon balls . Indeed one cannot properly talk about 
seeing or feeling, though ~me must ; it is done with the words "visual" 
and "tactual". To insist with the sensationalist that I cannot see what 
I feel - the push of the ball - is to sa:y that I cannot feel with the hand 
that I see the billiard ball that I also see . Billiard balls and in general 
bodies are seen wi·th one ' s eyes and felt \Vith one ' s hands. What sort of 
billiard ball would i ·t be that one could not both see o.nd touch and be 
touched by? A Humean billiard ball , not really a billiard ball but a visual 
perception . A percep·tion cannot give a push : there is absolutely no need 
for Hume to areue that point . But when he invites the reader to "consider 
these objects w.i th the utmo::.t attention" or "in themselves", what he means is 
"as perceptions ." 
Now pushes are causes , though it does not add anything to what we exper-
ience as a push t 0 call it a cause . If I put my finger in front of the moving . . 
billiard ball , l etting it danele , I feel the push and it moves the fineer : 
I feel it rnovine; my finger, r1hich is to say , causing my f ine;e r to move . To 
say it cau::;es my finger t o move is to say no more than that it moves my finger, 
and this is a matter of actual direct experience . Similarly v1hen I push it , 
or pick it up and roll it , there is no point in saying I cauoe i~ to move , 
for t hat i s me r ely ales::; explicit way of saying I push it or roll it . Passive 
and active pushes ar0 just as much matters of experience as visibl e movemC'Tl to . 
All our exper icn..;e is the experi ence of an embodied ocin~; there arc not two 
or .thrrc or more - a seeinc one , a touching one , and a. mo vinG one , but one 
c r.1bodied bcinc which sec::; , touch0s and moves . 'rhus I s0c the: push as well as 
feel i t , ju::;t us I nee t he rOllt)hness of a surface as well a ::; the.: colour , or 
cr unp the very Lh:i.nt;; ~·lhich I see . "ifc need not "rack Ollrsc 1 vcs" to knm1 that 
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we observe not merely two movements when one billiard ball rolls up to 
another, but the one hitting, pushing, impelling the other , which, if one 
wants to use the otiose word " cause", means causing the other to move. 
There is no . question of an occult cause •. 'Pushes and pulls are matter s 
of direct experience , just like colours . There " nothing occult about 
being jostled on a crowded bus or being dragged by a child towards the 
sweet shop ; one actually f eels the push or the pull . Similarly one has 
direct experience of strength, force , p~ver , r esistance , weight in l i fting , 
laying , hoisting, throwing and swinging things . One knows what force and 
power are by shoving and being shoved , just as one knows what colour is by 
seeing colours . 
One does not experience one ' s own body as a thing , except to some extent 
when one contemplates it - f or exampl e , one ' s hand lying on the t able. 
t hen, i f one move s · a f i nger i t i s onl y i mperfectly a thing or object , for I , 
who see i t , am mo vi ng (it) , as I might move my eye s to see it . But apart 
from the occasi ons when I contemplate it in t his way , it is entirely me , a 
subject not an object. It is by being a body t hat I have any exper ience of 
t hings, events , processes, phenomena . As a doer engaged in various t asks , 
my ar ms a.11d hands a r e not things aruong other things but the power I have to 
r each , touch, gra sp and manipulate t hings and are so experienced - non-
t hct i cally , as Sar tre would say . 'fhr:y are not t hcmoe J.ve::; t hinc s whi ch one 
~ 
mani pulates or grasps or moves or touches - f or i t i s v1 i t h t hem that one gr asps , 
et c . 'I'o t ouch one ' s oYm hand is t o touch it ·with one ' ::; oth0r hand , and 
t hougb normally touching a.nd bei ng touchod ar e j u::;t as diffe rent f r om each 
othor a s are pushi ng and being rnwhcd , i n this case tho (~ ):pcricnce i s peculiar 




to get at , near , round about , over or away from things. 
One does not move one ' s body; one moves bodily ; movement is bodily 
To move anything one must be a body, an emhodied subject , and 
as.such lift or heave or 'push or pull it. The one body one cannot lift 
or heave or push or pull is one ' s own , for .even in climbing a rope or 
hoisting oneself on to a high wall it is as a body that one is pulling or 
hoisting. · One has to ~ay one lifts one ~ s arm and use many similar expres-
sions i n order -to npecify what mw ement one is maki ng. But it is easy to 
ignore the difference between lifting one ' s arm and lifting a hrunmer, say. 
One lifts the hammer with one ' n hand and arm , but one doesn ' t lift one ' s 
arm with anything, for it is a part of oneself, the embodied subject . 
Hume ' s discussion of bodily movement in the appendix ( P. 632) is founded 
on the distinction betvreen a volition and a movement of the body. He insists 
that " the actions of the mind are , in this respect , the same with those of 
matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction ; nor can we ever reason 
beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy , more than external 
objects have . Since , therefore , matter is confess'd by philosophers to operate 
'I 
by an unknovm force , we shou ' d in vain hope to attain an idea of force by con-
sul tine our own rn:i nd s . " To consult one ' s own mind in this context can only 
be to consult a di:::>er~hotlied mi nd, for Hume ' s argument is based strait;htfor-
I'FurcUy on the mind-matter dualism ; the body is matter and there is there fore 
no quest ion of con::;ul ting one ' s experience as an embodied 1lcinc - the exper-
i cr.ce of be.in~ a ·body - to attai n the idC'a of for<~e . Voluntary movement is 
held t o consist .in a mental volition folla.ved by a movement of matter. But 




the experience of doing and acting, in which the volition is not identifiable 
but p:essure, r esistance and force are . As Ryle has argued, to my mind con-
elusively, volitions belong to the theory of the ghost in the machine. 
In the "Enquiry", Hume discusses the question at greater length , but is 
prevented by his preconceptions from recognising the importance of the "animal 
nisus", as he calls it. This "though it can afford no accurate precise idea 
of power, enters very much into that vulgar , inaccurate idea, which is form'd 
of it ." (Enquiry , P. 67) . This point is consiened to a footnote, though one 
might have suppo~:~ed that the vulgar idea of power was the very one , if ·not 
the only one , whose oriein i·~ was in•por·~ant to identify. But Hume ' s concern 
is causal inference and necessary connexion and he of course identifies power 
and necessary connexion • 
. Having found that external objects give us no idea of power or necessary 
connexion , " l et · us see", he says , "whether this idea be derived from r eflection 
on the operations of our own minds , and be copied from any internal .impression. 
It may be said, that we 0;re every moment conscious of internal pm·:er ; while we 
feel , that , by the simple comrnand of our will , we can move the organs of our 
body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of voli tion produces motion 
in our limbs, or raise s ·a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the 
r1ill we know by consciousness ••• But the means , by v1hich this i::; effected; 
tho unere:; by wh.i_ ch the v1ill performs so extraordinary an opero.tion; of this 
~~e are so far f rom being immadiatoly conscious , that it must for ever escape 
ou.r' mos t dilit;ent enquiry." (Enc;.u iry , P.64- 65) . 
The terms in ,,:ihich flume puts the problem arc~ .acain those oi: the dual'i.s t 
t heory of th0 inLcraction of ooul and body, the body beine the particular bit 
of Hlat'l.c r on r;bich the :::;oul ac-t;s . 'l'hc :::;ucacstion that we arc eve ry moment 
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consci ous of internal power , he interprets as meaning that we are conscious 
of the power of t he mind or will , for embodied experi ence , the experience 
of· being a body, is excluded from consideration. Just as my hand moves the 
pen , so my volitions move my hand; the connection is equally myster ious . 
Volitions are the "occult inner thrusts" of which Ryle speaks , like the thrust 
of my hand on a lever, except that they are unobservable . Hume takes them 
for granted , as he doe s the theory to which t hey belong, but not the actual 
experience of p eing a body. Hence he cites t he case of a man 3truck with 
palsy who trie s to move his limbs but cannot , and argues from this that neither 
in his case nor in the normal case "are we ever conscious of pov1er" . " Con-
sciousness ," he says , "never deceives . " 
But the whol e passage i s based on the assumption that we do not really 
have bodily exper ience , that our experience is that of pure mi nds associated 
with things .which ar e mer e t hings we can "command", but not r eal ly £2• I 
don ' t know about t he pal cy , but what one experience s when one is too weak to 
move i s weakness , bodily we o.kness ; one tries to stand up but can ' t , but the 
trying is no~ t he net of o. disembodied mind ; one tries bodily. This sort 
of experience is i mportant for understanding what i s meant by an act of will 
or sheer will-power and indeed t he meaning of " can" and " cannot ", as we shall 
see bclo·.1 . But Hume den i es dir ect experience in favour of science : 
~~","Jc learn f r om anatomy , that the i mmediate objcc·t of po·::er in volun t o.ry 
"' motion , is not the me:nber itself :-1hich i s :noved , but certain mu:::c:lcs , and nerve s , 
artd anii:Jo.l :::;picit? , and , pcrhap~ , something still more mintttC' and mor 11 unlmown , 
thront;h v1irich the · mo Lion ic ::;uccc,•ssi vely propaljatc.d , ere it r each the member 
it:::cl f \'lilOGe motion i::: th..: immcdin:Le oujcct of vohtion . Can th~rc be a more 
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certain proof that the power , by which this whole operation is perfor med , 
so far from beincr directly and fully kno"m by an inward sentiment or con-
sciousness , is , to the last degree , mysterious and unintelligible? Here 
the mind wills a certain event : Immediately another event , unkno\711 to our-
selves , and totally differ ent from the one intended, is produced : This 
event produces another , equally unknown : Till at last , through a long 
succession , the desired event i s produced ••• How indeed can we be conscious 
of a power to move our limbs , when we have no such power ; but only that to 
move certain animal spirits , which, though t hey produce at last t he motion 
of our limbs , yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our compre-
hension?" (Enquiry , P. 66-7) . 
The physiological mechani~m fu not r elevant to the analysis of bodily 
experience . The experience of moving, of raising one ' s arm , of reac~ing for 
a pencil , of one ' s arm not as a thing but as the power to reach a thint;, is 
ano·thcr matter. But if the question is whether we experience power, how we 
acquire "the idea of power " - or to put the matter in another way , vrhat "power" 
I 
\ l
means - it is this experience , and not what object ively , physiolocrically , 
happens when v1c have this experience , which is the relevant consideration. 
I 
Hume ' s argument here is of exactly the same kind an his o.rgumunt that taste 
and smell arc really non he r e , y,rhich is to deny tha·t one tastes a fig in one 's 
;:?outh or smells a stink at a midden . The argument tha·~ •:1c don ' t really see 
colours but only liclrt of different r1avc- leneths be lung<> "'to the sanae family ; 
jus.t ao , accorci inc; to this ar(..-ur:Jcnt , \'ie don ' t see r1hat we think v1r: see , so 
for Hume r1c don ' t do v1hat r1c think v;e do r:hen v1e m0vc an ar:n . 
!!umc ' s discusni.on i:.; dominated by the qucnt ion of nccc osury connection , 
tho crounuo of iufcrcncc from th0 past to the prc:;cnt and. -the loci cul problem 
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of induction. Force , pov1er, are treated simply as linguistic variants , 
and the animal nisus - the experience of effort and exerti on of force , 
successful or unsuccessful - is dismissed as giving only a vulgar and in-
accurate.i dea of power . But how in Hume ' s sense can an i de a be accurate 
or inaccurate? In this parti cular case, he would have t o say that t he im-
pression , i.e. , t he actual experience of effort , exertion , push.ing, vras 
inaccurate too. What he mie;ht demand is a more precice analysis of our 
actual experience , but he i s not at all concerned to {!i ve ·that . His demand 
for more accur acy seems t o be aki n to the demand for more accuracy in an 
account of seeing a coloured surface . One can only describe some aspects 
of t his , but one cannot say what a colour is , so far a s di rect experience of 
colour is conce~cd . Similar ly , one cannot say what a push or a pull or 
pr essure or exer tion ar e i n di r ect experience without using synonymous ex-
pressions : one •Jan onl y descr i be various cases, which it i s indeed ·important 
to do accur ately. But Hume i::; demanding in the case· of pov1er or force , what 
he would not dream of demandi ng in the case of colour. 
There i::J not of cour se a p recise parallel . We open our eyes and there 
are t he col ouro . nut we only experience the r es i::;tancc , pressur e , wei cht , 
otrenLrth and f or ce of thi nt;s i n opposition to the effort vro have to make to 
shif t and manipulate them in a vari ety of ~aye and in their various i mpact s 
upon us ; but for our own doings and t asks as embodied beings , it go.Js without 
. "' saJinG t hat we :::;hould have no such exper ience and theca ·,;or do nCJulu be meaning-.. 
lt;;s . l ut t hi o· iG a matter of di rect embodied expcriencfJ 1 ik" our seei ng 
colour , shape and cxten:::;ion , but not , as might be ~'1d oftc'n i:::> \'irOnL;ly sup-
posed of thane , the experience of a mer e passive , contemplati ve being, but of 




a doer with 'hands and limbs. To do is to cause , but, I repeat , one isn ' t 
addi ng anything to the notion of doing by saying that. 
One question which it is important and interesting to ask is why the 
story about volitions and movements of matter has been found so persuasive , 
for if it were not supported by some sort of experience it is unlikely that 
it would have survived and been widely accepted merely as the corollary of 
a metaphysical theory. What we must look for is the sort of experience 
which is r eadily transposed into the terms required by the theory. This 
sort of .experience , of which it is said in tradi·t i onal terms that the spirit 
is willing but the flesh is weak , is of the kind where there is indeed a. 
conflict and ipso facto a certain duality , an_d which therefore lends itself 
to descri ption in the dualistic terms of soul and body , will and body , or 
will and .passion:.>, vrher e the pass ions are bodily passions . Here are so me 
examples: one must get up to go to work, but the warmth, comfort and drowsi-
ness are almos t overwhel mi ng; one wan·ts to r each the summi t of a_ mountain , 
but heat , thirst and f atieuc make one falter - one io t cr.tpt ed to -sink down 
and rest; one's anger is boiling up, but one tries to keep co.lm. 
In t hese cases one is contending not - or not onl y - v:i t h an external 
sit uat ion but with what has happened to one bodily. E'ati[;uo boars doYm, 
ange r hoi ls up , desir e gripG or i mpd.s , illneos str i kes , ol d age ::;teals on. 
'.rhe ::;c thi ngs happen to one ; on0 does not de ci de upon t hem or choose t hem , 
any moro than one choose::; t o be born or wher e t o be born . Hence they are so 
far like othC'r eiven elements i n one ' :::; situat ion - one: must s t art f rom the 
civen G.i tuat i on and act or r e- act i n one vray or another . 3incc t h€se happen-
i nc;::; or ;_; tate ::; arP. bodi ly happcnj_nt:;s or otat c s , vihich one cannot hel p , i t is 
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natural to suppose that the spirit or vtill r esists or succumbs , master s them 
or is defeated by them. But a moment ' s r eflection shows the fallacy . They 
are conscious ; they are experiences ; they are of the spirit as much as of 
the body. And on the other hand, the resistance , the attempt to ove::-come 
them is no less of the body than of the spiri t : the will is a bodily Ytill 
no less than when one is eneaged i n athl etic combat . The unity of embodied 
experience is indissoluble . The ~ind-matter duali~m applie s plausibly to 
certain phases of it , but even in these the action or r eaction of the VTill 
is bodily action . The will cannot act upon the body, for it is itself em-
bodied. A doctrine which takes one ' s own body to be matter and nothing but 
matter must ienore the essential and or iginal character of embodied experience. 
If the body as subject be rejected, the subject can only be a disembodied con- t 
I . I 
sciousness , not u seeine consciousness or a hearing consciousness and not a 
rnovine consciou~ness . The myth of the will is a myth of an unmoved mover , 
makin;::; non-motor movements . 
The experience of movi ng and doing i s insepar able from being a body. 
Humc ' n doctrine of y>crccptionn docs not deal d.th motion , other than per ceived 
motion which strictly would be a succession of perceptions . In subsequent 
sensationaliat doctrines , the experience of bodily movement was described as 
cons is tine; of l~inacsthetic sensations , a:'ld this , I think , takes the pr ize for 
idle verbalism. 
Pcrccr>tions arc essentially occurrences , events , happl'ni nG3 , a s !Iu:ac i ndi-
cates in saying that they arc all of the natur e of scnaatinn3 like the pain 
of the cuttint; st~cl . 'rhat is to say t hat they arc no~ doin c::> . The mind 
or consciousness for Hwnc is often essentially pas::;ivc , contemplative , and 
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not active . Its propensities and dispositions are in effect happeni ngs 
too. The association of ideas just happens . Such a passive conscious-
ness could have no direct experience of power or causal ity, but only of 
succession , contiguity , repetition and constant conjunction. On the whole 
Hume has. seeing in mind when he speaks of perceptions, but not looking. 
Lookinc is active : it is the way a doer with a. ta.ok in ho.nd sees . Hume 
thought he found in experience vrhat his mechanical model of explanation and • 
his physiological premises persuaded him he must find . He could only , 
however , think this in his study, not when he played backgammon or was 
merry with his friends . 
For the contempla·tive consciousness not only is there no direct ex-
perience of power or force , there is no direct experience of possibility, 
impossibility or necess i ty. Even in its liveliest moments it is passive : 
"For after a frequent r epetition , I find , that upon the appearance of one 
of the objects , the mind is determined by custom to consider its usual 
attendant , and to consider it in a stronger l i ght upon account of its relation 
to the first object . ' Tis this i mpression , then, or determination , which 
affords me the :id. ea of nccessi ty ." (Treatise , P. l55- 6) . Again; "We have 
entablinhed it as a principle , that as all idea:s are derived from impressions , 
or some precedent per cept ions , ' t:i.s impossible vre can have any idea of power , 
or efficacy , unlcos some insto.nces can be produced , wh<:: rc:Ln this power is per-
~ 
ceiv ' d to exert itself" . (P. l60) . Again: "We never have ·any i mpression , 
tl1.::.t contai n::: any po1·1er or cffic::tcy. We never thE:re forc have any idea of 
pov/()r . " 
. Hy ex.:linplcs of the direct experience of force or power :i.n hea.vinc or hoisting 
--- -- ------
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things would not count for Hume because doing is reduced to perceiving 
in a passive way and because a disembodied consciousness obviously canno-~ 
do anything. Nor can its objects have any function or use . The J:e rception 
corresponding to what we call seeing a hammer is of a certain shape , size 
and colour and that is all . We cannot literally see a thing to knock in 
nails with , see its possibil:ities, see what we can do \Vith it . We do not 
literally see what we can handle and grip : the visual is related to the 
tactual by association. That is to say, we can never see a hammer. A 
contemplative di sembodied consciousness is not a,doer and does not see as 
a doer. (It cannot, literally, see) . 
Nothing for such a consciousness is possible , impossible or necessary. 
Vlhat happens, happens, and what does not does not . Knowledge is knowledge 
of what happens . Since such a consciousness does not do anything there is 
nothing it can or cannot do; but anything may happen or be joined to anything. 
There can be n9 neces sary connection in the happenings contemplated by the 
passive consciousness . The necessity has to be just another happening that 
befalls it: "'Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords 
me the idea of necessity." 
Let us then return to actual embodied experience , to pushes and pulls 
and dunts and doings, an Yrcll as to shapes and colours. It is not difficult 
to eive examples of possibili-ty , impossibility , and necessity. As in the 
case of povior and f o.cce , tlwy :1re not quasi-observed quasi-vi sually by a 
contemplati ve consc.Lousncss , but experienced i.n act i on. \"fh .;n J find I c:an 
or cannot do what I want to do hy tryinG to do it, I cxperi~nce !JOSsibili ty 










arm, trying to r each i t , standing on tiptoe at full stretch ; no , I cannot 
quite reach it , I cannot stretch far enough ; I must 6et clos er . I need -
the light for I want to go on writing. To replace the bulb I need some-
thing t q stand on . I must get a chair . And t hat ' s it ; that was ~hat 
was needed. 
To describe thi s a s a series of happcninga would be t o describe it as 
a series . of meanin c;l c s s antics , if i ·t were not that antics are antics only 
by cont·r a st with conduct that makes sense , rational conduct . What I ex-
pericnce as hap~enings or event s are only certain elements in t he situation , 
.for example, the light going out. But even that is not a mer e event : I 
am writi ng an1 am suddenly deprived of light to writ e by ; I · need light and 
lack i t . The extinction of t he light is not a mer e happening but a happening 
t o me in my s i t ua·tion, \·rri t ing i n the light. Only for an agent v1i t h desires 
and purposes , a pour - soi pro jecting a f uture, can t her e be any lack , anything 
mi s sing , nny negative experience . What I can and cannot do i.n pursuit of 
rny purpose i s vrhat is poss i bl e or im_possible . What I must do t o achi eve 
it is what is necessary. In order to understand practical ne cessity one must 
be a doer or agent . Li ke colour or force or depr i vation , i t can be described 
and talke<l about , but one must have had the experience t o know what one is 
t alking abuut . 
The difficulty about necc~si Ly , possibi l i t y , and impoosibility i n any but 
a logical context f or the empiricist is that in the only t er ms acceptable to 
hi m these words can have no meaning. What ever is not mere ha!".r•:ninc;s , data, 
L ~; knar.ledcc . Cl.nd the problem of lmovrlcdge i::; the problem of cb j ecti ve , 




and then observes and notes t he results . Though this peculiar experience 
becomes in empiricist doctrines the type of all expe rience and is read back 
into pre- scientific , pre- predicative experience, the model docs not even 
apply ~o the case from which it is extracted . Objective experiments do 
not conduc·~ them eel vcs ; nor do they happen , though they are de!:iigncd to 
reveal what happens , under such and such condition s , if such and such be 
the case . If there were no embodied being who did not know but wanted to 
know what happens if ••• there woul d be no experiment . Only a subject can 
make an experiment and observe what happens. •ro observe , however , is not 
pass ively t o contemplate , to be the recipient of data , but t o know what to 
l ook for and look for it . But in empiricist doctrines t he very experience 
of t he subject , the maker of experiments , is reduced to happenings , events 
and processes such as are observed in an experiment , and the only acceptable 
account of it is of the same kind as t he account of what happens in the ex-
· periment . 
. ~ 
The body i s an object , so t he only account of it can be a caus al account . 
The subject , if any , ic a pure mind. But for such a mind t here could be no 
barrier s , opportunitieo or prospects ; doing nothin&, i t could not succeed 
or fail ; experiencing no necesaity , it could invent nothing; ther e coul d 
be nothj.nc to cir cumv0nt , ourmount , exploit ·or profit from . It could not 
knoVl how ; it could only lmo·;; tiw.t . 
"' Let us turn then to kno\;::_ng that , to kn0\7ledce of matter::; of fact , of 
wiiut is ob::;'"'rvah.l.y the cace. 
·::hatcv" r ·;;e ob::;crvc i::; obs12 rvcd in a world of ·:;!d.ch it, foL·m:; a part a.'ld 
in which we oursclvo::; arc , and in which \'le and it stand 'i.n u multi pl icity of 
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relationships to other things. Every "this" is " such and such": 
;J'o,'i:'(v~ 
al\7ays~ Without some of its relat ions , a thing cannot be conceived 
or described as being what it is - such and such a thin{!. ':/hatever is new 
and unf~~iliar is so only in relation to what is familiar , the world as we 
already kn0\"1 it. 
When Hume want a to illuotratc the absence of causal necessity in what we 
actually observe , he ·takes the case of what we already conceive as billiard 
balls . These are spherical objects , f!ard , cold to the touch , heavy, smooth, 
which v1hcn struck roll silently over the green baize used in the game of 
billiards . Anyone who knows a billiard ball when he sees one , knows these 
defining cha racteristics . crhat do we mean when we s ay there is no necessity 
in the arrested motion of one and the imparted motion of another when the one 
impinges on the o1;her? '::e can certainly imagine t his not happt ning, even 
if we exclude from consideration all causes which mieht , unknown to us and 
contrary t o our expectation , prevent it from happening. \'/hat we cannot 
logically do is to conceive billiard balls, used in the e;ame of billiards 
as i t is normally played , behaving othe rwise t han as they do. If thoy behave 
otherwise they arc by de finition not proper billiard balls (a::: prescribed 
in the book of rules ) or :i.t is not a proper table, or come other condition , 
explicit or i mpli.ci·t , of playi ng billi ards is not fulfill ad. To conceive 
them behaving othcraise ilj t o conceive something el se , for the concept of 
a billiard ball i s the concept of a ball that behaves ·tJ1'o.t way und billiards 
is- po::::si'ole only because it does : a ball is not ju::::t \'ihat is round , hut 
·::Lat roll [~ and :;e t a the oth<.r balls rolling. It must hr>hav,.. that way to 
be a billiard 'ball Cthou(;h one can ~i ve tho name of 'llllliard- bn.ll to n.nything 
one plea::>cs . ) v;c can predict t hat on i mpac-t with anothc:r billic.rd ball i ts 
j , .. 
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motion will be arrested , as we can predict that if we look at the side of 
it which is not in view we shall find it s mooth and curved like this side . 
In no sense , hoHever , is the mind determined to pass f rom 'l"ihat it observes 
t o what. usually follows - it can pass to anything it pleases. From seeing 
the billiard ball rolling , we can pass to imagining i ·t swerving round the 
other , rebounding , stopping dead , or rising vertically. But the logic of 
our present concept of a billiard ball requires that it behave as it does 
in fact behave . There is no reason* why a billiard ball or anythinG else 
should behave in a part i cular way or why it or anything else should exist , 
though the complex of conditi ons of its behavi nti as it does behave might be 
indefinitely extended . If its behaviour were completely i rreeular and un-
predictable we could not conce ive it as such and such at all. Nothing can 
be known of what offers no r egularity and no patte rn . Objects , s ays Hume, 
have no discoverable connection t ogether. Unless they do they cannot be 
conceived or rccogni~ed . 
Why do we be lieve that inductively established lawn , causal r elat i ons , 
obse rved r crrulu.ritlcn , will hold good in future ? \•/hat i s the rational 
ground of prediction? ~lhy do we believe that the future will be like the 
pas t , that lam; which n c have fonnd to hold in the pa nt will hold i n t he 
future? 'I'o an~1·:er thi::; quo::; Lion , one mu:::t first a Gk \7hat we m<..an by tho 
future , hoYT r:e con ~..:c i vo the future . :"lhat ne mean by tho:: futuro i:.; not mere 
ab::;tr act futurity , but tho future of the past and prc::;ont. Anu th'J pa:::t 
an~ prc ::;enL ao \·1e coneeivo t h<.:ul are the \·tay the ,.,orld and c vorytLi. J"l C in it 
has been and is :iO far a s we knm: . To conceive t h(! f ut 1P·e is t o conceive 
t he futuro of \·1hat the re is , and ·we conce.i. vc what there i::; in ter m::: of causal 
a nd many other relation::; . 'rherc arc no oth·.;r t ormc i.n which r1e can conceive 
)q :!/hut sort of rea son couhl t hat 
po::::.liuly be? 
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the future . The sense in which many of our particular predictions and 
assumptions about the future may be unfulfilled is precisely the sense in 
which this has happened in the past : things , events and proces::;es turned 
out not to .be as we had supposed they were ; we made mistakes . If the 
future is like the past t her e will be plenty of surprises for us; but 
vre are familiar with surprises ; we almost expect to be surprised. There 
can be no question of probability that the future will be like the past 
or present. If it is the future of the past or present it will be , for 
that is wha·t we mc:.1n by the future . We can imagine what we pleaoe and 
dub this a possible future ; but this is not the future of things and the 
r10rld as we know them, which is the future . 
• ' I 
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Chapter 12 
RUSSELL ' S REDUCTION 
" 'l'he Analysis of Mind" is carelessly written and it i s often difficult 
to see how i~s areumcnts , d r a\'m from the mos t disparate a.nd diverse sources 
in scientific theory, m~y be connected. The doctrine which it a·~tempts 
to expound is a form of "netrtral monism", of which Hume is the ~ssic exampl.ar . 
In what follow s , I have iiricd to concentrate on the essentials of the doctrine 
as they illustra:te characteristically empiricist ass umptions , ie,noring the 
considerable part of the book which seems to me to be merely playful or 
trivial. 
What Russell calls sensations , aspects , a ppearances , or particular s cor-
respond r ouehly to Hume.' s impressions . It :is not clear how far they are 
deduced from physical or phyaiological t heory and hO\'t far they arc supposed 
to be given as such in experience . They are, howeve r , the e lements out of 
whi ch minds on t!1e one hand and physical objects on tha other are somehow 
constructed or constituted. Tha differ ence lies in the r e lational structure , 
not in th~ stuff . Image s , howeve r , are peculJ.ar to mind , and those partie-
ularn which are not scnsationo ( if any ) are peculin.r to matter . But the 




Ce!ltral to Ru:;::.e ll ' s doctrine is the concept of a sensa.tlon •:1hich he takes 
over qui to uncr l tic ally a.1d \'lid_('h retains all its a.nbi~ui. Ly . The doctrine 
is ::.t::tted in Lecture V, " PsycholoGical and physical causal ln:::s " , P. 97 :-
"A pi(::CC of matte r , as i ~ i3 known empirically , is no~ u oin~le existing 
-------- -·- - -
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thing, but a system of existing thi ngs . When several people s i mul taneonsly 
see the same table , they all see something differ ent ; therefore ' the ' table, 
which t hey are all supposed to sec, must be either a. hypothesis or a con-
struction . ' The ' t abl e is to be neutral as between differ ent observers : 
it does not favour the a s1:e ct seen by one man at the expense of that seen 
by another. It was natural , thouGh to my mind mistaken , t o reeard the ' r eal ' 
table as the common cause of all the appearances which the table presents 
(as we say) to differ ent observers . But why should we suppose that there 
is some one common cause of all these appearances? As we have just seen, the 
notion of ' cause ' is not so r eliabl e as to allow us to infer the existence 
of something that , by i ·ts very nature , can never be observed. 
" Instead of looking for an impartial source, we can secure neutrality by 
the equal r epr esentation of all parties . Instead of supposing that there 
is some unknown cause , the ' r eal ' t able , behind the different sensations of 
those who arc caid to be l ooking at the table , v/e may take the whole set of 
these sensations (together possibly with certain othur particulars) as actually 
be inc t h·J t<1.ble . 'J.'ho. t i::; to 3 ~J;ft the table w11ich ia neutru.l an between 
differ ent observers (actual and po::;sible ) is the set of all those particulars 
which YIOuld naturally be called ' anpccts ' of the table from different points 
of view . ('l'his is a f i rnt approximation , modified later . )" 
nu::;:::;cll , like l!umc , is denyinG th~ "doubl e exi::;tcnce", "l.hc }h:rccptions 
" 
and the unobserved cause of the perceptions , " som ething that , by it::; very 
natur"! , ca11 ncvrr .h e obse rved ." Hussell i ::> not just propo::;inc; n.lloth,)r \'lay 
of <JcsGribint; th0 ord.i.nu.ry experience of sccin.:; a to.blc , or at lcJ.st docs 
not in t c:nd ju:.;t ·thu t . 1n Ru::; :::;cl l ' ::; ter m::; tr1o peoplt: c:1n nuver EE£ the same 
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:1ing. Nor can one person ~ the same thing for tr1o moments running unless 
~ remains immobile . Nor can he have another look at what he saw before . 
lings seen are momentary occurrences , and an occur rence ca~ never be re-
~a ted. Russell ' s r eason for proposine this view is his a ssumption that 
~ople who would ordinarily be said to be ~ooking at a table are having sen-
ltions , and that each sensation is an occurrence where each person is , and 
)t where in the ordinary sense the table is . And this assumption is derived 
!'Om t he t r aditional sensationali::it view i n which the data or clements of ex-
~rience are assimilated to bodily sensations whi ch are where one ' s body , in 
1e ordinary sense , is. 
Though Russell r ejects one form of the causal account of perception , his 
m view is inseparable from some such account , for one of t he main reasons 
0.. 
)r holding t hat a patch of colour or aspect of~thing seen ov e r there is real l y 
sensation her e , i.s that it is held to be the effect of a cerebra- neural 
~ocess initiat~d by the stimulation of the r etina . This effect cannot be , 
1 itself or 11 really", v1here vw see it to be or as being - over t here , for 
1ereas the irnpint;emcnt of r efle cted light and the nervous impulse may be 
~counted for in physical and physiological ter ms , the final effect could 
)t be accounted f or in t .i1ese terrno if it were an occurrence at several yards 
~ miles from the brain . And this is i ndeed Russell ' s view : a. sensation 
!cur s rrhen a bra.i.n i:::; pa:d; of the intervening medium. 
"' This conflict be L·neen the doctrine of sensation and the vny r:o .:;ce the 
_lei;cd 3encation may be avoidcu, as iL is by Hu:ne at timon , by r ccardinc; the 
moat ion ao a mcn·tal r:vcnt , aa cv0nt in the mind , no·L i.n the v:orld , and 
ter~forc an being in i L~elf , or or:Lc;inally, or really , nm't i1c. r c , f or wha~evcr 
Put thio of course rai ses 
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e problem hmv we could ever know that there was a physical world , and 
a.t t her e is a physical world is the assumption of the whole causa l theory. 
iily sensations are good candidates for the rSle of neutral stuff, for 
ey are felt , and are t herefore mental or in the mind ; but they are for 
3.:<1lple in the leg , and ther efore bodily or i n the body ; so they are both 
~tal and physical , or neither , neutral . nut this docs not ee·t rid of the 
ior. a~sumption of a physical world on which the whole theory depends , nor 
es it put the r ed of the sunset as I see it where my hea~ is . 
The view which r ecrard::; the real table as the common cauGe of what several 
::>ple woul d ordi narily be said to see from different angle s is a view 'l'lhich 
3sell r egards as natural , and no doubt it is. But i"t i s not the natural 
ew as this is displayed in ordinary languaee and conduct. The natural view 
that the r eal tatle , or Gimply the table , i s what we see i n depth from one 
~le or another , not the cause of what we see . The table is the thing we 
i te , at, or have our dinner at, visible and to.nciblc , and not the cause of 
~t is visible and tancible . It is not to be supposed for a moment that 
3sell does not know thic ; his very languaee makes this plain. But he 
rer examines the experience of seeing a table or what peopl e ordi narily 
1n by "table" and " sceine a table" . Instead he attack::; a silly view in 
lch the r eal tahltJ i::; an inferred entity , not actually seen or l e unt upon , 
t standi ns there in depth ,.,i th a hither a"1d a. f urther side . 
"' Hus:::;ell con·!;inue::; ( P.98) : " 1t r:-.o.y be said : If thcr0 is no sin0le exis-
1·t r:hich i....; the ::;.om·cc of all thc::;c ' a spects •, hor: ar~ ~he y collected to-
thcr?" !•'rom the natural oto.ndpoint , ·the question vo-r:c·~s on abcu.rdity . 
·.·:alk round t.hc "table \'ihich stay:; •::he r e i t. i:; and one side dl:;o.ppcar:::; from 






1e question may be intelligibly asked , hovmver , here is the answe r: 
"The answer is simple: just a s they would be if the r e were such a sinele 
cis tent . The suppose d 'real' table unde rlying its a ppearances is , in any 
Lse , no·~ itself perceived, but inferred , and the question whether such- and-
!Ch a particular is an ' a spect ' of this table is only to be settled by the 
mnection of the particular i n ques tion with the one or more particulars by 
tich the table is defined. That is to say, even if we assume a 'real ' table , 
te particulars vrhich are its aspects have to be collected together by their 
!lations to each other , not to it , since it i s merely inferre d f rom thE:m. 
l have only, therefore , to notice how they are collected together , and we can 
ten keep the col l ection' without assuming any 'real ' table as distinct from 
te col l ection. When different people see what they call the s ame table , 
tey see t h ings v1h i ch are not exactly the same, owing to differenc e of point 
v iew , but vtlli ch arc sufficiently alil{e to be described in t he same words, 
• long as no great accuracy or minuteness is sought . These closely similar 
•rticulars are collected toc;c the r by their similarity primarily and , more 
•rr e ctly , by the fact that they arc r elated to e ach othe r approximately 
:cordin0 to the lawc of perspective and of r eflection and diffraction of l ight . 
suecest, as a first approximation , that these particulars , tocetl1cr wi th 
tch correlated other s a s are unpe rceived , joi ntly ~ t ho tabl e : and that a 
.milar definition applie s to all physical objects. " 
" I t is 'r:orth rcma.rb.ne that this sor t of vicv: forrnc the basic f or the 
'r1i10rly rtidesprcaQ. intcllcctuo.Hs t v iew of pcrcr::ption , wldch Russell at 
.mo::; adopts . Accord:i.nc; to this v icv1 , r:e intcrpr<.: t \':hat \';c ::;cc , :fill i t ot\t 
:Lh i lllac;c:.> , t hoor.L::;e about i t , and the rcsul t of o.ll this ·j_::; \'!l to.t we say vto · 
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see or perceive . The model underlying this is of course the interpretation 
of evidence in solving a problem and seeking an explanation. Applying . I 
this model to perception , advocates of this vi ew have to say that , of course , 
we do t his unconsciously , thus puttine the question beyond the r each of 
argument . Apart from that , however , it is difficult to understand how on 
this viev1 there could be any such thing as veracious perception : the complaint 
about witnesses in law courts is pnlcisely that they do not describe what 
they saw , but have dravm all sorts of conclusions from what they saw , taken 
disltl;kes to one party or another which influences their account , etc. To 
see is precisely not t o image or imagine. On the sort of view which Russell 
is propounding \'Thich takes the table to be a set of appearances in the flat , 
the squarenes::; of the table has to be the result of interpretation , and 
jepth perception of the table would be as it were a photogrammetri cal recon-
str uction . J have called this view "intellectualist" since it seem::; to me 
:lvident that it ass:i.rnUa:ten perception to an i ntellectual operation ( though 
)ne which , unlike intellectual operations like solving logical problems , we 
:J.re never aware of performing). But Russell ' s account of it ( sec , for example , 
;>ae;e 81 and page 112 ) merely asserts in ef fect that a perception is sensations , 
)elicfs o..od imaL;CG . 
'i'o return , hrw eve!' 1 to Ru::;::;e ll ' c account of \'/haL a table i:.; , it i::; clear 
?nough tha t by a::;pects , appearances , particular::; , Ru::;sell docs no t, Mean ruty-
t hing essentially different from scnsa Lions . But if by ~n aspt.~;t were meant 
:!.G nuch of the t able a s is nov; vi~ihle over th•;r e , it,::; lo~.;at.i.on ,·;ould be 
Yver ·tncre . And the oo.mc mich t be mc o.."lt by an app,.,arance of the t able in 
)nc :::;en:;e . Bu t; i.n tita:L Gcn:.:e , nc i tlwr an acpect nOL' an :1ppearru1cc would 
:!Orrc::;ponu tv n ccn:jo.Lion occurrin£; YIHcrc til~ observe r r.a:.; . It ·::ould simply 
·- --···-----
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be the no\'t visible part of the table over there. In the other nense of 
"appearance" on which I have earlier dilated , the appearance of the table 
is the way the table looks to me or the way I see it , and it is a category 
mistake to attempt to assign a place to this either where I a..11 or where the 
table is . 
For Russell ,. hovtever , a.s for Hume , appearances are occurrences and they 
are in the flat , not in depth ; they ar e quasi- pictures. The squareness 
of the t able cannot be seen except head- on. On this view , '7hat people see 
when they look at a table top is not the same shape from different angles 
and looking different from different angles , but differ ent shapes "owing to 
difference i n point of view ." This last phrase of course impli9s perception 
in depth yet Russel l supposes that what is seen is seen in the flat , a skew 
projection of the ~able top from one angle or another . The table top there-
fore is the set of skew projections of the table top . As I pave areued , it 
is only by supposinG that thcoe skevr projections are like photoeraphs \'ii th 
a surface that can he lTC asnrcd that they can be supposed to be anywher e or 
to have any measurable size . Dut looks of things are not photol;rapho , nor 
are ·thoy anY\·1herc . There is no questions of dcacribinc; differnnt projections 
in the sarnn '"Orcls on account of their likeness " no lone; as no c;rcat accuracy 
or minutcnes::; is noucht" . ~he different looks f rom diffnrenL anc;lcs arc 
irremediably and ncces::;arily different : if they v1cren ' t thL. table would not 
be s tayinc; v;herc i t •:tas as we mov<'l c.bout it , aad all ·~hoG'c l ooks can perfectly 
Y:clJ. oc dcscr i bcd - forcsllo.ctcni n.::; into a lozen~e Gha_? o:> 1·1i Lh t ,·:o acnte and 
triO obtuse anc l e s and GO on . 'l'hat is t he ViO.J a G'}llarC tO [I l ook::; fr01~ a certain 
If i t did no t look lozcnc;c• ::>r1 i.l._2Cd "i.t \'ivu l d no L he cquare 






But the lozenge shape is not here , nor is it 
anywhere. Russell ' s collection of skew projections would rcmain~ as it were~ 
a collection of flat pictures which would never coalesce; but only as it 
~ a collection , f or being at no distance they could not be seen. ~Tor 
could they be r el ated to each other " according to the lav1s of perspective 
and of r efl ection and diffraction of li6ht", or collect ed together accordingly , 
for thece laws presuppose planes n.nd surfaces at different a.nglen to each 
otncr in depth. 
In the pa.s::w.gcc quo·t;ed , Russell has been concerned with sensations , ap-
pearances , and obne rvatlons, and is evidently intending at leas t in part to 
give an accoun t of ho11 what we call a thing is constituted in our perceptual 
experience. His next move , hoVIever, is apt to leave one bewildered . 
99:-
" In order to eliminate the reference to our perceptions , which introduces 
an irrelevant psychological suegestion , I will take a different illuctrution , 
namely , stellar photoe;ru.phy • • • • If we assume , as sci en co normally does , the 
continuity of physical pr oces3es , we are f orced t o conclude that , at the place 
where the plc.tc is , and a·t all places between i t and a ctu.r which it photo-
gra.phs , ::;orPethi.nc io happeninG which is specially connected wi ·Lh that otar • •• 
'r7e can Glas::;ify such ha!)p,..,ni.nec· on cith,~r of two prjnci.plcc : 
"(1) ·:tc can collect toccthcr all the happeni ngs in one: plc.c0 , us is 
"' 
done by p'lotography so far ... ~ .... .., liv"l-1t is concerned; 
" ( 2 ) .. , l oC can·collcct tot;cthur all the happen in&::> , in diffcrcn L places , 
whi ch arc cornr·c·tcd in the v;:J.y that corrrnon G0.n~;c rr-cnrd o u.o baing- du0. 
-1.0 tlJvlr 0. 'r. (lll ittinL; fr010 00° ObjCC"t o II 
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To suppose that Russell is not concerned with sense expe r ience , as 
his reference to the elimination .of irrelevant psychological suegestions 
might l ead one to do , and to suppose t hat he is concerned only with physical 
processes, would be to miss the whole point of his argument . The point is 
to establish the identity , and neutrality as between mind and matt er , of 
the elements or stuff which r elated in one way constitute mi nd and in another 
way constitute matter . The effect of th~ light on the photographic plate 
is regarded by Russell as essentially the same as the observed appearance 
of the sto.r o.t ·~he plo.cc wher e the plate i s . Hut thio i.s a. pr cpooterous 
vie'·' · What we see 'when we look at a star is not a photograph of the star 
where we are , nor is our seeing the star identifiable with any sort of picture . 
or r epresentation wher e our head is. The spot on the photographic pla·te is 
neither th~ star nor an appearance of the star. 
"Thus , to re".;urn to the ::;tars , we can collect together ei thcr -
(1 ) All the appearances of di fferent stars in a eiven place , or, 
(2) All the appearances of a given star i n different places . 
" But when I speak of ' appearances ', I do so only for brevity ; I do not 
mean anythinG that muot ' appear ' to ro mcbocly , but only that happoninc:;, \·;hatever 
it may be , which ia connected , at the place in question , with a aiven physical · 
obj<:ct • •• " ( P. lOO ). 
It is no t neccs::;ary "for brc;vi ty" to sneak of apucarc.nccs at all , as his .. . "' 
r:ords of e;cplanation sh0\7. But it is necessary to hi:; purpc::;e to opt::ak of 
appearance :.; , for he ·:Hl.'l ~::; to i tlcntify \'!hat micht be callc.d the a1lpcarances 
of the ::;tar to differ ent ob::;cr vers , or different p~ople 3r c1nc the star , with 
hn.ppr::ni:10~ or ocr:urrcncco where these people arc , llb.:: th•J huppcnineo at the 
-· ~---- ----
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photographic plate . An appearance of a thing is an effect or occurrence 
at another place . 
"According to the vic\7 that I am suggesting, a physical object or piece 
of matter is the collection of all those correlated particulars which would 
be regarded by common sense as its effects or appearances in .different places. 
On the other hand , all the happenings in a given place represent what common 
sense would regard as the appearances of a number of different objects as 
viewed from that place . All the happenings in one place may be r egarded 
as· the view of the world from that place. I shall call the view of the world 
from a given place a ' perspective '. A photograph represents a perspective . 
On the other hand , if photoeraphs of the stars were taken in all points 
throughout space , and in all such photographs a certain star , say Sirius, 
orere picked out Vlhcnever it appeared, all the different appearances of Sirius , 
taken together , would represent Sirius . For the unders tandine of the difference 
between psycholoGY and physics it is vital to understand these two ways of 
classifyine particulars , namely: 
(1 ) Accordine to the place where they occur ; 
(2) 1\ccordin{! to the system of correlated particulars in different 
pln.ces to which they helona, :::uch system being dcfincu as a phycical 
object. 
"Given a :>yG tom of particulars nltich i3 a physical ob,ied , I shall define 
that one of the sy::;tcm >:hich iti in a eiven place ( i f any) a::; the ' appearance 
of t hat obj (;ct in · that place . ' " ( P . 101 ) . 
Ru~scll seem::; .:.l.ctually to be f oi::;tinc; upon common ::;cncc th(' vi. C\'1 that 
an appearance of an object i ::; an effect or occnrrcncc ':;here on<" ' :::; he ad i::; . 
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rhese alleeed effects or occurrences are collectively the object . And 
all the happenings i n one place (where one head in the ordinary sense is) 
are "what common sense would regard as the appearances of a number of different 
:>bjeots as viewed from that place ." But if the appearances are in that place 
they cannot be viewed from that place. Or is it appearances which are in 
md objects.which are viewed from? On Russell ' s view objects cannot be 
riewed ~ anywhere , for they are simply collections of appearances at various 
places . This confusion of "from" and "to" with "at" or " in" is crucial in 
1ussell ' s areument . 
"All the happenings in one place may be regarded as the view of the world 
from that place . " This amounts to seying, for example, that an occurrence 
1here my head is may be r egarded as my seeing the house acros s the street . 
3ut this experience cannot be l ocated in my head ; thoueh I see Yri th my eyes · 
1er e , what I see is across the street . The word "perspective" is used to 
~ean both " the view of the world from a given pl ace" and "all the happenings 
~n one place." 
A photograph, says Russell, "represents a perspective " . In the ordinary 
ray , t his is true • But i t is not true as Ru::>sell seems to mean i t . What 
. t repr esents in· his sense is t he occurr ences at t he photo-:::;cnsitive plate 
tt the moment of expo3ure , and this is not the sense in which a photograph 
~ay be said to r epr esent a perspective , e . g. a photot;raph of a landscape in 
" )erapecti ve , from a point of viev; . In his sense , the occurr ences i n , or on , 
>r ' at , t he pl ate do not represent a p.;r specti ve ; they are a per spective. 
"or Russe 11 , a perspccti ve, like "a vi ew of t he ;-;or ld from ••• " , i s i n . one 
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l. point of view. But the landscape one sees or the view of the landsca pe 
me has from where one i::> standing is not a picture and is not where one is 
ltanding. Nor is Sirius or one ' s view of Sirius . But the photographs 
>f Sirius are iden·tified by Russell with the appearances of Sirius , and "all 
;he different appearances of Sirius , taken together , would represent Sirius .'' 
Accordine · to Russell ' s previous argument they would not represent Sirius , 
•ut .£§_ Sirius . 
wt be Sirius . 
Bnt , it need hardly be said, a heap of photoeraphs would 
Russell continues :-
"\7e can now bccin to under::;tand one o f the fundamental differences between 
>hysics and psycholorry. Physics treats a::; a unit the whole system of appear -
.nces of a pie~e of matte r , whereas p sychology is inte rested in certain of 
.hese appearances themselve s . Confining ourse lves for the moment to the 
•sychology of pcrcep~ions , we observe that perceptions are certain of the 
.p:;:>earances of physical oojects . From the point of view that we have been 
.i therto adopting, we mi eht define them as the appearances of obj J cts at places 
'rom which ncnsc-oreLln ~; o.ncl the sui table parts of the nervouc system f or m 
·art of tho inte rveninG rncdiurn . J ust as a photocrra.[lhic plate r r:ceivcs a 
i ffe r ent impre s s ion of a cluoter of stars when a telc::;cope io rart of the 
ntervenint; mcd i un , co a brain r c.;c c i vcs a different imprc ::;3 i on YllJOn an eye 
.ncl a..'1 optic nc rvo ar~ part of the intervening medium. An i m_9 r ccs ion due 
o t his s.:>rt o f inLc rvcning nedium is call ~.;d a !)crcc.t;-~!iion , a:1d i:; inter e sting 
o p::;ycnolot.>-y on i 'Lc 0'.'1!1 accom; ~ , not me r ely as one of tl":'c ::;c l. or correlated 
•ar-ticulan.; ;·:bi.ch i ::; t he physical ob j ect of ·::ideo ( ac \·;e cay ) \·.r~ arc havine 




the ordinary sense, the back of the head is, between which and the source 
of light lie the optic nerve and eyes as intervening medium. J;ly seeing 
the house across the road is an occurrence behind my eyes . A perception 
is an impression which the brain receives. A set of such i mpressions - some 
"' manques, s ince there are not brains ever~Yhere - is the physical object, 
nhat we *call the table or the house across the road. 
'rher~ are certainly occurrences where heads are , such as those recorded 
by the E'. E. G. But no such occurrence can be identified wi th the house 
across the r oad , with an appearance of a house across the road , or with our 
seeing a house across the road. Such occurrences are not part of per~eptual 
experience, though they are found experimentally to be associated with it . 
The brain is i t.::;elf a t hing which has to be seen , examined and subjected 
to experiment for this fact to be established at al l , just as one might s~e , 
examine and experiment v1i th a stone from the house across the road . Russell 
forgets that the brain is i·tself a " physical object", and ther efore on his 
view of physical objects could not be part of an intervening medium betv1een 
point A and point B, since it is the set af particulars or appearances every-
where but whore in the ordinary sense i t is. When he r eeards it as an inter-
vening medium hc· takEJs i t to be what is ordinarily meant by a thing or.body 
in a certc.in positio:1 in relation to another things . 13ut that is not hm7 
he defines a physical objoct . 
4\ 
Thi::; ·Lnconoequcnt procedure is characteristic and far- r 8o.chine. The 
alJ ct5cd po:;iti on of any of hie particulars or sensation::: is ei.vc'.'l by r eference 
"1;0 what :1r'~ o-c·di narily callccJ t •:ingc; , spu:tia]ly relatcrl. t o euch oth.;; r . If 
t h.: r oucl0r did not understand \'ihut nus 1:toant by a brai n OL' a table in this 










not attempt to understand Russell ' s spatial r eferences or his reconstruction 
of the world. But this understanding is founded on the actual experience 
of seeing things over there from here . There is no experience of seeing 
particulars where our heads are, no awareness of them. It is idle therefore 
to discuss r esidua.!. problems such as how we would be led to postulate those 
particulars in the set which ilerc not actual perceptions or sensations , or 
the mannur of their collection into one system, or v1here and when one par-
ticular would end and another begin, spatially and t emporally . It is of 
' 
some interest , however, to exanune Russell ' s view of space and time. 
----------------:--------------~ ........... r."'·-· . -~. 
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Chapter 13 
RUSSELL ' S VIF:,'i OF SPACE AND TI!.lE 
Russell assumcs·spatial and temporal r elations as these arc commonly 
understood. Spatial relations are relations of tl<ings and events , and 
positions and spaces can only be specified by reference to these . For . 
example, the v1indow is beyond the table and the tabl e is between the door 
and the .window. But the place specified as "whe r e the table is , between 
the door and the window" is not the place where t he particulars of the set 
which , accordinG to Rusoell , is the table , are . It could n0t be identified 
or referred to if the t able were what Russell says it i s , for it is the 
spatial dete r :rtinat lon of the table ( in the ordinary sense )
1 
\'iher e the table 
is, or between wher e the door i s and where the window i s , and not h i ng else . 
To assume ot hcrv1 ise in . to suppos e that space is not a r cJ c.t ional orde r , but 
as Kant exprc~ses i t , a self- subs istent non- entity , cont~ininc places which 
arc wh•) r e the.:y are , irrc specti ve of v1hat there i:.> or is not in thc~n , or at 
them, and indeed whether t here i:.> , or is not , any-thine at all. To identify 
a place , as Russt?. ll doe::; , by refe rence t o a tabl e or a brain , and then say 
in effect that t he pa.r-L :iculars of t ho set which is the tabl e or the brain 
are no .... ther e , i. s notlto identify any plo.ce at all . Th:i.:::; i s l1us::;ell ' :::; pooition : 
s ensat ll)no arr \'J!l'~rc your he<::.d i::. , hu-li your hc<::.d is not there . 
A sj r.·ilar procedure i ~ tc be f ound in Russell ' ::; tr~o.tuK•at of 1;imc 'in his 
chc:;ptcr on l":lcmory:-
" Jn invc GLico.tinc Mcmol·y- hcliefs , thcr 0 a r c cert:.~.i.n poin~o •:;~ . i.«>h nn=-t be . 
ho;_·n'? i.n mj nr1 . Tn the fj n; t p lo.ce , e veryt hi nG con:.;tii.u t inG a rltmory- belie f 
j s h<lpf1r·n i.nc !l2:::!. ' llCYl; i n tho.t pact tim•· to which t::1" br, l Lo f is :;aid t o r e f e r . 
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It is not loe;ically necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that 
the event remembered should have occurred, or even that the past should 
~ave existed at all . There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis 
that the world sprang into being five minutes ago , exactly as it then was , 
.vith a population that ' remer:1bered ' a \7holly unreal past. There is no 
logi early necessary connection bet\7een events at different times ; therefore 
:1othing that i s happcnincr now or will happen in the future can dioprove the 
zypothcsis that the world began five minutes age . Hence the occurrences 
'lhich arc called lmowlodee of the past are loeically independent of the past ; 
~hey are wholly analysable into present contents , VThich mieht , theoretically, 
Je just what they are even if no past had exi~ted." (PP. 159- 160) . 
nussell ' o account of tim(3 and memory is based on the r eduction of a 
aemory .!!2!! of an cccurrencc then to a complex occurrence !!..Q.Y!.r just as his 
~ccount of space and perception is based on the identifi cation of the place 
·1here something ic with the place from which it is seen , of there with ~· 
Jut just as he tru:es for erant(~d the distinction between the two places , so 
·1e continues to asoume the di:.>tinction between thu tv1o timeo. 
To say "it io not locically necessary to the exiotence of a memory- belief 
~hat the event remembered should have occurred" is to cay no mo re than that 
w may be mi~t<::.kcn about \"th at v1e ::;n::; or heard or did, that our t:ICrnori'!o :nay 
?lay us fal::;e . nut to o.dd "or even that the p<::.st ::;hould have exi~ted at 
1ll" is noL juot to extend the previous statement bn~ to •~ak" a uiffcrent 
:;ort of statt: rncnt ;. It i ~ to say , not that ne may be mor e or lt. :J!j mi.::;tn.kcn 
:1bout every tlii.nG in th( pa!j-1. , but thn.t there 1o1ay hc.vc been no thinG we could 
rcmemlJer v;cJ l or i..ll , or f<J.:!.l to r c:n ·rabcr , tha b nothinG at all ~~~~J.Y ever have 
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happened, that there may have been no past. It is to apply to the entire 
past , to the totality of past events , to the world in the past , the sort of 
statement which can only significant ly be made about particular events and 
things in the past , and this i s to apply to past time , the sort of statement 
which can only be made about things or events in time or .at times , having 
time-tteterminations . 
· "Ther e waG no rain in :r~dinburgh yesterday" is signifis::a.nt and ~ay be true 
or false . But " t here was no paGt" is contradictory , for the expressions 
" there was" and " t here was not" eGsentially refer to the past and cannot be 
used to make true or false statements unless they do . The past is presup-
posed in the truth or falsity of such statements. "There was a past" is 
tautologous , and " there was not a past" contradictory. 
The r esult of identifyins consciousness and object is that anything 
anywhere and at any time, which we would ordinarily say we t hink of, or remember 
or imagine , is simply a component of a complex occurrence here and now. The 
var.ious hypos tases - perceptions, images, thoughts , memories - are all essen-
tially pr esent . Pastness therefore has to be a characterist ic of a particular 
type of present complex , a date- stamp as it v;ere . But t he term "present" or 
" pro:::;ent event" is vacuous except in relation to past cmd future events . So 
i D " nm'l" except in relation to " then" (after or before , earlier or later) . 
Past , present a'1d future are correlative terms . It is per haps most obvi ous 
" that one cannot talk of the past or future without an implicit r eference to 
the present : it is solely in relation to the present t hat anything can be 
said to be past . But it v;oulJ. he equally mea.:1inglcss to talk of the pr esent 
·ni thout any i mplicit r eference to the past . The pas-tne ::;s of past events is 
·I 
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their having occurred before present events , and the presence of present 
events is their occurring after past events . If pastness were merely a 
characteristic of ~"belief-feeling" , as Russell suggests, it would not be 
a present belief- f eeling, since as such it would not have occurred af·ter 
anything. It would not be r eally present if other events were not just 
as really past. 
What we call one time, one moment or one period of time , is a time-
determination of some event or events . The time of any event is the time 
it is in r elation to the time- determina·tions of othar events before and after. 
To insist with Kant that all beginni ngs are in time is to say they are after, 
or later tha?l, something else . " 'rher e is no logically necessary connection 
between events at different times , " says Russell. The sense in which there 
is a logically necessary connection is that all events are temporal events , 
before and after oLhcr events . 'rhe " first of al l event::>" l'tOuld not be an 
event , for it would hLJ.vo no t ime- deterraina·tion, wvuld not be at any t ime , 
there being no previous events n.nd no prev .ious times. The supposed time-
determinaGion "five minutes ago" in "the world sprang into existence five 
minutes ago" would not be a genuine time-dGtermination , since it ·uould not 
be after any o th..: r time-detorr:Jination , there being no prnvious events . 
To assume othcn-:ine is to ouppo:.>e that time io independent of t he \7orld , 
of \'I hat there is , of wiwthcr .;;.nythint; ever happen::; , aad to su~pose that even 
if there ~as nothing there would still be differen t t i mon . Tlli:; i s , of course , 
the "snlf- sctbs .Lstent non- entity" view of time , whic!J dcr:Lvr.:d w:1utover pl aus-
ib.ility i L had from r ceo.r di nG differ ent tim\..:S us tl1em:::;olvc::; oc~.:nrrcnces in 
tlmc , hcfol''J and after other t .i.1ne::; , ju:::;t as the :::;inri 1 o,r vi.c·:1 or spac0. recards 






space. On rmy other vie'n , however, " an event five mi nutes ago" i mplies 
" something else before that". 
On Russell ' s " l ogically possible" hypothesis , not only the word " r emer .. ber " 
v1ould require the quotation marks he gives it , but also " past" and " present" . 
\That ne culled the po.st would not be r eally past , but neither would what we 
called the prcocnt be reo.lly ·prcocnt . . For we 'vould not know tho date . The 
present time i s , for example , twenty years after the 'v7ar ; nussell is an old 
man ; some people are old , some young; some industri es are dovcloping, some 
in decay. The Yll!Ole pre sent state of affairs is understood in terms of ·the 
past and cannot be spoken about vti thout implicit r e ference to it. I t is 
meaningless to talk of the present apart from what the re is nov1 , the present 
state of affairs , and what there is now includes old and young, new and old , 
activities in procres ::; , processes which were begun be fore nov1 , and s o on . 
To omit the numerous quo t at ion marks which the hypothesis would require is 
to display the contro.d~ction in s aying there is a present but ther e wa::;. no 
past . Innumerable " true " propocit.ions , particular and gene ral , would be untrue , 
o.nd it is these vrhich define what vre take to be the present . " \'le" should be 
" livln~" under a. cornpl ~,;tc " illusion" if we "' remembe red ' a. wholly unreal past" . 
The " present" woul d not b e t he pr-~scnt . 
'rile e r ror in th·:: hypothu :::i s ari:::es from v:hat one mu:; c <.~.ll th· : no.~u rali:.;tic 
o r rs:;cho l clu'"i.stic f ullo.cy . The ccs cncc of this f aJ lac~' i. s the a ttcr.~p t t 0 
r educe cuhjcc ~ivity ·t o objactlv.it y , con :::c iousncsc t o ohject , tv r cdu:.:c uec:!.ng , 
knrmin{; , bel il. v ine, f ec:l i.nc , deslr .i.n::;, etc: . , to c0.rt n. i.n ld.nd::; of 00r:1p lex occur-
r en ee::; . 'l'he: ,... ('fc ct· j n th8 c a cc of l ~nov;ln~ or r ume:nbnri.Y'0 j n p n.rticular is 
pur n.doxi cn.l.J.y a cub,jc ct l v i.st th•~ ory of }:nor:l E:dGc and. t r uth , thr; occurrences 
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here and now , constituting k.nov1ing or rememqerine; , beine loe;icully inde-
pendent of whatever else is the case. 
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Chapter 14 
TilE NATUllAI,ISTIC FALLACY 
It should be said at the outset that victims of the psychologistic . 
fallacy generally evade its consequences at the cost of radical · inconsis-
tency. In whnt foJ.lows I shall try both to expose the fallacy and to 
show how it is evaded . 
The hypostat ised ima.c;e plays an essential part in Russell ' s account 
of mind. He takes it to be a mental occurrence , a sort of picture , which 
v1e can contemplate and obse rve anu whose relation to anything else 
in the ordinary sen:::e , it would be said to be of - is inferential. 
what , 
Strictly , 
the observinG of it would have to be nnother mental occurrence , but though 
Russell "discusses this point in hi::: chapter on introspection, he n~ver _ resolves 
it. An ima.c;e f or Russell i s a copy of a. sensation , but since. to rer3ember 
a sensation i s to have an image and ther e is no othe r way of remembering a 
nsnsat.ion , t his can neve r be known , for e ach is simply a present occurrence . 
ltnd so are the preaent beliefs and belief - f ee l i ngs which nre ::Hlpposcd to 
establish the r el at i on of th<-) one t o t he othc:r . 
" The reference of thout;h b to ob j ects i s not , I bel ieve , the sin·:pl e dire ct 
essential t hine tlw.t Br entano and ·!c .inonc r cprc ;:;ent it as bc inc . It s eems 
tu r~o i.v be <lcr:i vu. ti vc , and to consist larc;r.:ly i n bd:i.c~ : belief s that 
1·iha·t constitutes the t hought is connected rri ~h various other c l <?F<C!lts whi ch 
toco l;lwr r:1~.d-;:l.) up ti:1e objt:ct . You have , say , an imac;c of :) t . P:::.u l 1 s , or 
mer e ly the v;ord 1 ~.it Paul 1 ::; ' in .rour lt (~ad . You bel i.8VC ' hov;cvcr vaeucly and 
dimly , that, Li1:i.u :i c conn'ected r.;i~h nlw.t yon nould ser~ i.f .'/0'-t vrent to St . Paul ' r; , 
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r what you \70uld feel if you touched its walls: it is furthe r connected 
ith what other people see and feel , with services and the Dean and Chapter 
nd Sir Christopher \7ren . These things are not mere thoughts of yours , 
ut your thought stands in a relation to them of which you are more or less 
ware . The awareness of this relation is a furthe r thoueht , o.nd constitutes 
our f~eling that the oric;ino..l thoueht had an ' object '. But in pure imag-
nation you can set very similar thoughts wi thou·t these accompanying beliefs ; 
nd in t his case your tho~1ghts do not have objects or seem to have them . Thus 
n such instances you have content without objects. " (Page 18) . 
Though these r emark::; are incleed preliminary , as Russell sayo , there is 
::>thing in the1n ,.,hich s c rioutily misrepre sents Russell ' s position , and if they 
~e obscure nothine he says later really makes them less so . It is intended 
J be an account of v1hat happens when one images or imagines St . Paul ' s . 
~cording to Russell ' ::; ::1.ccount , v1e have an image which we believe is connected 
i.th St . P::1.ul ' ::: or ~·;rot v1e should se c if r1e v1ent to St . Paul ' s . But i ·L may 
J a s ked , if 1·1e think of what we should nee if we went to St . Paul'::; what 
.3 this but to irna~c S·t . P::1.ul ' s ? ~.'he only case which vFoul<l at all fit 
..1.ssell ' s d~;sc:dp tlon io the caoc VFl1cre we imagine somethinG which l'le cannot 
..1.i t o place , when we have to try to place what \'te arc imagininlJ - a certa:i n 
) i:lCd. buildinG, oay . Por nuoccll , ho~·:ever , our image i::; ::1. pi ctur·':' , of 'l:hich 
1e con~cct.Lon rlith St . Paul ' o hn.:. to be cstabli:.;hl;.!d by the f cc l:i.nc or belief 
1a t they arc relatc:d • "' 'ro have a.n i r:Jage of s t . P:l.Hl ' s , tt. • r (• ' ,11J:;b he the 
.1ac~~ , the th0H[.;hl. 0f :::it . Paul ' s , n.nd the belief, if not ot!J.r " t.hou,}ht s " as 
Jll. i'lo·;; tlt,:re; is no doubt Uw.t Ht1s3cll mean :. by " :.i t . Panl ' c" that very 
.l.tilcdral in ·Lhr· city . 
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not something apart from the image. To image St. Paul's is to mean that 
very cathedral.. \Then one imagines S:t .• Paul ' s , it is ipso facto st. Paul ' s 
one is imagining. To image is one mode of intending or meaning an object. 
St . Paul ' s .is the intended or rre ant object , even if meamrhile some catastrophe 
has befallen it .and it is no more . 
For Hussell , hm ever , images are entities , and are not essentially of 
. . 
anything. As for othe rs who hold this view, his problem is to distinguish 
them from sensations eithe r by their inhe rent .characte ristics or by their 
causal antecedents , and the latter he regards as the only reliable way . (P. l49) 
Theoe causal antecedents are brain processes , initiated in the case of sen-
sations at the external sense organs and in the case of images vri thin the 
brain . This is not how in fact we do distincuish them. But what he s~s 
of ti1e brain processes vrith which they are respective l.y associated is no doubt 
true . The obvious r e a son for holcllnt; it to be true , however, i s t he dist.i.nc-
'tion we do make between see:i.ne somuthing and imat;:i.ning something. When we 
see somethinG it is there before our eyes , but vthen we i ruagine something it 
is uoually not , and if it i::; , i~ is difficult to imac-ine and not see it. 
If we did not make this di::;tin <..:tion indel)Cndently of any cau:..;al theory about 
seeing and imagine, we could not make the sort of distinction Russell proposes , 
for ·:1e \'IOUld not YJ'lo·;: v1huthcr rre v;~r;~ occing or imagininG t ho e vidence for 
brc.in . pr occ:::;ses . 
Tin~ sell ' s accow1 L of memory i:.; closely related t o hL; vier; of i r~acco. 
'f' ilc: i P1 ac;c is a :)l'Cocn t oc ,ll.rrc:!C(' n.11d tho pastnes ~~ o f r!hat :i.:::; rr::me ruu~ rcd is 
reduced to a pr~scnt belief- feelinG. 
'Phe bc l:i.cf " ;no,y be c xprc soed in l;h() r;ord:::; ' tlt'Ls existed '"~ 
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I t i s simply-a " specific kind" of present belief- feeling - " the r eference 
to the past lies in the belief-fe<-~ l:i.nc; , not in the contcn·t believed." 
(P. l86 ) " In the simplest kind of memory we are not av1are of the differ ence 
between an image and the nensation whi ch it copies, which may be called its 
'prototype '. · \'Jhen the imo.ee i::; befor e us , we j udee rather ' this occurr ed '. 
T~1e , image is not distinguished from t he ob j ect which exicted in the past : 
t he wor d ' thi:::; ' covers bo·Lh , and enabl es u s t o have a memory- belief which 
does not introduce the complicated noti on ' s omet hing lilce thia '•" 
It i ·s true that the image is not distinguished as an entity from 'l'that it 
is of, for it i::; not before us and is not an entity or quasi- object. When 
\70 nor1 i magine something pant , t he re is only one object - soJ'llething past. 
nut Russell \'!ant s to sum~est t !1at the unsophi sticated or simple person, of I 
whom he mn.kes e r eat play in this chapter, does not distineuish betv:een some- ,. 
thinrr past and somet hing pre sen L. When we r ecall somethinG i.n imaeination I 
I 
it i::: t hut vr:r:; thine or s i tual;ion \':e mean . Tf we cay " thic occurred" we muan 
wha t did occur and there io no confusion of t his with whateve r i s occurring 
now . Run cell ' :.; d:.oJ.·y about the :i.11pr•..:ci ::;i on of tmsophi.~>ti.cat0.rl pe nple is n. 
t all one . !Ie v1ants to nugt;est that they fail to di::;tineu i sh tho picture 
bef o r e them from the pa.::;t event which it repre::;ent ~J . '.Phiu would not be true 
0.vcn i: an imo.r;e •.-:0r0 o. pi.c tu-:-e : as if when someone said : " Tho.t ' o t ho battle 
of Lepanto on Lhe ;·tall", he actually t houcht there was a battl e iJ! pro[.;re ss 
on the Y:all . 'I'hio io a df'spcraLe s!•ift in SU!>port of o. bad ti11 .• ory. 
'i'i1c probh. '1 :i. :.; hor: to cct t.iw reference t o thr rant j r;t.0 a1 analy s is of 
Ruo:::ell ' s 
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present i mage, and the time- determination "past" lies in the nature of the 
But in what sense ca1.1 the time- c1 ; t 0T.'ii1ination 
"past" lie in a present feeling ~y more than in a present .image? · The only 
time- determinat ion v1hich could " lie in" either would be "present". The 
nature of the belief- feeling , we are told "is t hat called ' remembering ' or 
(be~ter) ' recollectin&'· It is only subsequent reflection upon this ref-
er ence to ·the past that makes us realise the distinction between the im~e 
and event recollected. When we have made this distinction, we can say that 
the image ' means ' the past event." If the , reference to the past were in 
the belief - " a spec':i.fic feelinG or sensation or complex of sensations" -
incomprehensible though this mieht be we would be rememberine;. But that won 't 
do , for what we would be "remembering" would still be a present image. So 
we have by r eflection to realise the distinction between the image and the 
event recollected. 
But how on earth on Russell ' s theory do we ever make this di stinction? 
It is hard to resist the conclusi on that Russell simply realised t hat the 
past event had to be e;ot in somehow if " memory" was to be me mory at all , and 
made it mater ialise by " subsequent r cflection11 • This r eflect i on would of 
cour se oe dist.inct from ·the hayp:~ning~ and occurrence s to which muntal life 
·;1oul d be ot herwise r educ i ble , e1nd WHich he set out to s 'how it would be entirel y 
r educibl e . The "pant" event , ho1·;ev0r, need not be a past event , for n.s nc 
have ::;ccn , on Hu::;scll ' s vi~:m , it is logicc.lly pos sible ~ha. ~ there vms no past, 
aud t lh..:rr; f: rc t ba. ~ til err; i:,; no mcJ:lOr·y , irut only " mc:!:Jory" of the p<.1nt . 
P.u.::;sell ' s doctrine i..:; ba.sed u_r-on ph~1 ~:> i cn.] and JlOycho l ogj -::al t heory,. of 
r:i1ich he tak~s va!·ious G.SIJect ::; n.s p : c:;,ise s of hi s D.n.J.lyoi 1> of w!1<1t t her e is 
----- _ .. ___ _ 
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and of his reduc-tion of perceivincr, believing, knowing, etc . to occurrences . 
The spatial and temporal orders are assumed in the pr-emises , but the reduction 
of mental life to present occurrences then suggests the possibility that 
there was no past . But if there were no past , the premises, physical and 
psychological , would be false. The hypothesis could only be advanced if 
t,hc analysis of all there is , incl urUne lcnoYTled!Je , into occurrences were -true , 
but the truth of the hypothesi3 would falsify the anaW-sis . It is true that 
the logical atructurc of Russell ' s doctrine is very difficult to discern , 
but it is evident that his crucial arBUments are taken from physics and to 
a somewhat less ext ent from psycllolo{!Y. The essence of the naturalistic 
fallacy is the attempt to explain experience in terms of natural scim ces 
whose only evidence lies in experience. Russell ' s scientistic assumption 
is that whatever may be known about "m:i.nd" is to be scientifically, empiri-
cally known , and thi::; means by external or "i nternal" observation. 
Before I deo.l v1i th behaviourism and. introspection:i.om I r~ould l U:c to deal 
with an olde r example of the psycholo~istic fallacy , nov: uni veroally aban-
doned - trw attempt t o reduce the principl~ of conLradiction and the other 
"law ::; of t hought " to facts of human psycholoc;y , to belief;.; or convictions , 
·:1hich, thouch pcculi:!rly furr.~cful , might ncv(~r-thcless have been otherwise . 
This amounts to BO.yint; tilo.t it is logically possible that the principle of 
contradiction should not b0 true , that .i.ts denial is not u con t radiction . 
"' But i f it ;-:ere not true , th:i.:.; ::>tn.tcment i t::;clf could not be t rue . 
To 1 mJ.r~r::; r.ap<.l ot.Jwr ca::;co of t he fall acy , it i:.; no~ c :J0n:;h t o r est contr:mt 
r:lth the uis Linct i.on bctneen on th '1 one hand analytic , l oci -:;.tl or nccc;.;sary 
t rutr1:> , and. on the oth~r hu.nd ::;;;nthctic , factual and C•.mtin;;cnt truths . We 
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must examine the premises which led to the attempt to r educe logical truth 
to contingent truth, logic to psychology, fo r these assumptions are essen-
tially the s~~e as t ho se which l ead to the attempt to r educe the past to 
present " r:Jemories", t hi ngs s een t o present pe rceptions , t h ings ima ged tc present 
i mages and belief fee lines, facts known to the kno..-;ing of " facts" , and so on. 
The , ~ssumption whi.ch is common to doc.tri ne s attemptine; to reduce logi cal 
truth to psychological f act is t hat menta l life i s r educible to causally 
connected events , occurrences , processes, and states , psycholo gi cal facts 
r1hich are e mpirically observed, obse rved by an " i nne r perce ption" or intro-
cpection. Thic assumpt ion no doubt date s back to Locke ' s account of the 
ide as of r e fle ction VJhich are o.cquired by the mind ' s at t ent ion to its ovm 
a ctivi ty about its ideas of s ensation. On such a view, intr ospection i s no 
l ess a s ource of ompiri cal knowle dge than exte rnal obs ervation. '.'lha:t i s ob-
served i s even t s and processes v;hich may be subsumed unde r various laws of 
success ion and a ssociation , by t he formulat ion o f hy!'othcse s a nd t heir ex-
per:i.m•:ut al v cr i f i cation , a o i n physi cs . The p r o ce s s of percei ving and thinking , 
t he s tat e of k.n.owinc, may be thw; d c :::;c r .i.b e d aild the laws wh i ch c ovcrn t he oc-
currence s const.L tu t i ne the se acti v~.ties mn.y be f or mula ted . 
Noto r ious l y, tldn;_;::; t1.i.d not q vi Le r1or k ou t ~ll a'L way, but t ili:3 could be 
put do,·;n t o the pc.culiar difficulti c~ s of t he s abject ma t ter , as coul d diff er -
cnc c ::; i n the p r oce du r e s of b.iolo Q' and phy s i olog>Jt -:; ay , a s com·r arcd r1i t h ph.J·cicso 
In pr i nc: i plc , t he mi.nd r1 a s a do1:1n.in of CJt:p i r i cn.l inv cct.i'to:.:ati cn no l cs0 t han 
th¢ phy::.; i cal \'rorld. If knord. cucc of t he mind nc r c roc : iblc at. all i 'L rqn::; t be 
c::1piri cal kno·:tlc de;c , knovil cdcc of o b::;c l''rc d fact::; n.nd vc r i f i.cd hypoti1cso s . 
And the IJro ::.:css0 s l'!hic~1 con8ti l,u Lc knm~inc mu st h8 Jm or:n , i f a:t a l l, i n thi s 










f thought" must be l aws aoverning mental proce sses , thoueh of a very general 
nd f~damental character, and the fact that the mental processes do not 
l\·1ays appear to conform to these laws - logical errors are very common -
.ay be ascribed to countervailing causes, as may , for exa:nple , that fact that 
he compass needl e docs not alr1ays point north . ('ilhy one process or succession 
f ·occurrences should be considered erroneous as compared vii th anot her remains 
. mystery , for v1llat is a imply is , and · Hume ' s theory of knowledge is itself l' 
uen to this very objection. ) 
~ . Thus the 1 aJNS of thought like the laJ.vs of 
ssociation Vlould be empirically established la.vrs governing mental phenomena. 
hat is true would be what we believe wi"t;h conviction , and of t he l aws of thought 
e are completely convinced. T~ey are the most general , most indispensable 
f l av;s , but thuy sim:ply happen to be as they are . .Their necessity r emains 
contingent , psychol ogical necessity. 
If such a doctrine merely asserted that it was psychologically possible 
o believe a locical imposaibility , to believe that a l ogical contradiction 
aa true , it woul<.l not be opell to any radical objection . To believe that a 
o(jical contradict ion ia true is to f<1ll to l'!)U.lise that it is a l or;ical con-
radiction ; l oc;ical contradictions are not all self-evident , but often very 
iff icult to de tect . But what is acserted is not just this comlolOnplacc , but 
ha t vre could r ecot;nioc a contru.dlction and believe it to be true . Being 
hysically as v1e arc , ITC cannot fly like birds . BeinG mentally as we a re , 
:) cunnot r\...cogni se a con tra<.liction a..l'ld believe it to be ~~uc : it i s a psy-
. ol?Gical ir.tpossiollity . Thi l:> i npossibility is conti nccnt , de facto , like 
~r inability to f l y . But if thi::; 'i.'cr e so , ho\·: could. r;c kno·:; it \'las contingent 
c suppo~e t na:t it coulu oc otl'!e r\;ise? It nould be psy cuoh•.,s.Lec.lly ililpossible . 
tL -..;b.~,:. thc.:;n could. " c:onti nc;ent " mean but "not locicu.l l y nccnssc.ry" ? And this 
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' would. s i mply re- establish the dist inction which the theory set out to 
abolish. If we beli eved logical contradictions to be true, e . g . that 
"p is true and p is false" is true , we should simply be in error, making a 
logi cal blunder , fai ling somehow to recognise the meaning of "true" and 
"false", of "is" and "is not" , of assertion and denial . These meanings 
are assumed in al l empirical invest igation. 
The psychologistic view is not only untenable as regards logic and 
knowlede;e of locical truths , it is equally untenable a s r egards empirical 
knowledge , perception, memory , thought, fee ling, desire , etc . On the 
psychologistic thro ry we could be said to know or apprehend a matter of 
fact , or the truth of the proposition . expressine; it , only when a certain 
conjuncti on of mental phenomena, i tself a s tate of affairs or matter of 
f act, came to pass . IImv then ·woul d one deter mine the truth of the · pro-
position "I Jr.now that this type\'rri ter is on the table"? To know t hat v{e 
knew the typewriter was on the table , we should have to know t hat the type-
wr iter was on the tabl e but also we should have to kno\v the men·~al matter 
oC fact conctituting onr knowinr~ tli:l::: . Bnt to k no1·: tlw.t we l<ncw the:Jc ti':O 
matters of fact , we should have to knm·: these matters of fact plus the higher 
order mental matter:.:; of fact constituting our knowing th0m. And so on , ad 
i nf.. Si milarly to lmor; that " I sec a typewri ter" was true , v;e should have 
t o knovt that tht::re was a typewr iter in a certain place and that the mental 
occ11rrcnces cunsti t;uting seeing rrcr e· actually occurringi' and that the relation 
bet•,'jeen tl10sc occurrences nas of t he appropriate l:ind . 1\ furth(~r di fficulty 
is the " systematic elusiveness" of the introspective observation. If em-
pirical observation of the introspe ct ive kind were possibl e at all , it vmuld 











not be what was investigated or . observed; it would not be observing its 
ovm activity, the activity of introspection. It is hard to say what the 
mind would be observing, but its procedure would be objective , scientific 
and empirical only at the cost of failing to do what it sets out to do -
to observe its own activities. 
, · For empiricism there are two sorts of knowlede-e - knowledge of logical 
truths and knowle dge of matters of fact . But if the mind were as s ome ell'l-
piri~ist doctri ne s have held it t o b e , neither kind of knowledge would be 
possib~e . For knowlede;e itself would be entirely reducible to mental states , 
events and procer:ses - matte r s of observable fact - and knowl edrre of any 
matter of fact \'lOuld t herefore itself be r e ducible to a matter of fact. 
The ·sta·l;e consti tutine; kl10\'1ledge, being a matter of f act, could have only 
a de facto r elation to any state of affai r s "in t he \-rorld . The relation of 
knonin5 to v1ha t ··:as knv·.vn would be external and contingent . Tho state con-
sti tutine; " lmov1inc t hat X is A" would be logicall y coml!atibl e both vrith "X 
is A" and ·~ x is not A", s ince the mental state would be only conti.nc;ently 
r elated to tho other s ~ate of aff<::.irs . If lmoYiing n or e a men t al s tate of 
a ffai rs it wou l d not ne c eGnaril y be untrue to say "I lcnow that X is A" if 
X wer e not in fact A. If, hOi·;c vcr, one defines t [hJ r e lat i on of knov;ing to 
knoo;m in ;:;nch a r1ay ti12.t this i7 0Ulii be contradictOJ."Y, ncvert:nc less , n.c cording 
to the in Lroopcctioni;:;t doctri.ne , one r;ould have to 1m o·.; b0 t h nho.t ti1c e x-
t c rnal st<J.te o [ n.f[n.irs wa s and v1hat t he mental sto.tC' o1' affn.:i. rs •: a~ i n orde r 
t~.~. rl e t er ::.i.nc..; ·::l1ctiwr tho r c lationr;llip bet.,1ccn t hGI!l con ::;tj Ln ~cd. a co.sc of knoYI-
Put hor: conld one kno1.·: tk:.t on·:: 1-::ncv: wlin.t tl1'..: ext 0rnn.l state of 













stituted by a relation between two states of affairs and so on. 
If it is asserted that no introspectionist ever actually he l d. such 
a doctrine, my r eply is tho.t if introspection is held to be empirical ob-
servation (as it commonly v~as ) there i::> no escape from the above absurditie s . 
It is because in~~rospect'ionists commonly take ano·ther ki nd of knowledge, which . 
the.,Y will not recognine as knowl<.ldge , for ·granted that what they say is often 
plausible . *· And it is true that t he word "introspection" has been used in 
no.ny wa:ys . A subject de scribing what he sees in an experiment in perception , 
for example , would be des cribed by some peculiarly inane psychologists as 
~i vl.ng an introspective r eport , a usage •rhich identifies in·t rospection with 
~xtraspection . What I am concerned to atto.ck is the v iew that there is any 
3ort of empi r ical observation apart from the commonly recognised kind - ex-
ternal perception of thinGs o.:nd events in the world. 
People say , f ,)r r3xample , "I knov: the height of the Eiffcl Toner", or "I 
1rn listening to the radio" or " I see a mo...11 over there" or " I remember mee ting 
rom l a st v1eek" . These verbs in the f i.rst person sinGular are ruaong the 
)Om1.10nest i n the EnGlish languu.c;e. :?ri mo. faci e , everyone understands such 
?xpre osions , knows what t hey mean , and assnmes that they co.n be true or false . 
~hi~ com;non understandinG is "tho s t art:i.n& point of any analyois , philosophical 
)r psycholocical , of 1:1.ind . S:i.n<:e r> r~oplc clo not suppose t ha t a ny intro3p\::c"tive 
)Q::; . .; rvation i::; requ ired t o ver.i fy t hem , si. nee they o.rc una\-: arc of makinc; any 
... 
;uch obs e rvation \'I hen ~hey 1rwJ:r; sur.h assc-:rt lonu , titcre nould ::;e'='r1 t o be no 
~rounu f or hol1.ing tllat ti1ey do . For 0.veryone o.d!Jli ts t hat the basis for such 
l::>sc rtion s as '"r.hor c is o. fly i.n m.'/ t ·."'w." io ob:>orva : . .i on , but ::>tn:t<:)r.;cnts bccln-
1ing " I lmOi'r • • • " or· " I ~jr::t: •• • " or " I h·:ar • •• " o.re j ll :..;t ar; c:u mmon a nd if they 
lb '+ 









were founded on introspecti ve obse rvation how could people fail to be 
a•aare of this? 
Part of the inspiration of behaviourism was the need to reject intro-
spection as a source of empirical k:nm·;ledge . For the consistent b ehaviour-
ist - r e latively consi stent - " seeing", " knowine", " listening ·to", " thinking" , 
" b~ ing in pain", etc., all essentially refer to ob::::ervable pub~ic happenings , 
j ust a s a doc ' s hunee r is its salivati on, tail-wag~in~, etc . • Behaviouri sm 
has this c:i.enal v i r ·tuc that it is not concer ned with alleged ~ho3tly happenings 
in a . non- cpu.tiu.l pl U<~0. called t he mind , but with vi cihlc , observable happcnin[;s . 
But the reduction of mentu.l l ife to externally observabl e states , e vents , ~d 
processen leadn to a di fficulty no less ·acute than its reduct i on to internally 
obse rvable states , events and processes . A strict behaviourist must fei~ 
anaesthesia, or posoibly accept solipsism. It i::; commonly supposed t hat 
y.cople can f ee l pain , cay , a pain i n the l ee, and that eroans and the screming 
up of the face and so on arc the expression or symptoms of the pain , but not 
the pain itself. And the pur pose and virtue of o.no.esth~tics arc he ld to be 
the stoppine; of the pai.n itself. But a strict beho.vionrist would be obliged 
to hold t hat their purpo::;e i s t o change t he patient ' s behaviour , to s top him 




e vQr yonc mo.inta.i n::; that he Y.n ov1s Yihn:t pain is , what " pain" mean ::; , and i t ccr-
t ainly i:J not pub licly observabl e o.n t ics. 
Acain , a bchavi ouri ::;t mn~t cbs0rve t he ber101.vion:· of "~~~ ::;o-cc..lJ •.:d suh j cct , 
hi s o·:;n br~ho.v.i.ou.1.· he: c annot be s c.i. J to lmo;: tha·:. he 11u.r.,; oh::;r::rvcd th~ doe or 
the baby. He cannot; kno\·: t ha t he sees the dos unl· ::;s he. ::;eeo 1tiosclf seein~. 
:'.nu if it be :.>UP!l OS~"~d t h.:1t ho -mi..:;ht think ovc i.' t llc c xper i. r~c"! L::; of the day a lone 
--~-------------------------------·-~ 
in his armchair in tile evening or wonde r r1hethe r to go to the cinema, 
the only ev i dence of this would be incipient vocal movements in the throat , 
uhich he does not observe and could not know he was observing if he did. 
There i s no evidence acceptable to him as a behaviourist that he is thinking 
at all and no evid~nce that he has mental i rnaees or images anything. 
Aeain , it wi.ll be said this is a cari cature . No behaviourist denies 
conscious experience , and it is precisely because it i s not empiri cally ob-
servable that he d0.cides for r aasons of method to ignore it. This is much 
too kind to behaviourists ; it is unwise to take thb plea of _tJhilonophical 
asepsis at itn face value . I shall argue , ho11ever, that the behaviourist 
does not ignore conscious e;.;perience but takes i t entirely for granted. 
In tro~,ectior.ism and behaviourism have in cownon the assumption that 
the only knowledce of mind a s of :natter is empirical knowledee , knowl cdae of 
fact , and ouch know l. cdgc is founded on cbnervation of ::;tates , events and 
proceo::;cs . The nodcl of ob::;crva-Gion is what everyone mean::; by observation 
looking and seeing what happens - rrhich is no less indispensable for the 
v<=: r i fica tion of an claborJ.te scientific hypothesis than fo r t[le common purposes 
of ever y day . But i f thi~ model applied to our supposed knov1ledee of the 
mind , if the evid0nce for the truth or falsity of statcmm-'vc bcainning "I 
see • •• ", " I am r;ondc r lnG \':hc thc r • •• ", " I am uneasy about ••• 11 r:ere obtainE:d 
h~r ob;:,e rvation i n a1~ytilin:; li:~c t,Lis sence , " I " v;ould not r e fer to t he s peaker 
" 
;:..ny f.l 0.1.'(' than " effc rvc ::;cent liq:.tid in the t est tube " r e f er::; t <' t !tr: che ii.ist. 
Sut no one C' ! . i.o\::;;ly .;up.' o::;e ::; t~ 1at he has t o make obscrva l;l onr- on ·:1h:i.ch to 
base as::; r.: r t iono l;nu.~ he.. ::;ee::; , i .:; '::on de ring •::he t h c r , i::; un.::a::;y about , is thinY.ing 





observation, he does not and cannot know that he sees , hear:> , etc . 
But the common conviction is that such :>tatemcnt~ can be true or fal:.e 
~ 
a.'1d that there mu::; -~ be~ sense in nhich rue can Jr..now wheth•.:: r they are trw::: or 
false . These exprer;sions plainly refer not simply to events and happenings 
in tile world but to our experience of t hem and the various wayG in which we 
experience them. This experience js made explicit in r eflexion or self-
aw:arencss , for example, the exfC r i cnce of being a body here seeing something 
over there . ~hen we simply descri be what we see , we arc not describing this 
exper ience , but \7hat is r eflexive ly described is implicit in 0ur se~ing and 
in the visibility of nhat is seen. If r eflexion or self- anarcnc Gs vrerc not 
complete:ly currnnonplace in the viay v;hich I have tried to elaborate earlier , 
some of the commonest and lllo::;t faoiliar expressions of the lan{;Uage 11ould be 
hard to undcr staud - 11 I see • •• " , " I've crot it ! " ( said on ::;olving a pr<:>blem) , 
" I rer.~ember ••• " , " I seem to reme;uber • •• " nut everyone unucr f; l;ands t hem to 
all appearance :::; an I unde rstand thom, and I undcr:::tanu. th...:m because I knovr 
what it is to sec , to think , to nonder , to be puzzled , to have u. fla::;h of 
illumina tion , to rc.: r:1embcr , c·~ c . Such ::.;tatcmcnts of e:<:pur:i.cncQ arc not in-
corrigible , nor , ly:Lng apart , arE! they al'.'lays true , for the cxpc~ r:i. cnce of seeing, 
fo:::- example , i:.; lll::;oparo."olc from ::;ometh:i.•1(>' s een , and r1c ma;y ~:Ji ::;bakc an after-
i :nat;c f u r a _ratc! t on l~i1c i·:all. (:'ihether we say v1c sec 0.11 {lf~cr-im~~u , 
"' p~culiari~ic.::; are r.:a~i ly cnouch di::;ccrned ':>y rcflc:xion . 
pc~uliuri-tlc::J of. Lhc crapiricic-t philo:::opl·lcr ' s hohuy rtor:;~ - hal 'lci.na ~ion::. , 
n.c~ordint; to tllo:.; c ·::ho have hud ·Lbe m. ) 
Our ( ::pe;r Lcnce .::1.3 crnbo<ll<.:d bc.ini_SG i::; t.::~.k, .n CO.l.' ..; n.~o11 ~cL1 j n ull i.n bclli:_;ible 
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observation sta·~emcn·ts about the r10rld . Such sta·tements do not r efer to 
it , but i ·t i::: sol ely by virtue of it that they r efer t o anythin~ at all. 
Objectivity is ·the correlate of nubjE.ctivity. The a ttempt to reduce the 
one to the other merely leads to confusion , for it deprives •rords of their 
moaning and thdr rncaning is n0ither mor e nor less than vthat we mean by them. 
The explicHation and analy:::is of linguistic meaninc; is twel ess unle::w i.l. , 
is an analysis of what we do mean by t he exp:· essions we use , a::: indeed it 
is in J . L. Aus·tin and the better lingui sti c unalysts . The correctnesn of 
such an a.nalys:i r; is not a matter of inducti ve observation of the circumstances 
in vrhich the expr cosions in que8·t ion occur, as i t might be if the injunction 
" look for thu usc" r:e r e to be f ollowed. The only question is : would I say 
t hat in such a nd such a case? Is that what I mean by • • • ? And this is knom1 
by reflexion , not by a ny sort of empirical observation . For laneuarrc , the 
poner of ::;pecch and expreosion , is lil~e all my sr..ills embodied in :no . I 
am in possession of it. Nobody nho wasn ' t would have t he rl:Jno·tcst idea 
what t he.: pellucid Aunti!-1 v1a s tall<inc; about . 
Such plaus i.bili·ty a o the iri~ ru spectionist and behaviouri:::t doctrines have 
depends on ·the cor:~mon understandin~ of what cxprc n::: icm s r cfcrrinc to experience 
mean , t he reflex i vo undcr~rt:.l..l'ldlnc; of ·what it i::; to ::;cc , hear , be hunery , be 
depr e3::;ed , think i wundcr , desire , e tc. In order to ~;ay riiw.L thei r topic is 
huz:c c r , rutr:;cr , f ear , c ·tc . , - t hey have tu u:.;e t:1c nords r:!Jo::;c !'lt:aninG e ve ryone 
"' k.IlO\i:J, and i-t i G n"'rc ob::;cn.cantl ::;· r to l)trt tL.cr.t i n qnoLation l'!a~~:-:~ . It i ::; an 
i llu:::;.:.rm Lo :::;t;p"'l<;sc tltaL t!Jc:::;c ·;:u l.'d::; arc merely u:::;cd by ~·;o.y or intr oc.luct.i.on 
t.L 
in Lh<.. Lr cn·diliU.i.'J :aco.11 i.n.:;::; , l u.k r to be ab u.ndonud . nt:! Ia 'I j_(~L'i :.; 1~ l'C:•n.in:::; 
::;ccrctly d0pc.n c.ltJ• Jt t.ill'011[;bout 011 cuc~1 ordina ry mcur; Ln .;:.. . 





behaviour ist describes them could only be deacribcd and crrouped as related 
manif estations by one who already knew what hunger and anger wer e like , what 
it was to be angry and to be hungry , and to be embodied. When ange r is 
therE(:after redefined as an observable type of ant ic , the secretion of 
adrenalin , i ncr ease in blood st~ar , etc. this is a mere a3sertion that the 
rreani ng of " ans;cr" is not what v1c normally mean by "anger" . Dut the entire 
discourse depends for ita intelligibility upon our .lvnowine what anger is by 
having been angry. 
The conclusive uraument similarly acainst nussell ' s analysi s in " The 
Analysis of Mind" of what "Napoleon" means or what we mean by " Napoleon", 
is that we moa...Tl v1hat we mean and ~.,e do not mean what Russell so.ys we 1'1Ca'1 , 
either by " Uapoleon" or by "table". This is no low , vulgar jibe , though 
in Hume ' s aen::;c oJ: "vul&""ar" I mean t o be vulgar. For either we do not mean 
vrllat nu::wc ll -;;ay:J we mean by " Napoleon" or ne do not mean Yrhat nus::;ell means 
by "what Yie mean". Prom a description of Napoleon in nu::.::;el l ' s terms ( ::;ets 
5 
of series wtd scricn of sets of ocnsatiml , etc. ) it would be utterly i mpos-
:> ible to lmor; vd10 or ;-;hat nus bclng describe d , much loG3 to l earn anythinG of 
interc:::;t o.bont it or hi.J:J . Compared v;ith this vulG"ar cbjection , the crHlcism 
of Hn:::seJ.l. ' :::; doGtri.nc: of :;cn..;a!;ion:::; is mere triflinG, thouc;h i.~ rlt.H.tld :;c cm 
to be o.:1 equally concl usive ohje cti on to his theor y tho.L ·:.•c o.rr: ne ver a;·:are 
of t:v~ all c.:c cd "ul tl:1t.~ C' brief c;;: j o-tcnts that co -to Mal: <"' np t'1~"' col.le ctlono 
;·re call ~i .int_;:; or perovn:::" and ;·;.rich v1ould be ::;pokcn of "''oy ::~can ::; of oomo 







head in one position - but one cannot ask of the s ensation what distance 
it \'la.s at: one ca.n only ask tha t of things and events in the \'lorld that 
one sees in depth. The elaborate phrase docs not refer to anyth ing, such 
as one ever experien ces . 
'The short an~wer to the question " Hov: do ~'Ou knovl you se~, hear , think , 
are pleased , etc.?" is " By seeing, etc .", or " Because I do see , etc ." Pe ople 
t end .to be baffled and bcwil<;J.ere d by the ques tion , and if they produce this 
answer they t end to fee l that it i::; not really an ammer at all. (nus sell 
takes this view in his discussion of .an articl e by Knight Dunlap , the 
~rnerican psychologist, who insist::; t hat ther8 is knowint; but no observation. 
P.ll4) . I think it is essentially t he correct ansvfElr, and I thinlc it is 
~lso understandable vrhy i t is f elt not to be an answer . In all their en-
=1uirie~ and investigations and pr oje cts and actions , people take themselves 
for a rantcd.; be ing an embodied consciousness is the a priori condition of 
projects ~ . actions , and invc stign;tiono . nc:fJ.exion or self- avmrencss i z me r e ly 
) 
the explicitation af what i s implicit, in the s e nse that v1e tn...l<:e it for t;rantcd. 
[ f such explici ta~ion we re no·~ comnonpla ce , rre could no t n sc or understand the 
::ountl c:::s or dinary \'lOrds \'lh:i.c h refer t o a11d describe , not j 1.1St ·;;.bn.t is t!H:! 
:!<!.Se i n t he world , but ou r cx_:Jcr:i.cncc of it , end words ouch as "he re" and. 
'no\'1 11 v;llich huve no mcunin~ .::.part rrom our experienc e of cn1 ocU O('i be ing, be ing 
1 bouy. Dut t he ;-e an inc of all the::;c \'Jurd::; is tu~~cn f o:.- cr.::.:1 ~cd in cxposi tions 
)f doctrines of ;ni n d. o..nd bod.y ·;;i.d.eh , if true , i'loulrJ. :na~~~ our O.L'dl na ry unde r -
:;t.::.ndint; of the; : i.m[lo ::;::;ib l e . 
Hie ac ..;oun L of CXj_1er i c ncc doc::; not start 
r ro:-n c z:pcr icnc c , but f r o m plw :;.i. ~ r.: , a nd \':ha t it boi l:; U0'\ .' 11 t L) i::; t llc a ::; ::;ertion 









reall y mean but just what we imagine or suppose they mean. There is no 
better example , though there are ·many others , than Russell ' s account cC a 
table. 
If philosophy is to give an account Qf experience, it must be concerned 
v:i.th the actual experience we do have and not with hypothetical or possible 
"e·xperiences" we do not have, nor derive from physical and other theories, · 
the evidence for which lies in the experience we do have,. an account of 
experience · ~s it must be , in R~ssell ' s na~ve phrase, " if physics is true. " 





Y!HY SENSE- DATA? 
When Hume c i t e s houses , tree s , and mountains as examples of impressions , . . 
)r ~uses the words "object" and " impression" indifferentl y , or says that 
~he vulbar take their impressions to be their only objects, it occurs 
~o one to VTOnder whether the doctrine of impr essions and ideas is anything 
nore than a way of tD,.lking. 13nt it i s plain that Hume believes that im-
)ressi ons and ideas arc what ·the re really is, that they are knO\'ln to us by 
:onsci ousness, as he says, such as they really are , and that they are as 
;hey appear , Vfhatever we take t hem to be . 
Most sens e- datum doctrines in the past seventy years have shared this 
,mbiguous .charactr; r , but their authors , like Hume , have mostly supposed 
;hat they we re maki ng assertions about the nature of our perceptual exper-
.e nce a nd no t merely proposing anothe r Yray of talking about it. Some, 
to?; evc-r , and notably A. J . Ayer, in " The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge", 
1ave maintaine d that s uch doctrine s, properly ·understood , are no more than 
>roposals to adopt a linguistic expedient , to talk in c. ce rtain way, to 
ts c a l0s :.; a i:tb iguou;::; laneuar;c f or philosophi ca l purposes. If HUJi1e oo me-
. Lmes see ms to be doing no mo re than t his , t hough he intends t o do much !nore , 
.yer would. h ave us believe he in·~ends to do no mor e , t hou1;h he trie s to do 
·e ry much more . For as we shall s ee , he take s sense- data to oc , if not 
'hat ~here ihdubita.bly, r eally is , at l ea s t what :i. n induoi t aoly Gi vc n in 
>Grccp ~ion . A sctJ::;c- da t um sta.tcmsnt is i ncorrirri bl0 , e zcepi lir e;uistically. 
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the nature of sense- experience and of language alike , and that his mi s take 
about the one is intimately related to his mistake about the other . 
The cs::;ential point may be stated at the outset . Actual sense ex-
perience as we have it is the experience of an embodied subject with eyes 
to see, ears to hear , hands to grasp , legs to walk vri th, etd. , in depth, 
in the world , in the midst of t hint;s . Language is the language of such a 
be ine. Vlhat would a la:neuage be that was not utte r ed or heard or r ead? 
What v1ould i-t mean to utter without tongLJe or teeth or lips? 'ro hear 
without ears? To r e ad without eyes? There is only one an r.;we r: notning. 
The r e i::. no t a be ing who experiences and a being who describes or expresses, 
but one v1ho expresses what he experiences. The J.aneuage is as it is, because 
experience is as it i ~. To invent another language i s t o invent a language 
in vThich one ·can s ay only what one can already say. Ostensibly , Ayer 
admit::; t his , but his " laneun.t;e" is not of t his lcind ; thn.t is why it cannot 
be used , \7hy one ca.nnut -:;n.y anything in it; and th:i.s t oo he adwitn , thoueh 
he do cs not tmde r ::>tn.nd v1hy . 
But it is ·:~orth acldng in the f i nd; place why , if H were pos3ible to 
use the sense- datum lo.J1C"llat;c , he •:toul d Y:ant to do no . The r eason is c i vcn 
i .n the f.':i.r:::;t eh ea.ptcr of '"i.'hc l"onndatl on: o.f Em~iri.cc.l KnoriJ.c-Jcc " , 0n " thE' 
ar[,"'Jm~;n't f r om i.l.lu::;ion" . It :i.e t ho allccc d ambl::rn.i -ty of t he 0 .l.'rlinary lant:,'l..l.a Ge 
in ca::;<:s v;ll(. r c •::e m<.~.y b e mistn.kcn in onr; r;ay ·or ano ~!: ~: ::- <1hout ·;:l w.t r:n ::;co . 
"' 
These n.r 0 n.J l l umped to~cthcr a s illusions . Bu t mout of t ho ca:>o ::; C'i ~;~ d 
by Ay' r a re; not vi:jual i l l <J:>ion:j , ~nd in only on( o~- t.·::o of th·"::l could V!G 
b -3 :J<.J.i d )l;o be miutuken n.bont wha t \'!C ZC-3 or t o dr:::.r: f<.;.l G•-: cone 1 u::;ion s from 
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Amon~ the " illuDions" cited a re mirror i mages . But to call seeine 
one ' s f ace in t he mi.rror an illusion is the heieht of absurdl ty . gi rrors 
r;:ay produce illusions and may be used for this very purpose , for exar:tple , 
to make a s rnall cafe look spaci ous, to give " the illusion of spa ce". Once 
one sees the mirr or s , it still goes on looking spacious , but one is under 
I 
no illusion; for one see s wher e the mirrors are ; one sees the mjrrors as 
w·ell as what is in them r e flected in them. Wher e is the illusion? It 
is not an illusion that such a p l ace looks spacious ; i t does look spacious , 
for things and. places l ook t he way they look , the v1ay we se c them. The 
" illusion of space" when one is under no illusion is simply the spacious 
look o f a place . 
Among other cases c i t ed is the coin that l ooks circular from one point 
of v iew but elliptica l from another . But why not? If i t d i dn ' t , it 
nouldn ' t be a. coin , or at least not a circular coin . ~here io t he illusion? 
But the coin "problem" is not the ultimate in philosophi cal canards . As 
eve ryon.c: has heard , p eople in de serts sometimes takc1 rniraces f or oases . For 
Ayer a rn:i.racc i a a ~:omplctn hu.lluc inut:i.on". nut Lhe m"i.rac;c :i ~ a well- known 
type of v ·i.siblc phon~rnenon not only i n de se rts but at sca, v1hich anyone with 
nor·mal vi sian can see , v1rw t her he knows a mirac;c whe n h•.: see s one or not . 
The polu t a bout halluc ina:t.i.om; i s ·that ·the r e is notbin0 ~o sec . 
lfavi nc i.n th r.: fi 1.·~ L pl a -::c ni xed up all sor t3 of d i f f r·r c nt tl:"i.~cs 1mdc r 
"' the iv-:ad.ing " i l l n:'}ion", 1\:;rc r then ::;oes on t o ar.::;uc t!'1u t. th,. ::.:cn::;e- datur.t 
l "unc. <.:.,_;c. l o..y :.; d~rm " an tmo..mb.ic;uous convent i on fo r the n::;'• of ·::on1 ::; t.hat s tand 
for ii)0des of p<..rc:r•p·L i on . ... f rceint: us f r om t :1e vc r ha l p l'l'b lv•;::; that deve lop, 
) 







(P. 26) . Undoubtedly the word " illusion" is used in several ways . But 
what is meant is generally understood quite clearly from the context and 
situation. So far as the problems are merely ver bal , they can be cleared 
up as Austin has ~hov.n in " Sense and Sensibilia". But some of them are 
not merely verbal : they are problems of reflexive analysis . Aye r claims 
t !w.t there are two senses of " perceive" (by which he rneans " see" ) , and in 
one of them it can be used "in such a \7ay that to say of an obj,:Jct that i·t 
is perceived does not entail saying that it exists in any sense at all ." 
The context in which he asserts this ( P. 2l ) is a discussion of s eeing double 
or seeing two things when there ' s only one. There is no such sense of " see" 
as he alleges . 
But this problem i s not a verbal one. The yr oblem is to analyse the 
differen.ce be twee n seeing one man double and seein(! twins , a difference of 
v;hich we are all aware. The analysis of this diffe r ence is of importance 
for understanding how in perception we fix and orde r things in t h Gir spatial 
relations . In double vi sion , t he two " images" do not have a place in the 
v10rld , but float in front of things~ \'!hen v;e fixat e the obje ct they wi th-
draw i nto i t . 'l'his f i xn.t ion is no t au tomatic but " i ntentional", t hat is 
t o s n.y, we lool< a t t he object . CAs t his is a mat·~cr of considerable i nt er e st 
I hn.ve appended to t ld s chapter . an illuminating di scu s:::; .L on of i t by r·:crle au-
Po" G.J'. ) 
.. 
No d<; 11 bt t he \'lord " ill twion" is u::;e d in s eve ral nay s . If ''-0 rds y;e r e 
not pol,yv n.l ~nt i n t his way v;e should nc0rl n.n enor!Jlous l y e r e a t e r vocabulary 
than Yre ac ~ually have . 
> 
Tt i s onl.r when \'Ford~ a r e t c..kon out of con text or 
apar I~ f r o r'l t ho ::;i tun.t i ons i n wrd c;h t hey arc u:;cd that t lwi r mcan ine is e cn-















them to be use d in many different contexts unambiguously, and to be given 
if necessary new meanings or new shades of meaning contextually . This 
'is one of the essential t hings about a lanffUage , which Ayer seems to 
misw1derstand no less than Russell , >rho complains i n the "Analysis of Hind" 
about the vagueneas and impre cision of \~rds . The attempt to construct 
• 
other l~guagcs is based partly on thi:;; misunder standine- , f or the other 
languages are inte nded not to have this essential wHbigui ty. New concepts , 
and for , the devel opment of knowledt:;e , but with " unambicuouo" \"lords of the 
t 
I 
1 n evi meanine-s - some of them by stipulati ve definition - are r equired by, 
kind desir ed rte could no·~ s uy anythi ng new wl thout a ne\'1 word ; the old 
meanings could not be bent or stretched , analogies exploited , or new terms 
explain.ed . 
Aye r offe r s no r c:a::;on tha t holds water for wanti ng to us c a sense- datum 
lan~~a~e ; we can do pcrfe ctl,y rrcll without i t and this hr:: admit ::; . But 
the r e is a reason \'thich he doer; not a~fll.i. t f or want ins to usc r.;uch a " langua.ee" . 
Ayc:r al mo::rt from tho start talks abo1lt " perce pUono" in thC:i Ilumean way , and 
everything mic;ht be expe:;dcd to follow from this . And indeed it doe3 , for, 
h e 3ayo , " s lncc in philosophiGint:; about pcrcep~ion our maLn object is to 
ana l,y::::c the r ... l atlon:.hip of our scnsc- cxie rienec to t hu propooi tions we put 
f o r 1:ard concc:rnin~ r.atcriul thin~s , it i s ur;e ful for n::; to Ju.::.v•· a t~.::r;ninoloey 
"' r.ut. i.n ark•n·!l:1C i~ ·::e 
f acl.c , 0r even •:tak" iL po~ ... ;ibJ c fo.~.· u:::; to cxpres::; :.Lny l;hi 1·C ·l.itat ·::~ could no t 
At beet it cnahleo u:.; nn l~· tJ r • · C'0r to fn.:ni lia r 
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facts in a clearer and more convenient way. "·• 
I 
(P. 26 ). 
eyer ' s account of the object of philosophising about perception in 
fact proposes one philosophical view of percept ion , viz ., that >7e have 
sense- experiences or perceptions \7hich may be _consider0d independently 
of any supposed world of things , events , processes , happenings, whi ch they 
might be supposed t o " present". In other words what we a r e aware of in 
perc0ption is the hypostatised perception or con i;ent , not the cat on the 
mat or the house across thE) road or the rai nbow in the sky or the mist in 
the valley. Now the " cat" couJ..d be a clever simulacrum of a cat , the 
'house" could be a m•Jrc fo.ctl.de or a piece of trompe- 1 ' oeil , the " ro.inbow" 
' 
could be the e ffect of a garden hose , and the "mi st" could be smoke . What 
none of them would be or could be is a perception or content . For each 
would be seen. in a certain dire ction , in a c ertain place , or covering a 
certain are a , whateve r v1e sar: them as , and vthateve r v:e took them to be , stand-
:i.ne or sitting where v:o were , seeing them with our eyes. But nhatever they 
we r e , they would look as they looked . ~7hat v:ould the " content" be? 
r!hat cou ld it be but t he look.'2 But l ooks are not i ndependent of cw-
bodied be .i.nt;s ocein,:; thint;s i n t .i:w v1orld , nor can they be intelligibly spoken 
of as if they rtere . •:ie do llO~ sec cat- li.kG l ooks , v1hich is what cat- like 
scn::;e- datu ·::auld be , but the l ook of the cat on tho mat , \7hich is the nay we 
see til~ ca t from a cert a in an;;l c' , at a ce rtain dis t a nce , in a c (n·tain light. 
"' I n t he sc~sc-datum doctrine , as in th~ doctrine~ from ~i• l~h it d~sconds , 
And ::; i11 ce t o talk of s e e inG i. s t c.' rcf e; r t o an ernbodiod 
x 'L'IJe i1ar•l f11c t L ; tlia t i -1; clue ::; not rm ablc us t o rc·fr r to 
cn y t l1i.nG, lllllCh l ess in <.l c l '"arc r Viay . /-.;.fe r .'::ivc :::; no '<:<:.lllp l c 
,,_;ld no cxa•nplc.; can be eivcn , for r easuns Vi!l::. c h he fail::: to 





being with eyes at a di stance from what he sees , and thu s to talk the so-
called "thing" lan(,'Uaze , t he aware ness of contents or sen se- data has to be 
that of a disembodied beinc • . And that is to say , one is not talki ng about 
experience as we actually have it at all. That is why the r e is no sense-
datum lanzua.ge • I t i o only as embodied beings , situated in the world , t hat 
• 
vre have sense e xperience . .. I t i s not t r ue that th~ sense - datum languaae would 
enabl e us " to r e f er to familiar facts i n a cleare r and more convenient way". 
It viould prevent un from referring to them at all : t he " experience" it would 
r efer to vrould be that of a di s emhodied awar 0ness of fret-- floatinG looks. 
The al lcaed examples of sense - datum language are simply ordinary laneuaee 
vri th the word " s e ns e- datum" jammed incontinently in ; they arc all quite 
intelligible except for that rror d . 
One of th.J fallacie s of t he whole doctrine is the belie f t hat you can 
change yonr de sci·i pt i on of your actual expe r ience , t he ve ry meanine of VI hat 
you say , \'fhile conLinui.n.:; to dcccribe exactly the s a:ne expcri <::n~ c , that you 
can , for example , des c ribe your expe rience of seein.:; t he cat on the rnat , the r e 
in de pth , p layinG wlth the ball of YI OOl , wi thout br:i.ne inc the ca:l; into the 
dcscripl;ion o:t all . A cat i s in Ayc r ' s t e r ms a rnate ri.al t hing , and s tatcmc:nts 
abont 'Tln:Lc r i al t ld.ncs " a.rA neve r conclusi v e l,y ve r i fiabl e " ( P. 239) It is 
not :mr pri.sln0 chaL on <:. ab:::;ur d du~trinu l ead s t o a:to ~hr: r , 0 1· , i. f one c a res 
t o put t he point anot;h(;r ':Jay , t i1 <>.t one a bsurd v:ay of t.al. tdnc l.:.atl::; to ano Llle r . 
"' AJ'cr i. .:; a0::0rt.inc , f vr c ;:a:!!pJ , , tha t one c annot concl u:>i v0ly v0r i.f~' that the 
cat i.~ :i.n t.1.0 ki tr;i:~_;n . But if· one ~·,ere ~ i ttint; i n ti·, ~ 1: i tc-bc...n r:i th the cat 
l i f L i L up Q.Hl hL.Ul' i L pu.cr.int; . \'JouU. t hat b.-; con<:l :;.::;.:.v c vr:ri f.Lca tion ? 
!lot hy Ayc-r ' 'J :; Landn.t·d::: . Tf oni'J took h i m ccrlolJ::;ly 1)11C.. ·::v u 1 cJ. buvc to :::u.rpoce 
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that he didn ' t knov1 what a cat was , what "cat" meant . The only sense in 
\?hich one would verify that the cat was in the kitchen v1ould be - if one 
did not know - to go to the kitchen and see that it was there. But if 
one took Aye r seriously, it could never be "conclusively ve r i fied" t hat 
it was the kitchen one had gone to ; nor that one had ent ered by the doorway. 
i1hat docs he mean by ve r i fication of a statement o.bout a material thine? 
F.ntailment by a :Jet of statements about sense- data.. Since no finite set 
of statements about sense-data can ever formally entail a sta·temcn·t about 
a material tllinc, such a Gtatement can never be conc~usively verified. And 
here we r eturn to the secr e t raison d '~tre of the whole doctrine : the 
traditional s~nsationali.st belief that tilerc are i ncorrieibl e data of sense 
o r percepLion , .,.:ilich arc r;hat they are and what they appear to be , and to 
nhich - r elated in various vrays - all that r1e call ~he \'lorld of sense- experience 
is r educible . 'I'his v i<.JVI ic open to all the objections I ha.v0 mentioned in 
connection l'li th l!ume . Aye r tri8s to meet some of them by dint of great 
liberality in admit ting characteristics of experience aG cltaractcrl stics of 
sense-d at~. Bn I; th r: case; :i. D the ~;a1uo as v1ith IIumc . Y/hcn Hume ta.llw of 
l)orcoptlon:::: nl Lhou L :1ny c;m::tpl o:.:; it is oovionsly not things he i:::: t:1lkine 
about; bn·L r:hen he ~i vcr.; cxo.;~:ple :J , it tHrns out to be thi:ncs aft0r all , at 
l east part of the till:<.. . 
Tn A;;cr ' ~ cu.::;c: , the roo·t .of -!;h.; tr(;uble is t h0 insc :sa l;c dcoir0 f(1r 
certainty of a toi;:;.ll.}' 111 inc(.nccivc~ kind .• Th ...! r!Ou"l of ·::: .a :: t .... C"rt~in is 
, .. h ;, + ). . l • ., ,. I• C . ' ll " 1 ''ltr 
••J;4 U V . oJ ' o.,:>· '-"" \)•\, 1.. • 











of such statements , or of situations in Vihich 11 favourable 11 or " unfavourable" 
sense- data would be sen;;;ed. This is plainly not an account of ho>1 we find 
out if the cat is in the ld tchen and can on occa3ion be qui tc certain that 
it is. But is it meant to be? The only ansv1er is : it is and it isn ' t . 
It io founded on a doerna about the nature of sense- exper ience , and therefore 
h~s ~o be such an acQount and nothing else. But the doBTo'la is masquerading 
as just another way of talkinG' which i s philosophically more conven:i.ent , so 
it is no thine so vulcro.r as an assertion of ho;v I 11know" ttJin is a typewriter 
I '~ tappinG, or t hat the cat is in the kitchen. 
I come now to \7hat may be called Ayer ' s ontolo~ical proof of the exist-
ence of sen:Je- data , \'l hich fairly takes the philosophical bi::::cui t . Ther e is 
allcccd t o be no qucation whether sense- data exist or not , or rihctlv?r thines 
exist or not , but only ~hether there is o. eood reason to usc the allcccd sense-
datum lancruacc ·~o to.lk o.bout experience . How then can Aye r paradoxically 
permit hir!lcclf to ·balk a::; if there were in<.lub i tably nctlsc- data , but not in-
dubitably thine;::;? Bccanse this is so by definition . We arc anare of ·sense-
data and scn:;e- do.ta ex:i st , bccan::>e our belnc; awar,) of them awl their exist-
(;nee is part of what AyrJr has made " sensc- datum11 moan . He sct3 out to make 
them as cliffcrcn t cs pos::;il>lc fr<,m thinc;s , to avoid con fusion v1i th thin co 
and the ullc crcd confusion w:1icn ari::; c s out of corn.1on di:::cour:;o about thincs. 
And in pu.rtlcular iw inGi:::;t::; t h:..t they cannot be s aid 'l,o c.xi.:'t nn~cn:.cd . 
" J\cr~ord.i.n..;l~· ," he :::;ayn , " J fi nJ. it udvi.Gable to rrtckr it a ncGCG~ <lr'J' u.o 
rie ll £!.,; o. :::tt f i.' i c i •.:n ~ eonJ. L t.i.on o f the e;:i s t cnce of :::once .- tl:;ttu l;ltu. ~ ~hey should 
Ln fu.c ~ lH~ :-;cn::;c<l . " 
:;cnsc- ctuLo. c;<.Ls·L , hcc:..n::;c I havr: defined thc·m a::; r;xis ~( n l .• " It i s incon-















since it has been made self-contradictory t o say of an experienced sense-
datum that it does not exist or that ·it doe s not r eally have the properties 
it appears to have. " One might suppose t hat at least the experiencing or 
sensing of the sense-data was contingent , the point of contact , so to spe o.k , 
with reality. But no. By definition we do experience them , and they are 
what we sense or experience . If one we re naive enough to ask what i t means 
to sense or e xperience or be aware of, · as distinct from seeing, hearing,, 
touching, moving about , handling, scruti nising, examining, etc . , there is ,, 
\ 
no a.nsv;er except that we 've decided not to talk that way . Whenever we would 
normal ly say that v1 e see something, ho.vever , we are by definition a·war e of 
sens e- data. 
No\·1 i n orcJ i nary us age s eeing is one way of being aware of something ; our 
awarenes :::; of it is our s eeing it , and what we are av1are of i s what we s ee . 
If v1e were: avtare of visual s ense- date i n the same s ense of "anare" , then what 
would be de scri be d in t he sen:::;e - daturn languago , if that we r e possible , would 
be neithe r more no r l e ss than what we see as v1e see it . If not , "bc ine a..-1are" 
cannot mean what i t c ommonly mean::; . It would have t o be a mode of awarcnc::;s 
entire ly unknown to ns . Discmhodicd avmrcness . 
Rotc 
Doubl e vi ::;ion and fi xut:ion 
I t ::;llould be · noted that i n what f ul.low<> Llcrlcau-ron"\ y is arcuine fh·st 
a::;:..~.in::;t t!te v iGw tha t f ixat ion of the sine;lc objc G't; occurs auto r:w.t i c o.lly , 
and not b,y lool~inc . !£i::; " phenomenal body" corr~"::.;por:da tr .. ·;;hut I have called 
the crnbodic'l s uhjoct or one ' s (>;nhorl i t.!Cnt . 
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"\then I look into the di stance and _.for example> one of my fingers placed 
near my eyes projects its image on non-symmetrical points of my retinae , 
the disposition of the images on the retinae cannot be the cause of the 
movem-=;nt of ~ixa.tion which puts an end to the diplopia. For , as has been 
pointed out , the J i sparity of the images does not exi st in it::;elf. :Iy 
finge r f orme it::; i mage on a ce rtain area of my left retina and on an area 
of the right retina v;hich is not symmetrical wi th the first . But the 
symmetrical area of tho rjaht r etina is al so filled with vi sual excitations ; 
the distribution of the s timuli on the two r e tinae in only tmsy mrnetrical 
f r om the s t andpo i nt of o. sub j ect comparing the tno cons t ellat i ons a.nd 
identifying th~m . On t he re t i nae themcelve s , conside r ed a.s obj ects , these 
are me r e l y two incomparabl e groups of sti.muli. I t will be r eplied per haps 
t ha t , r1i thout a. movement of f i xa.tion , t hes e two gr oups cannot be supe r -
imposed, nor t;ive wa.y to vicion o.f sOJTtetllinc;, a nd in this scn~e t heir pr es ence 
alon11! c r ea tes a state of d·i.sequilibri um. But this is pr cciGely t o a.drni.t 
ri:w.t v1e a rc trying t o pr ove : that the vision of a s.ingl e ob j ect ic not 
t he s imple. r c r.: ul t o f f i.xat i on , that it is anticipated in tho V(:ry a.ct of 
fixation , or ~h at , as ha.::; been co.:i.d , th..,; fixat i on of t he look is a " pros pect-
i vc act i vi. ty" • For m,y l ook to turn on t he ncar objects and t o con<..: entr at e 
the cye3 on tht: r:J , i ~ mn:]t f eel the diplopia us a cli;;cqui.lihri.un or a s i.m-
pcr fcd vi:;i on a.. tl mu::;t or ient itse l f t o':::1rds the s i nt:;lc ob j ect a::; the 
r es olution of t hi ::; tcncion and the a~h i.e vc;;wnt of vio.i.oJ1\ ' One r.n:::;t l ook 








is visibly not the simple superimposition of them : it is of another 
order , incomparably more solid than them. The trro imaees of diplopia 
are not amalgrunated in a sinsle one in binocular vision and the unity 
of the object is indeed intentional . But - this is the point - it is 
not notional (or conceptual ) . One passes from diplopia to the single 
object , not by an inspection of the mind , but when the two eyes cease 
to function each on its own and are used as a single organ by a single 
l ook. ' It is not the epistemological sub j ect Vlho carrie s out the synthesis ~ 
it is the body when i.t pulls it0clf tot;ether and makes for the sint;le 
term of its move ment by every means , and when a sinele intention is born 
in it with the phenomenon of synergia . We withdraw the synthesis from 
the objective body only to give it to the phenomenal body, that is to say 
to the body in so far a s it projects around itself a certain "milieu", 
in so far as i. t::; "parts" are known dynamically to each o th ~r and j ts 
r ecept61·s arc dl::;poced in such a nay as to make poss·i b l e by thci.r synergia 
~he perception o.f the objec-t . In sn,ying t hat tlli.::; intentionality :i.::; not 
a thoucht or id.eu , we rnc o.n t lud. it is not effected in the transparence of 
consciousnc: ns o.ncl tltat it t alws for granted all the 1.:3-to,rt lmo\';ledgc r:ty 
body han of j Lnnlf . Gupportcd by the prcl ogica.l uni. ty of ·the corpor eal 
schema , t he fl tl rccpt ual :>j n t iJC::;i c no ~nore pos::;e:Jces t h·.; ::>t:cr8 t or t he objc,ct 
tha :1 t!1:::.t of on r-.: ' :J 0\'in bOJJ , C..'1d t ha t iG why the pcr'cc_;_vcu OOject i s (l!::ays 
civcn a::.; tran::;ccn<lcnt , 
oiJjc<'"l; iL:;uf , L11 tl1<.: \':orl<l , <:!.. tel noL at t ili ::; rncto.ph;ri ·al p•'linl. ·::ilich i s 







scious ·of progressing tmyards the object i ts.elf and of having finally 
its presence in the flesh . The monocular images wandered vaguely in 
front of things, they had no place in the \<torld, and suddenly they with-
draw towards· a certain place in the world and are swallowed up, like 
phantoms at daybreak, into the place they came out of. The binocular 
object absorbs the monocular images and it is in it that the synthesis 
is carried out and in its clarity that they are recognised in the end 
as. appearances of this object. " 
(Phlnomtnologi~ de la Perception. X 
Le Sentir, P. 267- 269. ) 
















. o~.~. , 
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Chapter 16 
hi\NGUAGE 11.1-!D EXPERIENCE 
The attempt to tear languac;c o.nd experience apart is based on a . . 
radi.cal misundcrotandinc; both of the nature of lane;uage and of the nature 
of exp8rionce , or perhaps one should s ay on a decision to it,.I'J'J.ore their 
nature . nut their nature will out : it keeps ero ~rffing in little \"A:J rds 
like "now" and " then" and " up" and " down", and in bigge r w:J r ds like " visual ·' 
field" . ':ie kn0\'1 what these words mean by being embodied as v;e are . For 
our language i::~ that of embodied subjects , as is all our experience . 
Lansuace is as i.t is bccauoe experience is as it is . If it were not so , 
la:1gua~es woul<.l not be translatable. The " sense- datum" laneuaee is not 
tra.:1slat3.bl0 , for it is neither about what ne experience , nor about our 
experience of it ; if it nere , iL would be otiose . 
To say that the boot i::; on the other foot, that expcrit:r,ce is as it is 
because lancuaec is as it is , i s to make , however , a point of esccntial 
importu...'1cc . The lOJ1CUa$e v:hich \ '/C learn is , like t he vrorld into which 
•:;c arc bot·n , already thur e bcfor:: uc , incorpora:tinG catecrori0s and meanin t;s 
throueh which \':e pcrcci ve and. understand i t , makin;; sense of thine;::; , dis-
tin truishinc , sortin~ ou ~ , and r E!latinG. <)ur Viorld is a spoken world, for 
to learn a languaze is to 1 earn to make sense of the \'Ju:t"".l.. d , to lc o.rn the 
sorts of t nines in their rclat lon::: , to r oc0511ise the " ::;il~h" i n the " this" . 
Our ,?1'im.:1.ry cxpcri·;..ncc of la'1SUUCC i::; of our native lanc,"'.lo.0e , t he laq;ua_gc 
we: u.rc born to , as ;, roakers and li:::;tcncrs , as eubocli.::d :.;ubjcct::; ·,·,ho say \'ii th 
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the toncue in i;heir native tongue what they see with their eyes or do 
with their hands , for Ylhom vthatever is can be said , and for whom what 
is difficult to say is difficult to understand. To know it is to be 
possessed of it as a bodlly skill , to be articulate,, to have words at 
one ' s ·co·rnmand. 
Vfhen I move my f i ngers , it is not lik.e movine a pen ; it is with my 
finge rs .r move the pen but I do not move my fingers with anythinc; . 
Similarly , I do not move my vocal organs with anything. Hut with them 
I ~ake the sound . Hy voicing the sound , my movement:; of the tongue , 
t eeth and lips , is my ::>aying the words , and my sayinG the \'lOrds is my 
meaning •. Hy mcanincr, true or false , is on my lips . To speak the truth 
is bodily to vocalise it. 11y having the words i::; my power of expression. 
I n utterance , unstudied utterance , one does not t h ink of the \?Ords , one 
simply means a lvud , voici.ng mr:anine;. One ' o na ti. vc lan(.."Ua~e i.s a mode 
of bodily bclnc , <' 110 ' :.; powe r to r:ay . ~e usc it in un~tud j cd utterance , 
only in the pc ct1liu..:r ::;cn::;e that vre use our voice o:r handc or arms or eyes , 
or use our ski lJ at tho piano , not , ·that is , in the s cn::;c t.hat we u ::;c the 
pi.::1no . 'ro ::;p~.:al-: is t;o mean w l th the voice , to voice moo.nj.nc, to make one'::; 
meuninc public . 
:Rut tl' 0nt cr 11 pon i. i; c.nd po::;sess 




anyone ' s lips and of the !!leaning thut unyone hears. But lancuaee in 
itself is only the deposit , as it were , of acts of meaning, for of course, 
words acquired or were given their meani ngs , as today they are Given new 
meanings . 
The meaninG is both in the word and in the thing, both in the sentence 
and ,in the fuct . We do not usually say a thing has mea.'r'ling , for the meaning 
of a thing is s i mply vrhat H is. But what it is is also the meaning of 
the Yiord . Hhat a cat is , is what "cat " me ans . The universal is in re , 
but also ~ ££_, i n verbo . llh<:.tever ne see , touch, grasp , hear, or move 
about , is both " this" o.nd " such" , "t"ode and -rclrov8e. The universal is in ££• 
But i t . is also in ve rbo. To hear the sound " cat" or to see the marks "cat" 
on a blackboard , in isolation , is not simply to hear a sound or to see marks , 
but to hear the word or roacl it , and this is to hear or r e ad th« meaning of 
" cat" . In one's nati.ve l aneuage , every thing, fact , rolation., , situation , 
experience ls essentially expressible . i'Jhat i s seen ;·ri th the eye ca n be 
uttered wi th the toncuc . In our native language we do not put vrhat we see , 
or think or me an into wor ds : rre mean what rre see or t hink , vocu.lly, our 
meaning is in the word;3 rre utte r . To think it out beforehand :is simply to 
mean s ilently , to -cay to oneself. This i s ·t;h~.:: point often made by saying: 
" I dun ' t know \"l.hat I mean t .i. lJ. I say it ." · IIm·; could it be oth<::rv!ise? 
·:ihcn r1e r·~ad u book , 11c s c·e th r:! 1:e <l.lline on th0 pac;e us we r ead : nc do 
"' not see ,.;·urh; o.Pd intarpr e t th<.-.:..r meaninc. The meanin;:; :i. s not in 'the> r.mrg:in 
O r: , j,)':1C:Ill'· r 8 of.( the pa;:;e , hut tbnr c on the r a £;C , .from J.inc to 1. lDC' a nd I'a&e 
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" does not count as sense- experience , does not even count as seeing. Reading, .. 
in the intellectuali s t view 11h:i.ch is happily at ease with the senoation-
·alist account of perception , is an operation of the in ·~ellcct followinG 
the ope rations of a.'1other mind by means of signs and symbols . After all , 
there are only black marks on a \"lhite page : that is all there is to see: 





what .,the illi t e ra:te sees is what we all see . But are we talking about e x-
be done if your nose is near enough to the paper. ) But surely , it may be . 
said , if you want to call readine; seeing , it· is at lc;ast a ve ry exceptional , 
1 
peculiar kind of seeing. But is it?. Did ·you ever , I r eply , see a face 
I 
t 
1 without an expression? Did you nd>t "read" the exp:- ession? 
l 
Thouc;h one might not think it , sic-ht is regularly asserted by sen:::;ation-
alists and their descendants t o be the most important sense for those who 
have it. I c an only suppose that while they arc thinking about what t hey 
call sense- experience , they happily forget about laneuage , vrhich can be left 
to l exicographers , phi l ol or;ists , logicians and phonetic ians . HearinG a 
r 
I· 
delicht ful story, the voice of doorn from the judicial bench , anoLhcr voice 
!' sl ro.uque et d ' amour si voil &e", oont;"s , peals of lauc-htor , eve n t he sir:1pL::s t r 
bit of information in<li::;pr::n~;ablc f or the ordinary conduct of life - none of 
that counts as son..;c- cxncrionce . ---- ~ ·,'ihat \"tC really hva r arc jv~t sounds , and 
t;onncls are evcn·~s which occur when a prc:ssurc wave wl ~hin a c e rtain rane e 
of fre queneic o impin::;es on the tympanum, e tc. Since ·ttw.t ii:i o.ll r:e c c:· t , 
r:i;lut we t~ .ink \'!0 hc<.l.r is not r:lw.t \'le r eally hc;ar . •ro cxpJ ;.d.n r:ll<.l.t v;c think 
·;;e hear , th~r'3 is the nnconsciouo interpretation story and a variety of other 
philosophical fi ctions. 
People tuke .lru1c;ua[;'e f oi.' c-rantetl in pr.::d::;el,y tlle •::cJ they tab.) the ir own 
- --·----·---- -----
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bodies for eranted. Bain& articulate is part of being embodied . One 
must alracdy be articulate to say anything about language , objectively , 
scientifically, an one must sec to m~{e any observation . The embodied 
subject is a priori in ·this as in other respects . The physical world , 
t he ·\'/orld concci ved in tho t erms of physics , chemi::>try and physiology was 
a s sumed in the old scn~atlonalist account of sense - expe rience , and re~arcled 
in effe ct us \'lhai.. ~here really \"IUS "in itself" . The parallel mistake with 
languaec i:J t o try to account for our cxperi cnce , or a.llcee d experience , 
as speaker s and l is tcm<.:rs , in t e rms derived from t he objccti ve :.;tudy of 
lan~1aee , as cui acner is , in iLsclf. 
) 
To und~rs tuncl Galilco ' ::; cxpcritnent \'J i th bodies on an inclined pl ane , 
one mu::;t already knor: v1hat bodies are from having seen bodj es and inclined 
planr:!s fro:n havin0 ccen clopec (and 11alked up the;:t or sliu down them ) . No 
sub ::;equcnt development of phy:::;.i.cal theory can tell us nhat our actual ex-
pcriencc of bod.i.<.:s and s lopec ic - v1e know t hat alre ady. Phy::;ical ucfin-
i tions arc operational - not "v1ho.t the dimension is" but " hov1 to meo.suro it". 
'.'!e could neve r l co.rn whu~ lenc;th na.s from phys i cs . nut ';'/ () knov; vdut lenath 
i s : \'IC :::ec tJ:w lencth::; of tllil1(;:> nnd the farnc:::s a nd nc:arnac::: of ·thint;s . 
One r:1a:.;t b0 a boclJ to clo phy::Jics , to knoi·i any ph~;..; i.caJ fact or to test auy 
On 1 y for an embodied beine; could flhy::d.co be a bout 
" ~ · (II'• ';i1 :::::l; .. ._. , 0 l.' V C' J.'Y tt;lh;h ~·.he C0..%.~ 1 LJOCG f <h' t.!l•~ :::;\;ttJ:,• 01.' 1 <..L. l~J U_3'C , in 
'n:: hav LllG r .e:J.'1 L 1 b:,r ~;;:.yin ...; 1 hy "1 \..:a.l i.ne,; <!.l t~wl . 
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tudy of l~1guage take meaning for granted , but some try to impose their 
;:>nclusions upon it and to assert what our actual experience of meaning 
:1st be . (Russell ' s r emarks on meaning in "The Analysis of Hind" or 
yer ' s in "The Fow1ciations of Empirical Knm ledge" are as good examples 
s any. ) 
<., 
Heinuna, in effect, is reduced to .§iml and Bedeut\mg. But it 
s only for one who means (mcinen) that there can be ·either Sinn or 
~deutung , that there can be a language . To say in "objective" , " scien-
Lfic" terms what "I mean" or "my mea.tling" is, is no more possible than to 









G00 D'MAN Al)'D THE CARDINAL BIRD 
If one tnn.y generalise· about the Vienna circle , their common standpoint 
was essentio.l'ly that of a neutral monism similar to nus sell ' s , founded 
upon tho doct rine of scn::;ations which t hey inherited from Ernst Hach . 
The idea of a logical construction was intimately related to th~t of a 
unified science . In the loc-ical language, physical statemen ~s would be 
translateable or transformable into ps cyhological stateme nts , or , as Shlick 
put i t ; " propositions concerning bodies are transformable in·to equivalent 
propositions ~oncerning the occurrence of sensations in accordance vTi ·th laws". 
The unification of science in t nis \'lay was philosophy. 
, 
For a metaphysic so grandiose and ambi tious , one must , I t hink, go back 
to the previous pan- logicist , Hegel. The r eason why Hegel ' s " logic" is not 
logic in. the accep ~ll0d modern sense is that it includes the r eal , the exist-
cnt , that is to cay, it is not formal l ogic . The di alectic is , an it wer e , 
a deduction of the real. Kierkegao.rd ' s criticism, unfo. Lr as h0 often is 
t o !Icgcl , i::; no 1noru t lt a.n the otatement and re- statement of the point t hat 
t'!'lere can be o. losical sy::;tcm but ther e cunnot be a sy:;tcm of exi stence . 
Exist 0nce cannot be deduced . There is no r eason '.'Illy a11y thint3' cxi ::;ts . 
do0s not ii'lw.:h ma t t er \'Jhethe r "exist ence" is understood in Kierkecao.rd ' s 
"' 
(it 
special sc'1:;;e of individual s ubjectivity or simply in the sense in ,·;hi0h it 
is said. t hat thor ,.) arc t hings in the wor ld .) 
:wron0 l;he r:IC:.ilbl")r:J of thu Vienna circlo , S';h li ck und.cr:;;toou Lh i....: point 
ve ry r;ell . A bod.y of cstubJj :-:!led ph~' ~icn.l luw :.!.nd. th<:.ory cn.n be r cconotructvd. 
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as a deductive logical system. Though its whole justification is as a 
means of prediction , as a logical system it has no necessary conn0ction 
'7lhatsoever with what th" r e is or ·aiJ.at is the case, or with the inductive 
obse rvations w~creby the laws it incorporates were established. It is a 
fo.rmal system . Its relation to real ity is anoth~r matter . It is , in 
Schlick ' s words , " a means of finding one ' s way a mong the facts ." ("The 
Foundation of Knovrl e dt$e" in " t~oeical Pos i tivism" ed. A. J . Ayer , P. 226 ) . 
Reason , as Ueyc rson says., has onl y one means of explainine what does 
not come from itself - to reduce it t o nothing. The general theory of 
relativity, for example , is a deductive system in which the phYsically 
discontinuous is assiJ,jilated to the spatial continuum, the existent ( the 
physical ) to th:: formal ( the geometricn.l). But , T.~eyerson points out , 
this rationalisation can neve r be complete - the real cannot be deduced . 
The theory doea :10t a:ttcmpt t o explain why one " track" of space is at one 
point and not at anothe r . This i s simply accepted as a fact , y;hich is 
expressed in ordinary language v1hon we no•ce the presence of a mass or an 
electrical field . 'l'he theory. assumes this and shows how the phe::nomena 
of eravi~ation follow . In other words , t he explanation is confined to 
the " essence" of the phenomenon , a.nd leaves aside completely the order of 
existence , \7hethcr olJj(.)ctive physical c;:istc:1ce or the P.Xi.Gt.~"ncc of Einot.ain . 
There is no reason to believe/that Einstein was so foolish ao to th:i.!1k othe r -
\\isc . ( Sec P. lt15 " f,a b 6'duct .ion Rdativiste" , by F. . : ~yerc,on . Payot. , 1925 ) 
''ut ll)cicc.l con:;'tr uctl• ns or rc- conntructlont> of tllr' ·:1ur· d arc fuundcd 
on t;1 ~ C\lli Lr~ry uo::;ump-tion :md arc in tiliB rc~pe:c·t ff].r more lih .. f!c.:;c l ' a 
The cy::;tc!rt mn::; t include i ~s author . He eel ' ::; 
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system is meant to , but as Kierkegaard said , he is like a man who bui.lds 
an enormous castle and lives in a shack close by, or who professes one 
world and draws his salary in ar.other. The joke is crude , for the point 
it makes is crude, bu-t nonetheless in<;.scapable : Hegel' s very death panes 
from t he:: cholera must have their place and meaning in the system , if it 
is what it purports to be . Precisely the same applies to Russell ' s or 
Ca.rnap ' s vastly different systems . What we call "Napoleon" according to 
Russell is a logical construction out of sensations . · So, therefore, is 
vrhat we call " H.ussell". This is the essential point of Russell ' s denial 
of conscioLisnes s or subjectivity , and his attempt to treat these words as 
the trivial outcome of certain .linguistic habits. The case is the same 
with Carnap ' s "Subjektlos" construction of the world, r1hi ch is also essen-
tially a neutral monism. 
In "The Loci cal ~onstruction of the World", Carnap ' s first problem is 
that of the data or ground clemcn·ts v;hich are to be values of t he variabl cs , 
Ylhereby alone his construction can purport to be not merely a lo.;ical con-
struction but a lo~ical construction of the world. Acceptance of his 
sy:::;tem dr::pends upon accep tance of his ar t,;u rnent for the subjectless Zrlebnis 
\':hich he t akes f or "quas i -analysis". 
Goocl:nan has an i nter·:...stinc discus:.>ion of this ques tion in "'.rhs Structure 
of Appear:111cc", in wld ch he argues t hat for t he :purpo~o of a l 0£;i cal con-
~ 
s t n;ction what i s Given, in t h e ::;en:::e of b~ine a "r ar; dutnm" , i::; i r:-cl evant. 
Goodman seem ::; t o me to be r ich L as oppo:::ed to Carnap , bnt he s e~:Jas t o me to 
be r1ronts i n a more fun clam.~ntal r1 a.y oviine t o a ccrto.in pr econception about 
sens <::: -cxpcri~:mce v1hic;h he shar e s Y:.i. th lllany oth·:; r Cl.lpiri c i:.; ts . His O';'m 
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suggested syste~ takes ·~qualia" as its atoms , and includes places and tir:1es 
among the qualia. In no sense are these supposed to be the units " in vrhich 
~xperience is originally gi yen ." Other systems with othe r units are en-
tire ly admi ssible , and one system could be prefer red to anothe r only on 
grounds of utility. Ther e is no question of the qualia " float i ng free " 
of concreta; all concre.ta contain qualia and all erlebs contain concre ta. 
It is pointl~ss to ask which sort of unit c·omes f irst or whi ch is r eally 
f tmdamcntal . If the question is "which way experience is packaged on 
ori ginal delivery", says Goodman , " I have no idea what criteria would be 
applied i n seekinG" an answer ." A constructional system is not necessarily 
intended as " an epistemological history." ("The Str ucture of Appearance", 
Pp. 150- 151) . 
Now Goodman is certainly r_igh,t to reject any notion of " rav;" or "original" 
experience but J.;hc w<;>rst difficulty is one which i s raised no l ess by his 
system thun by Carnap ' s . It is the di f'ficul ty of lmov1ing what is meant by 
a quule or a c~mcretum or an crleb , a difficulty akin to thut of knowing 
,;;hat Aye r means by a sense-datum~ It should be specified in the ordinary 
_languuzc s o that there is no doubt what is r eferre d to . But thin is simply 
not done, u.nd the r eu.sun u.gain lie s in tl1e nature of lan[j"t.ta.ge and experience . 
One can talk about the v;orld and anything whateve r in the' v;orld , or one can 
talli: of one ' s e;(perienc;c of this and that , but one cu.nno t talk a:::; if there 
were no di stinction bet•:1een experience and v1hat is c:;q)~rienccd , or be-b·:ccn 
v~ha·r. :i.l.J eJ{p0rl cnccd u:::; it is exp•.;ricuced and r;hat i s cxpcricncc,J ac it ac-
t ually i::; . Nor; thi::; is not u matter of epi:::;tcmoloc-ical hbtory or of "which 
VIU:J. e ;·. p l:ri. !.;J1 CC iG r1ack~ed on oric-inal de l ive ry" - w;1at th:1t nould mc:1n is 
as ohscnre to me as i ·t is to GoouJn~n . It i;:; a matter of the r1ay '.'iC have 
- 192- -
it now. 
If anythine could be said to be packaged it would be v:hat was exper-
icnced not the expe rience of H , and this is precisely the di stinction 
which Goodman does not make . As in all such systems , expe rience is 
identified with ,.,hat is experienced. The qualia, concreta and crlebs 
are not what we see or hear , nor yet our hearing and seeing, but both or 
neither . It is anothc.~r " subjektlos" system , and again the crude question 
is whether it includes its a1~thor . Now Goodman almost certainly would 
want to deny his commitment to any view about the nature of cx}>crience . 
It is necessary therefore to sh0\7 that he has such a vicn and what this 
v iew is . Fo r this purpoac I take his discussion of the question of "epi-
stemolo.gical priority" in connection with the r e spective claims of physicalism 
and phenortcnali : .. an , v1hich , as he remarks , is badly confused. 
'"rhe c laim ic that one basis corresponds more c l o:..e ly than anotlu.:r to 
what is directly appre hended or immediately given , that one more nearly 
than the other r epresents naked experience as it comes to us - prior to 
analys is , infcrnncc , interpretation , conceptualisation. Now one may 
certainly ask whethe r a given description is true of w!Jat is experienced ; 
but here the further question is whether one or the other of tvro true des-
cri ption::; mor e fal thfully descdbes ;1hat is expe ri enced a ::: i ~ i s e xperienced 
~1d t his I have ::;orne diffi culty in w1derstandin~. liha t I car1 a momm t aso 
"' r:Jicht be deccr ibed as a moving patch of r ed , as a cardi nal bir d , or a s t he 
t hirt y- seventh bir d in the t r ee this mornint; ; and al l t he :;;e de::;cr.i.ptions 
~~ay be t rne . nut the phenomcnali::;t seems t o hold t hat \'JJlat I :;av: T sar1 as 
a movin& putc i1 o.f rod , ·;:hich I t hen inte r pL·c tcd a ::; a r;linp:..;c o f a cardinal 
bir d . 'l'!1c phy s i cal i. l.> t r.;ccm;:; to ho ld. t11at I sa\': it .Q:;l_ a carcJ.i.na1 b i rd , and 
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only by analys~s reached the description of it as a moving patch of red. 
Both apparently agree ( s ince I made no count) that what I saw I did not 
see ~ the thirty- seventh bird in the tree this morning. 
is in question h<.: re? Let me try to formulate it ••• 
Now just what 
It ... The criterion ouggested here is apparently that what I see, I see 
as what I know it to be at the moment I see it . Did I then see (it) ••• 
as more than 5000 miles from China, as weighi ng less than Aristotle , etc ••• 
surely this formulil~ion will not do . 
u Perhaps , then , • • • to say I saw a red thing is nearor to u'iy raw exper-
ience than to say I sa.VI a red bird, and this in turn is nearer than to say 
I saw the eiehth red bird on ~he tree this morning. In that case I am 
more faithful to my experience if I describe what I sa.\'1 as a vertebrate 
than as a. bi r d , m1d faithful to the ultimate degree if I describe it as a 
cow-or-non-cow. " (P. l03 et seq. nThe Structure of Appearances". ) 
Goodman ' s purpocc io t o sho:: the .difficulty of "ra.tine perceptible indi-
viduals on a scale of i mmcdiacyn, and to s ho':l that the claim of greater im-
mediacy for either o. physicalistic or a phenomenalistic basis is not easily 
~uGtain~d . Be i:::; Clltirely successful in this. But he goes on to say that 
u:1n economic aad well - conctructed system of either cortu \'/ill do and that it 
need not be · f uJ.·thc.;r justified in terms of nsomc subtle epister:1ological or 
::-ctaphysical hierarchy" . I n applying the terms "phen0,;10nal" and · "p~ysi cal" , 
he: say::> , he is not attcmpt.i.nc; to distinGUish the immediate and the non- immediate : 
"Pol' rxu.:rpl.<.: , th.J ·t-·m-di~o1Cn::; .i.0nal field of vi.;ion i.c ch . .:-.rly di.ff(•r cnt from 
t hree-dimensional physit:al space ; a chance of po::;ition in ci L,:-.;r r'lilY or -;:Jay 
not be accomp:1n:Lcd by a t:han.:;e of position in t he other. " And t:1is f:1irly 
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gives the show away . 
Goodman entirely confuses the rre aningless question o.bout " naked ex-
perience" with an entirely different question : "whethe r one or the other 
of two ~rue descriptions more faithfully describes what is experienced as 
it is experienced", :mel ·this he sa;ys he ha s some difficulty in unders tanding. 
This difficulty stem::; from t he failure to make the ordinary distinction 
between what there is, or what in the case , and our experience of · it at any 
pa rticular time . \"lhat is the case can only be knmm by experience , but 
a t r ue statement of someone ' s experience need not be a true statement of 
what is the case . If I see an attendant in f,tadarne Tussaud ' s as one of the 
ex.hibits , this is a true description of what I sec as I see it , but not of 
Ythat I see a3 i L really is - not a waxwork but a man . I see nomething all 
right , but I see it as a wax•;;ork when it is actually a man . Ther e is no 
difficulty in ll''Jde rst"anding this . 
Now Goodman holds that a true description is a description of what ob-
jccti.vely , em}'lirinally , ic tho case , and he holdc fu:::-tho r that s uch a de s-
cription cun be eivcn clthvr in physicaliot or in phenornenalict terms as 
he describes the~c . Bu·b tlrtis is not so , for diffe r ent s orts of descriptions 
are in qur.s tion - though none of them is a description of occurrence::; in a 
t·::o- dimenr;ional " fie ld of vi:.;i.on ." One micht oay the phr;nowono.llct JOcs 
f o r the looY.::; of t h ln.:;o , Ythil •: t he 1)hysicalist go<;:s f or the t h:i n.:;::; . Ordinary 
l:::.n~taz;c , ::;i nc c e xp0ri.1,ncc in a t; it is , ~ocr; for both ; a thinG ::;ccn in depth 
l~ ::;ccn f r o:1 a '' .o.nt;lc , l ool:inc as i b l ooks , a.r.d i f i L looks ve t·~· odd then it 
l<)ok.s ve ry odd , YJLether or nnL it i. s in any s cn::;c odd or unns .... al. '1'hc 
ques•liion is what one !1C illl.J , r,l1<1!; one is describinG. 
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Let me mention a few of the commonest distinctions . There is first 
the distinction bet·;1een the way a house looks from he re, the houce as you 
see it from here and \"ihat you see it as - an oblong house . '.iha t you -.;ee 
it as may not be what it is, e . g ., the attendant seen as a waxwork , or a 
trompe- l ' oeil 11 door11 in a uall seen as a door, or a mere fa'!a.de seen a::; the 
~ 
front of a house - in all of r1hich cases the thine- look::; liko what you cce 
it as . But you may see a thing as what in fact it i::; , but lookine; like 
some t hine; aloe , e . e;. , a bare tree looki ng lil<e a bunch of sn ak0s wri thine 
in the air , or a man lool<ine; lil<e an old v1oma.n . All these expressions 
have to be understood in a particular context , for often one can be sub-
stituted for another , for example , I might say I see the tree a.s a bunch 
of snakes , when I mean "lookine- like a bunch of snakes . 11 If you said of 
some porcine cha.racter that you _sa.w him as a great fat pie; , this r10uld not 
mea.n that you fai. lcd i;o recoQ1isc him as a man . Again there are some 
situations whwrc to ouy t hat something looks lil~e a ma.n a.nd t o sa.y you see 
it as a. mn.n would a.nnunt t o the~ same. The con ·~ext and si tua.tion. a.re essential 
t o undcrsta.nding v1hat "i. s meant . 
T'Tor1 Goodma.n ' s as~:;Ulnp Lion ic that all true de:::;cript jons arc do.::;c.;J"iption.::; 
of r:11at is the ca:Jo objec Li vely ; they are all e::~pir leal descriptions , des-
cription:: of r1ha~ lc obccrvc d . But t!1:Ls is not co . Descrlp~ion ::; of a 
t Ling are Ol!l!)irical ; de::;cr ipt l on:.. of see inG i~ or of ho· .. one ~cc ::; i t arc 
not . One do .... ::; noL ccc or ob:::;orve one ' s see ing, what o~c ~cc ::; is t he t hi ng . 
One knows t hat t~wrc ir; a. c;::.t on t he r::at by scc inc; the ca t 0!1 t lv ma t . One 
does not knn-.·t one :;cec i t by ce:c .i.ng or ob ::;c rv i nt; one ' s ::;cr: in.; i L. Ob::;erviuc 
i.::; t ht.. cond..i. L.on of na.ld nL; o..n c :;lpiriccl , objcct.i.vc.. ::; Lukr::n t . !Jucit s tate-
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one ' s observinG, one ' s hearing or f eeling or thinking, in a word , one ' s 
ex~erience . I t is by experience that one determines what i s the case , 
objectively. Ob jective statements are not s tatem01ts about one ' s exper -
ience , but statementD of \'rhat is the case in the world. 
To misunderstand this is to misunderstand the nature of scientific 
experiment u.nd discovery. It proceeds on the a priori assumption that 
ther e LJ a world which io as it is independently of anyone ' s knowing it 
as it is , but which can be known by observation and experiment . That 
is the very meaning of discovery . The looks of things or the way you 
see thin&s or I see things are not objects of scientific determination 
and dincovery. They look the way they look , but the 11ay they look to me 
may be vastly differ ent from the ·:1ay they look to you. · Lool<s arc not ob-
jective. They may be dcncribcd and t hey may be depicted but they cannot 
) 
be objectively d~termined by measurement. Nor can a collection of looks 
cbnntitute a thinG. 
UnderlyinG Goodmo.n ' s difficulty is th0 sensationo.list hcritaze . He 
r ightl y realises that nothing can i ntelligibly be said about raw data of 
perception. But he asm.unes that there are , or were , such dato. . Since 
ne cannot deseribe the data, all we can describe is v1hat is the c::.::;e in 
tl.c r:orld , which ·;re may do in m: .• .ny d.iffcr ent ways ; all ::;uch :;tatc;?: -:llt:J 
'.'till be c:Jpir leal and ·:Jill be true or false by exactly ·the sat.~c criteria. 
" If lw pro Lest::; that he is not saying that what r:;e describe is ·::Ho.t is the 
case in the: •.wrlq , the ansner is : Rieht , if you \7<.\.l~t to have it tnat way , 
':::.at rte describe truly or fal::;ely i::> ::mbjccti vc expcr:i.wcc . Por he mc.>cs 
no distinction . It io all one to him . :But " A ca.rdiP::.l bird fl c\·t in a 
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south westerly direction across the ~;arderi at 11.36 a . m." would not be 
a description of my experience as I sat reading a nd somethin~ r e d caueht 
my eye . For Goodman t here is an inordinate difficulty i n describinG 
present experience as we have it . But such de scriptions are a monc the 
mostfrequen~ ~1d commonplace in the l~gua.ge . It is impassible to believe 
that Goodmari does not use them with perfect ease when he is not v;riting 
books , or that his descriptions are no·t effortlessl y true descriptions. 
A birdwatcher l ooking for cardi nal birds and who knows what they look 
like , mi ght say as he sees ·the red flash across the garden , " There 1 s one!", 
if that is the way such a bird l ooks in flight . He may of course be wrong . 
He v:ould follow it up ~d ·try to get a proper sight of it v;i th his bino-
culars . I , who don ' t knovT Yrhat a cardinal bird l ooks like in flight or 
othe rv1 i oe , mir;ht say : "rlhat v;as t hat red thint; flashing across?" And 
t~1is , in the form .of a question , vrould express my experience bette r than 
t he ntatement that I naw somc·bhing r ed flashing across , fo r :i.t says not onl y 
t ilat , but that I ' ' onder what i t v;as . "What 1 s that?" in n hat you say. when , 
f or cxru~ple , some sudden movement a r r ests your attention , but you couldn ' t 
sec it pr operl y , c01lldn ' t get a proper lool~ at it . Lm ' t this a perfectly 
far:til iar experience ? I f l;hr..: bird la:1dcd on a tree in view you nould 
scrutin·i.sc it , try to see a s :nuch as possibl e . But :i. f i t fla3llcu n.cro.::; s 
a nd. di :.;n.preareu , you wou l d be " left han.:;in&", ur~::;atisfied , and " . .1hn.t '::o.s 
that?" v:ould simply cxpross tllis . If you wer e fec1'1n0 drov:::,y , ~'OU r;d..:;ht 
not be: v r:;r:; curious , unles::; ::;o;1e one el:.e r -:m::;cd your: attention . A true 
dc :::;cripti•m or your cx1)c riencc the n would. be :.>Ol":lethi.nc l ike : " Yc::; , I d.Ld · 
sec ::;o !nut~linG r ed there , but I r;a :::; just dro)pi11C off." ·:!' ;at tile descri.b ':! s 
~ ,.. _ ------ · · ·---~~-~---~-- - ------ - -
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.s not n cardinal bird in flisht , us it might be described by an orni-
• 
.holocist . There is simply no qt<estion of that ; i t is not that sort 
·f description , for you do not knov; v:hat i t was you saVI - and you lr.non 
·ery well you qon ' t know you didn ' t have a ci1ance to get ·a look at i t . 
:ut there is no ques tion ci ther of naked or raw experience , whatever that 
ould be , . nor of cpistemoloc;ical history , Ylhateve r that would be . Simply 
. question of your actual exper ience , easily and truly expres::>ible in un-
tudied utterance. 
Goodman ' s problem arises because he docs not distinGUish between what 
bjecti vely happens in the r10rld and hov1 you experience ·,·;ha·t is within 
our purvierl at. any particular time and place , in your situation , your 
ood , r1i l.h your preoccupations and interests . He is tholed philosophically 
o . the same preconr,eptions about sense- experience as those vthose vie\'rs he 
s criticisi ng ; he realises , as sornc of them have failed to do , that ti'wrc 
s no qucs~ion of .whnt is really or oriQ.nally given , that this notion is 
a cuous ; · but the only sor.t of true description he will admit i :; an objective 
escription of what it r c a.ll.:r i:.; that is obse rved , and there are lots of 
hem. But as everyone lmows , t he r e are innumerable cases wher e we don't 
now what "it" objectively is , and that is why we ask questions . If we 
lir:1psc somethinb red that is our experience , but ':le don ' t lr.now r:hat the 
.And that is the d.i.fference between a dcscrip ~ion of our pe r -
c ptual ex_t>er icnce 0.11d r.•l1a.t is olJjcctively the case . 
On r.ood.r.an ' ::; v iv\'1 , \'lha t bc•co11t..S of what ·;; c sec as \':c sec it? 
c cO!;'iC ::> of ·::11Ut r;c sec i t as, r:.h~ti1er it is or is no~ ·::i1at ,·:c !je,_: it as? 
othin~ , it wvuld occm. No thine can b~ t r uly said ubout t · a l .• It is n()t 
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surprising that Goodman ' o own qualia are hard to identify either with 
anything or any quality of things in the norld , or \'iith any characte ristic 
of our experience of them , oince the distinction is simply not made. His 
construction is Subjektlos , like Carnap ' s and Russell ' s . 
There is one fundamental point about our perceptual experience on which 
I have touched :Jcvero.l time s , and which is 'North making again in connection 
r:J.th Goodmo.n ' s rejection of "naked" or " raw" experienc0 . It is that when 
rre catch a glimpoe of anything, ao for exampl e the patch of red flas'hing 
acroos the eardcn , \'te look at it to make out what it is - to ckterrnine it 
as such- and-ouch in the world . Perception has its teleoloey, as Marle au-
Panty says , its end is the thine; " in person" or " in the flesh". It passes 
from the indete r minate to the determinate . 
Now much t h at i s described in the phenomenalist way - " a patch of red" 
or " a r e d patch movine across" is a merely tro.nsi tory stage in the prot7ess 
of _perception to its end , or , if you like , in t hE'! emer&ence of the dete r minat e 
thine. It i::; no~ d1 at we finally sec , for s eeing is -~h·3 end of looldne; 
it i G Vlha:t \'/C look at 1 ser...k with the gaz e 1 befor e \'ie have seen it prop·~rly 
and c;ot a e ood slc;ht of i t . It i s nothine det er minate , hut indetor~inate 
and ca m1(')t t !1cr o:: r~.) r._ be dc~;cri bc<l except as " movint,; r e d", th~:~.t is to sa;;' , 
not ao D...Jyi;hin t,; in th0 \'torl<l , for a.uong t!'le things in thL! world thcro arc 
no mere "P.tovin~ r ode , " di::;carna tc qualities v:hh;zine; ~bunt . 
"' 
A movir..:; r t:d 
c 1t i. rcly a r ti.fi ~i.ul t o attc1:1pt t t• dcocribe t.he ind0t" r ·.1inut c , for to attcm~t 
to dc:::cr ibc anyt.ld.n..; c t:: rlo;,wJ.y i..; f i r ::;t t c: ta:(•; a ~uou l ool: uml <1ct0r;ilinc it , 
/ 
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;ee what you can of it. Things ther.~selves , we assume , are in themselves 
leterrninate , but as J.1erleau- Ponty argues very powerfully, they are first 
:onstituted as determinate by the teleology of per~eption passing by 
_coking fr-om the i ndeterminate t o the determinate. What is determinate , 
te areucs , is ess0.ntially what has been determined. Though we see the 
~reen book at the cde;e of the desk vaguely, we as sumo that it is not in 
_l;self vacue , for to look at it would be to see it properly , to see its 
tard, firm contours. 'i'then our eyes leave it , roving over and dominating 
:he things in our purview , havine; been once deterlilined , it remains determinate 







CAUSAL .EXPLANATION JJIJD THE J.lECHANI ST BO(jY 
The primordial the sis, unreasoned , unargue d , on wh ich all e nquiry and 
L•t i nvesti Ga t ion and discovery i s founded, i s t hat there is a vrorld and that 
· i s in itself, i ndependent of our being in it, and of our seeing anything 
of it or lcnowi ne anything about i t . To a s k "what is t he world?" is to 
a slt;: "what is it that t here is?". All we can say of t he world is whut we 
knovr abou t t h i s or t hat a spe ct of it. But there is a l ways mor e . It i s 
perfe ctly true t hat when we s peuk of t he world we do not know w'n at vrc are 
talk i nG about, a s we do when v;e speak of t he dining room t able or th'c. United 
States or t he House of Commons . , The world is not an obj ect and not d et e r -
1ni nahlc us an object.~ what i::; knO\m or what is det e r mined or det e r minable 
i s in the v1orld. It is by vi r t ue of t he primordia l thesi s of t he world 
that we alv;ays believe there is mor e to kno\'1 , that the r e are f acts , not yet , 
bu t to be , knovm . 
All our e:xperiun ce incorpora tes t his thes i s . We find rrhut is there::: , 
alre ady t hero , wu:i.tint; us it rr0r e t o b e ::; c r u.tini3cd , exa;Hined , discove red , 
or q ::; r::d ~'1d ::;Lupcd fnr our encl::; . It i3 given in t lJC sense t !1D.t •:1e do not 
i nv t.::n t it - t lw:t is the onl y scrw e in vlldch there is a datum . \7hi.lt r:c make , 
" '.'ie mu.ke of •:rllu ~ v1e find . ':tlnt ·:1e see is to be f11 r t hrr explc•:ccci. D.'1U dete?r•1i ned . 
't'o :::;c c D.n,ythinG. i.s t o b ccin , <it l c n.st, to de krminc ·:1:w.t it is. 
it j s :i.n eve r y l noJ..: \·:e co.st on n.r'yt~·inc-, evor~: · 
.I 
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scrutiny , every question. The ·thesis of the world and the thesis that 
it is to be lrnm·m are not matters of knowledee, but presupposed in all 
enquiry and all discovery of what is the case , the rtay things are . 
Hume realised this and his doctrine of natural belief is an expr 0ssion 
of it. But while recoGnising its non- rational character , he attempted t o 
give an account of it in naturalistic terms , terms which presuppose it . 
·Some of hie successors have tried to treat the world as consistin,g- of 
permanent poasibi.lities of sensations . Gilbert RyJe is not the philosopher 
of whom one v10uld most readily think i n this connection , but tfie diG1100i tional 
analysis of properties in the form in which he prcsent:J it leads , I think , 
strai8'ht into t hio position. 
" There arc , " say-:; Ryle , " at least two quite different senses in 
which an occurrence is said to be ' explained '; and there are 
corr0opondingly \l'~ L ... ast tY:o quite different senses in v1hich ·r1e 
ask ' why ' it occurred and tv10 qid te different sense in ..-:hich v1e 
say tha·~ i.t happened ' bncn.uoc .' so and so was the case . 'Phc firL~t 
sense i~ the cau~al Gens o . To ask vJhy the el as~> broke .L:; to 
as; ~ wi.tat cau:::;cd it to brc<lk , and we explain , i n this sense , the 
frac ture of t he :.:;lass r:IJen ·.1c r epor t that a stone hit i. t . 'J'he 
' uccau:Jc ' clan~c in t!~c C:XJ:ll~nati.on r eports an event , nD.:ar·l,y the 
even t \':1d ch ::;tood t o the fractur0. of ·~he c;la::;s \lc r.a•.t:.;c to <- ffcct . 
" 
" But v e ::y frcq~.t(·ntly r:c l.ool: for a'1d cct c x r l_p,nc.{; i o·1~ of occur-
·::c n.:;:: .... hy ~ .t ··· ,::J. o..:-;s 
::;hivcr \d •:;ltcn :;~ruck by thr; ::;tone and •;rc cct tlic ~n ... ·;· ... r t !;at ·it 




ional adjecti ve ; that is t o say , to describe the ela ss as britt l e 
is to assert a seneral hypothetical proposition about the glass . 
So \'lhen we say tha t the gla s s brolce when struck because it \-;as 
brittle , the ' because ' clause does not report · a happening or a 
C:ause; ·it; stat es a law- like propos ition . People commonly say 
.of explanations of t his second kind that they ffive the ' r eason ' 
f or the crl aso br ea.k:i.nt; when struck. 
" How docs the law- like sencral hypothetical proposition wot'k? 
It s ays , rou~hly , . tha:t the gla ss , if sharply ctruck or t wi::;t ed, 
etc., wouJd not dissolve or stretch or ev aporate but fly into 
fra~nts . The matter of fact that the Glass did at a partie-
ular moment fly into f r agments , when struck by a particular stone , 
i s explaine d , in this oensc of ' explain ', when the first happen-
inc , namely thc.i mpact of t he stone , satisfie:; the pr otasis of 
th .... z eneral hy pothc t i cal proposition , and when th•: second happen-
ine; , namely the; fra::;mcntation of the class , oatiofie s its apodosis ." 
( The Con;::cpt of Hind , P. 8E1- 89 ) . 
" T!v-;rc :i.:::: , 11 :::aye. Rylc , 11 a t our disposal an i ndefinitely v:·i.dc ra11CC 
of di ::;po::;i!.iona.l tcrmn f l)r tal lci n.:; about t !Ji.nJ:J , li.vinc creature::: . 
a:1d hn:nan bc inu"s . :30IIC' of th0sc can b~ a ppli.cG. i nc:iffcrc'ILl y to 
a.ll ::::ort::: of t;dnc;:::; ; fo r c,: .:l.~.ple , oorne pit,CC S 01.' 1 .• c:~aJ. , ::;0 ·1o fi :;1!c::; , 
" ~~Hl ~o·1r:- hw1an bcine:; r:r>i.:;it 140 l b . , arc ela~tic x H.l co:1bt::;t.ihlc , 
n.·•d all or :t:l"J:t , i.f l eft unr:.;upportcd , fall a.t ~he ::;~ .c rat.• of 
a cc:cl -::rn. Li.on . Oth,: r di::;po:.:it.i.onal term::; ca'1 be O.!) ::>l i.ecl on ly to 
r.crtai.n ldnuo of tltin~s : ' l1ibcrn.:1tcs ' , for exar1pl c , cau be <l.flplicd 
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\'lith truth or falsity only to living creatures, and ' Tory ' 
con be appli ed vti th truth or falsity only to non- idiotic, non-
infantile , non-barbarous human beings • •• " (P.l25-126). 
According to Ryle ' s account, if. we ask why the glass shattered when 
struck and r eceive the annwer "because it VIas brittle", this means "if 
it were struck i t would shattdr". Since ~ hvuothesi we have just seen 
thin happenint;, in what sense could this be said to be an explanation of 
any sort? (This woul d be like Uoli~;r:-e ' s "vertu dormitive".) It is true 
that if glass is brittle it vlill shatter when struck with a sui table thing, 
and this is the main v1ay in which vte discover that things are brittle . But 
to ascribe this property to it is not to say anything about how the property 
is discovered. To say it shattered because it was brittle is to say it 
shuttered because i t was a certain sort o.f thing: to say it was brittle 
is t o gi ve a causal explanation of its shatter ing no J. css than t o say it 
shattered because it v1as struck, or because the stonE: VIas hard , heavy, and 
t ruvelline fas t , or becaus e any other condition of its shattering was ful-
filled . There are not tvro different senses of "because", only on~ of Ylhich 
is cau::;al , but several causes or causal conditions of the glass shatteiing. 
The "becance" clause doos r eport a cans8 in each case . People comnonly 
noc t he \'lO rd "reason" instead of "cause", wh<::ther t he cause in ques tion is 
a prope r t y or an occurrence , but this is of no special i mportance or ci g-
nifi cn.nce . 
'l'he difference bct•::een tonch c;las:::; and bri ttlc c;.lass lies in their nole-
t 
cular ntructu:.cc a11d the c:.nwc of t his may be said t o l ie i n t~1e process of 
r'lanufact urc . T!t.i.o is no less a cause of elass breaking or not br oaki ng 
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when a stone hits it than is the throwine or impact of the stone. Poople 
nho know nothing of molecular structure t ake brittleness t o be a property 
of glass, and_ suppose that there is an i nher ent difference between tough 
and brittle materi als which causes the one to shatter and the other not to 
shatter when struck . Similarly , it was assumed when the first Comet j e t 
exploded in mid-air that there WaS SOme defect Of the fusela{;e Vlhich caused 
i t to disintegrate . This was found to be what is called mctal- faticue, 
a condition which develops under prolonged stress in certain alloys. 
Tho point mo.y be illustrated by ano t her exampl e . · ·The cau.:;e of an ex-
plos:i.on in a factory might be said to be a cigarette end, or it might be 
. said to be son,eone ' s putting the explosive material, months before the 
event , in t he place whore the cic-arctte end lands . In an enqui ry i nto the 
causes of an accidental eJ-p losion , they v1ould equally be r egarded as causes 
of the explosion. The dangerous condition of the factory , the disposition 
of the factory to explode, would be simply the explosi ve lying in that place. 
I ts being t here and the ci.:;arette end bei ng thrown woul<l be equally cauces 
of the expl osion. To Gay t !1e class broke becau:JC it \'IUS bri ttl c is' analogous 
t o sayinG t he factory exploded because i t was in a da.neerous conditi on : in 
the on0 case ne 1na,y lmm1 \'l1 at the conc.li t ion was i n some detail , end in th0 
other not , but i t is cor rectly a ssu:n<:..d. by peopl •:-: v1ho lmo·;; no t;hinc of t:1·:: 
natu.r·c of brittlenc ::;s t~w.t there i::; som\..t11i nc abc.ut the clacs ·:1lli.ch ra o..J.:~s 
4\ 
'Gut fur thi.s , physico.l 0...'1cl chcr~ical cuqui.ry Y:•n1ld have 
'::o.s hctr;c .~n [;'Ja~;G tha.t broke Ca:JilJ 2.l1d Cl acc that didn ' t,, f v t' they V!OUld 
--- --------------------------------
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Nov1 if the enquiry into the causes of such commonplo.ce event~ as 
the bre~<ing of glaos be carried furthe r , there are of couroe ~any othe r 
causal con<li tions wi~ h \'Jhi ch everyone is familiar . It dopondo fo r ex~3ple 
upon t hickness and weiGht in relati on to the missile. ',7hat the law- like 
general proposition says " roughly" is too rough - it masks th& f act t hat 
th0 v1cieht of the g.laos , wl:1ereby it is >r:i1ere it is and not floating around , 
can with as much or as little reason be considered a di~positional property. 
And wiLh as much or a s little reason , it can be said t hat to s ay t he e;lass 
is heavy i s to otatc one or more general hypothetical propositions . And 
so f or its ma so , volume , thi cknoss , roughness or smoothness , tro.noparency 
and s o on • . To cay the e;lass broke because it \'las brittle i. s a s tatement 
of exactly thC' same type as to sey that it did not break because i t ,.,as thick . 
ThicJ~nos!:l happen::; to be a property v1hich is visible to the naked eye. But 
no one suppooes that .all present properties \'/hereby the prcoent e;lasG i s 
e laos , arc visible or evident at a glance . 
' 
Propcrtieo o.rc eu'wul condition s of ha:ppcnings , even Ls , processes and 
behavi.our :md no on 1J coulu doubt :i. t . To say t hey o.re di!..>l)Ooi tional is 
tL'1other ·;:ay of s:.vinc; t h 'Ls , c.nd perf ectly harmless if thi::; :L:J 11 nder ntood . 
Expl analiion i u terms of rropcrtie:s is causal cxplana Lion. But i f one s ays 
t!1a t " to rle~i cri.bc tho cla ::;s u::; bri "~.tle i::; to assert a .:;en ~;rJ.l h~rpothct.i c nl 
pr ::rpos .:. tion abouL the cla::;::;" ono ha ;.; t :> say tha t to dc:.crihc -t :1 ~ t:;lo.s::.; as 
"' a:•.:; t~t'Lnc ·. ·.1at<'vc r i.::; t o a:::;oert a c;cneral l1ypothc"ti.cc.l pr·opo::;.:. t i.on . ·:ihat , 
'l'h'- only ·aay of ·:.:; ayi.n~ r! ,W.t t itc ._;l a ::; ::; i ...;, i ::; ::.::> :;u.y Y:!iat 
f l'vr:l i.h u :a :i. ~ i;; no·. ~;la:-;::; , hnt , i.f ruJ.Ytl :iH..; , :>vnctlt in ..; l"' l sc . To G:J.:f i.t is 
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general hypothetical proposi tions , to say it is glass iG to do so , and 
to say that there is any glaso in the \7orld is to do so . 
Ryle ' s view of disposi-tional pro:parties as tranolateable into hypo-
theticul propositions is inseparable from the view t hat any statement 
asserting what is not at present observable by th':l spE:alccr is r educible 
to , and indeed identifiable .,.,i ·~h , one or more hypothetical propositions 
specifying the conditions or met hod of verification. It r crra.ins to show 
that t his i::; not the meaning of such statements , but that ouch statements 
:aean preci sely wnat th0.y appear t.o mean: that such-and- such i~ now actually 
the case , n.nu that thc.Y are not really "if ••• then ••• " statements. 
There is no dispute about hOI'/ such statements are t o be vcrifi..;d . The 
Jtatemcnt "there is a broYm leather arm- chair in the next roo:n" can be 
;.rerifi r.!d by r;oine to the next room and 3ee int; if there i:J :;;uch an armchair 
ther e . But " 'l'h()re is a br0\'!11 l eather armchair in the :next room" doas not 
,wan " If I fSO to the next r oom , then I shall ccc , or be in a posl t:ion to 
:.:co , a bro·::n l e u. thor urrnchair" or uny oth•.; r ~:rt:1tencnt :Ju.yi:nc- i.n c ffc.ct how 
t; hC;;: f ir:-;t stat•.!l'1'm t i.s t o ,be vc ri.fi ecl . For u.ny such ntaLow~mt muot spocify 
Nor; t o c,ay r:hcr c i.::; to 3ay 
th~rc io ::;uch a :plu.ce . T~nt ;?lu.ces are spatia-l dctcr.:linu~;lon:::; of what there 
m 
i.s c.t ti1;.. .. : , or i n them , or no...u1· th~, o r far f r om t h<..m , n.nd no ;?l u'::c can be 
~ !'Cf0r ... :ncc to :JOTil'.:thi.!1t,; t) r ' ''u i ~1-} i. t 
"' 
J• •• " ,..., ..... 
·.:hen i. ~ i. ~ a L<.:. ',( rl ·V ;e:. L t;:, ' rr· i. .; :1 bro::n 
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there is a room next door and in it such a chair. To ancertain whether 
this i s m , one must co t~ithcr f rom hence . If there wer e not a \70rld 
and thinGs in the world , it could not be ascertained , for one ''ould not , 
to put it C!'\l<.lely , knon where to go to make the observation , for the place 
referred to in the hypothe tical could not be said to exist . nut the 
hypothetical propo~ition assumes the present existence of the n ext r oom 
and 'lfhateve r io in it . It is because we t ake the independent existence 
of t he v:orld and e veryt hing in it for granted that v;e can formulate such 
hypo ~hoticals . And it is because we take the exictencc of a piece of 
0l as r; to be the exict ence of all the properties of the e;l ass t hat we can 
f or::mlate any hypothetical proposition about it. It is because i t is 
nhat it is , or hac th ! properties it has , that it behaves as iL does in 
this or that circumctance . fu1d thi s is part and pa rcel of causal ·ex-
planation v1heth ..:r at_- the ki ·tchen or at t he laboratory level of sophisti-
cation. 
This is vHry ev i d.cnt if one takes things whi ch are actually nar:1ed by 
thei r pr incipal dir;po~i t :ional property , f or example , l1i.:;h explcsi vc s . 
tk--~J. 
\"!ha t con:::;ti tu"Lc c the oxplosi venc..;ss of tho e xplosive i:::; :i. ~s prc:::ent j.COm-
vosition , and if it exploded it noul<.l be this no le:::s than the dLmt or 
It would CX.[!lo<lc fo1· ex~mple be-
c~u~e i l; ;·;~:j T. r:. 'r . To ::: ny tha~ it is T . ~r. •r . and t •• o.L 'l' . :: . r . is a hich 
" cx~locivc i~ to describe o. pre~ent c xiutent . :!3ut t o de:-;c!' .i."hr :.:. ~.~.·c::;cnt 
c ;-~i. :...tent <.~.rtcl ao~.;,ibC' propcrtir::::; toiL is not , a::: !lyle ~;c~c;c::;t..; , to nport 
i.;.!1:J OCC11lt 0C'..:nr:::'<...l1CC :J hcl,inrJ !;!:r..: ::JCCI1'2 S , it i s ".;o :-;aj ·;;! :!t :.;or·t of stuff 
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occult about this. 
There is.no harm , I r epeat , in regarding properties as dispositional , 
if it is r emembe:red that this i s to r-:;gard them as causal conditions of 
various types of ha:ppc ninc;s or events . Now Tiyle is concen1ed to <?hovt 
that "he boasted from vanity" is an explG111ation of the same type as " the 
glass broke because it was brittle. " If it is , i t is a causal explanation 
as t his is understood in ·the kitchen , the worl<shop and the laboratory . 
" Naturally" says Tiyl e , " the addicts of the superstition that all true 
indicative sentences eithe r deucribe existents or r e port occurrences will 
demand tha t sentences such as ' this wir e conducts electricity ', or ' John 
Doe knows French ', shall be conatruud as conveying factual information of 
t he sar.Je type as that conveyed by ' this Vlire is conducting electrici ty ' 
and ' John Doc i s sp<::.al<ine French '. How could the statem·:mts be true unless 
there v1cr e soMothin~ now goin.; on , even though goine on , unfortunate ly , 
behind the ::;cenes? Yet tht.;.Y have to a gr ee ·[;hat vie do often know that a 
wir e conducts elect dcity and that individuals know French , rii l;hout havinG 
fir!:it. d:i.ser>verr;d any undi3coverable gvings on . • •• Dicpositional statements 
art:: !Wither rGports o.f ob::;crved or observable states of affairs , nor yet 
re~ortz of unob::;e rved or unohsc rvablc states of affalrs ." ( P . 12.1- 125 ) . 
Cnc i::; hC~.rd put to it to knor; who the addicts of the : m~crsti tion of 
occul t evince on be ll inti tl1c ccc.n(: s are or m:rc . Ent ~ispo:::;itional :.:rt ;:d;e-
J\s I hav e sho>in , to r~:.;..y ih: c;J. a :::; :; i:::; 
t l:licl-: is no 1 ·:: :.;~ a U.L;po::;:i.l;.~onal ::; l;atemcn t. than to ::.a:; i~ :i ::; britU" , and 
t(: ::;uy Lt bl'Ol\t:: bt:) cau:::;c it \·:as bri t tle is a state1~cnt of t!tu ::.:anc typo as 
Th0 d:mc:~ · r01.w eondition of 
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the factory, at;ain , is the eApl~sive material lyinG abou-t , If that is 
not a state of affairs , what is? To say " this >lire conducts electricity" 
may mean tha t it is COIDn!Only usea for that purpose , But to say i t io a 
good conductor is to ascrib~ a property to it , and this is soueht in the 
ph,y:,>ical constitution of the wire , and this again is a condition , a causel.l 
condition , of conduction. If i t vu~re not -.r.hat it is, e . g . copper , Cu2 , 
it r:ould not conduct i;h~ curnmt. Its being copper is the causal condition 
of eood conduction on various occasions . But if there is any such wire , 
it ia what it is r1ith all its properties novr . Now Ryle has eiven no r eason 
for supposinG that "kno\7ing French" is less a causal concli tion of speaking 
French on various occasions than 'being Cu2" i s a causal concli tion of good 
conduction on -nl.riouo occasions. Just as the properties of the ,·;ire , nhereby 
it ia nhat it i::: , arc causes of its behavin~ as it docs on various occasions 
c.nd in variou:::; ·.) i rcu:rtstunccs , so Jolm Doe ' s prope1·ti es \'IOuld be, causes of 
his pchaving as he doo s in various circumstances . 
'J'his is n. v i C:I'I \'/ll:i.ch is n:i.dcly held by bchaviourists , some physiologists , 
and cJ·bcr.netlclanc , and thd.r crcat virtue as aJains t; nylc i:... t hat t i1cy a rc 
quite clc· ar about r1.1Jat a causn.l explanation is . nuuscll in th<.: "Analysis 
of :1ind" is a cood case in point •• The occurrcnc :s \'ihi.ch in nylc ' s doctrine 
·;:ould vc. rif:,' the t;cncral h_ypoti1ctical propooition::; corrcc~: ond. to \'f h :lt ~nsccll 
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of the response . (Analysis of Hind , P. 77.) . Russell unfortun~tely does 
not make it quite clear that such an account applies not only to the behav-
iour of or e;anisns but to ·t!1at of inanim~te t h incs . The temper of a steel 
blade or the tensile strength of a gi rde r may be r egarded in the same liGht. 
·,vhen the blade cuts \"/OOd or the {;irder takes a strain , t he present occurr ence 
is the effect in part of the state of the steel and of tho processes of 
manufacture . I ts pact history determines i ts present behaviour , a s , to 
quote Rus~ell ' :; example , the burnt child fearc the f i r e . 
Intelliccnt machines 
, . 
Ryl e ' s acc<.•unt of dispo::;itional properties tend~ to ob:::;curc •:1hat ic r.1c ant 
by cau:;~l e xplanation , and he does not r ccoe;nise that his a ccow1t of human 
dispositions and propensities is essentially causal by the same token as 
the other dis poe Lt.ion:J and propen:.>itics of things whi ch he cites. T:y 
next cri.ticicm ic clo:-.cly connected with this . It; :i.s that R.rlc ' s concept 
of a ma cldne or mechanism is quite inadequate . At the end of his chapter 
on the wil l , he writes o.c follows : 
" In conclu::;ion , it is perhaps v1o r th vrhile g:tv:tn~ ~ r1n.rni.nc; 
Hw..t-~~~ 
ae~i.n::;t a ve ry pop1~l~r fallacy . The he arso.y knol'll ... d~"L in 
ilatJ .ce is ~; . .tb jcct tv rnccll<::.llical la':IS often t er,1pt:.> people to 
::;ay ti1a~ lTo.turc i::> •)i l.hcr one big naciJine , or el:::;e a con~lor:~-
cro. i ion of r1~cuir. (.. c . But in fact tb.ur .- ~rc very fr::·;; "'l<:.t.' : : i.t w ::; 
" 
• '"l ..... u1 , ~ ., urt. • '!.'ilc only ;nc.c.hi.n<' :J that r:e f ind arc the ;;-.:.r.:: i n!.. ;:; 
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do go on by themselves and repeat indefinitely the same ser ies 
of movements •••• Paradoxical though it may seem', we have to 
l ook -rather to l i v ing organisms for ·examples in Natur e of self-
·. 
maintaining, routine-observing systems. The movements o f the 
heavenly bodies provided one kind of clock. It was the human 
pulse tha t provided the next. Nor is it merely primitive 
animism wJ:1i ch makes native. ch;i.ldren think of engines as iron 
horses . The r e is very little else in Nature to which they 
h 
are so closel y ru1alo&ous . Avalanqes and games_ of billia~ds 
are subj ect t o mechanical laws ; but they are not at all like 
the norl<:i.ngs of machines." (The Concept of Mind, P. 82). 
On the pr evious pa,se , Ryle has asserted : "l1en are not machines, not 
even ehost-ri do en machines . They are men - a tautology which is sometimes 
worth rcmembc:d~lt;. ·" : · But up to the point at which these passages occur 
t her e i::; nothing to su;:>port his contention. I n the f i rst place , Ryle in 
effect defim:s a machine as beine; man- made of inorganic nat eria.ls , or at 
lL:a::>t of mate rials '.'lhose organic character is irrel evant to thoi r function , 
-cuch as t il '-' ..-: ..10d in a windmill . Furthe r rr.ore , a machine f or P.yle r epeats 
inU.cfini t c ly t!to :::;w!lc ee rie::; of l!IOve mm ts , t h0 exa mpl e::; bc.i.nt; c l ocl:s, \'lind-
mills and turbines . In t .i. is s0.nse of course men arc no t machines . nut 
t :1 i ::; is not the sense in \'lhich i t has been suggested t !'1at they are , ci ·Lhc.r . 
by Dc: ::;cartes in ::;uc;cestj_nc t lw.t au:i.r:.a.ls vrc rc automata ~r by a cybernetician 
such a s ·:: . n . Acitby in ou r Oi'm t.i:ne . 
'T'hc; ;l,)cha.v.i.our of man- made contr ol r.1c chanism::; , r:.bic:1 a.ro b<.:.sically elcc-
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was published. They incorporate negative feed- bacl< mechanisms - a term 
first coined in ·ehe field of telecommunications - of wllich many had been 
identified in nature long before such machines were invented , viz ., the 
homeostatic mechaniGlils in the orcanism and ·not least in the human body. 
It \"lill not do to rule out bio- chemical mechanisms by so defining a 
mechanism or machine tb.n:t i t C<wnot be bio- chemical , and this is \7b.at Ryle ' s 
"paradoxical ao it may s corn" sugGests that he is doing • 
. Han- made conLro l mechanisms reproduce, and are intended to r eproduce 
some of the characteristic f e atur e s of human behaviour , but alc:o to improve 
upon it. · Indeed t hat is the whol e point of them. By all the crite ria 
<{hich Ryle provides they len.rn , corrf)Ct their errors , remembe r , display 
purpose , and act intelligently. In Hyle ' s chapter on " Knoviinr; how and 
K..'1ov1ing that " , pa:3sage after pa0sa.:;e can be applied to some of the more 
sophisticate d of t he:-;e rnacl•.ine :::: . Nor do they just do what they were designed 
t o do : · t hey can do things widch their designers did not bar cain for •. ,. 
If , a s Rylc su.y'J , th0 chessboard is atilong t he places of t he mind , the places 
~1herc 1)eoplc r!ork or play s tupidly or inte.lliee ntly, nhat i s one to say 
of the c~less-playinc; J~achinc? Afte r t he i niti al programminG, it can be 
I l'i i ll take onl y t;·;o exu.r:r!"~l c~:; t o s ho·:; hor; D,:r l e ' s rloscr:i.ption of pooplc 
r· • , · Lll; nacn1.nc·:::; . P.oth D..rc frem the s ec tion entitled " 'fhe. r.':':'rc i ::::c of i n-
" 
hu.:.; h ocn cai d. , i n o. cnr.ta'i.n r:w .. nncr to J.ool:: b"~'011d tl!c 
.~ :Jc0 : ror~~' rt ~:r ; ... ner: ' "i'hc~ h .r::J.i.n ;;.nd the mn.r;!d.vw" i n " D:i.'1Cn:..;:i.onc 
of · ''L nd'' cd . ~>ydncy Hoo1~ . {f'o l.J. 'i.(.;r ) 
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performance itself ••• Our inquiry is not into causes (and 
.£ fortiori ·not into occult causes ), but into capacities, skills , 
habits , liabili tiGs and bents. 
soldier Gcorin0 a bull ' s eye. 
'Se obse rve , for ex.ample , a 
ITas it luck or was it skill? 
If he has the skill, t hen he ca.'1 e;et. on or ncar the bull ' s eye 
p.g;.J.in , ev0n i f the wi nd streng·\jhens , the range alters and the 
tc.rcet moves . Or if his second shot is an outer , his third , 
fourth and f ift h shots will probably cr eep neare r and nea rer 
t o th,~ bull ' s eye . Hn ccn erally che cks hi s breathing before 
pulling the tric;t;(;r, an he did on t h:i.s occas ion; he is r e,ady 
to advise his nei ghbour what allowances t o make f o r r efraction , 
wind, etc. ~.1arksmanship i s a complex of skills , and the question 
T!hethe:r he hi.t the bull ' s eye by luck or from eood ma rlcsmanship 
i s th0 question nhethcr or not he has the skills , and , if he 
ha:J , vthcth ·..! r he uzed them by makinc hir; shot vd.th c a r e , self-
control , attention to the condition s a nd thought of his instruc-
t i ons ••• " 
A~art from the soldier ' s holding hi s breath , Uyle ' :.; description of '::bat 
~onst.i.tutc s c ood markmnun::;ldp a:::'plies exactly to th..; most advancct1 type of 
unt omn:tically controlled anti- aircraft &'"~ tn i n use by 1945 . :Cy all Tiylo ' s 
cr'L tc:ria. it r;a:; far moro ski.ll E;d and in k.lliGcnt than u.•1Y hur:lan :.J arl~::; ;::an . 
A furth !!' c:r.t · ~no·i.on of the principles eraployed in it di'srenses with human 
" e;unncrs", for i!"l for1nation n.bout th(;l 90::;i tions and dir~ction::; of friendly 
plan~;..::; m a~' be f ed in mrtotna.tit:<:l.lly , and cor relate s its O:flcrn.ti~n;::; ';:i·~h tllocc · 
of oLher cun~; miles a ·,-:ay , i. e . , it advi :::e~> it::> nc:i.c;hbour~; Y:lw.t tc do , and c;et::; 
--- ----·----
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advice from them. 
Next let us take Ryle ' s account of what happens when a per son ar;::,1.1es 
inte lligently, o~ pae;e 47 . Ryle ' ? first point is that "the criteria by 
which his arguments are to be adjudged as cogent, clear , relevant and tlell 
oreanised are the srune for silent as for declaimed or written ratiocinations. " 
" Next , aHhout;h th<~re nF.t.Y occur a fcm stages in hi::; a.r[1ument which 
are so trite that he can so through them by rote, much of his 
. argument is lil<cly ne.v~r t o have been constructed before . He 
I 
haG t o meet new objections , interpret nev1 evidence and make con-
nections bet ween elements in the situation vThich had not pre-
viou3ly been co- ordinated. In short he has to i nnovate, and 
where he i nnovates , he is not OIJerating from habit . He is not 
repr.)ating hackneyed moves·. That he i :; nor: thinking v.rhat he is 
doing i~:; sl!a;m not only by this fact that he is ope ratinr; rTithout 
precedents , but ,also by the fact t hat he :i.s ready t o rcc~st his 
expression of obscnr c ly put points , on &"uard against a mhicui ties 
or e l :::;c on bhc looJ~ out fnr cha·1~es to exploit them , tukin[; care 
not ·!.;o rely on ca~>ily r ef ut.abJ. c infcrr.ncc s , alert in mcctin~ ob-
j cct.i.on~.:; and r e s ')lutc in stct::ri nr; the: c;cnc ral course of hi s reason-
inc in th0. directi on of hi:::; final coal. •• 
t!1r: :~ntclli;;cnt r r.: c.c•.mer there i'> the c ar d.i.na l fe atnrc t h a i; he 




stra·tegy , professi onal etiquette .and the rest... t.o operate 
efficiently is not to perform two operat ions. It i s to perform 
one ope ration in a certc.in m.:umer or wi·th a ce r tain style or 
procedure , and the description of thi s modus ope randi ha c to 
be in te r ms of such semi - dispositional , semi- episodic epithets 
a::; ' alert ', ' care ful ' , ' critical', ' ingenious' , ' logical ', etc . 
"'.'ihat is true of arguing inteilieenUy is , with appropriate 
modifications , _ true of other intelligent operations ••• " 
Hachinc s with hic;hc r -order p r ogr.J.mming are c ertainly not dcsisned to 
observe the rules of f or ensic strategy - \'ih ich would inc lude a e;ood ma.."ly 
thines besides cogent , cl ear , r e l evant and vmll - orcanised arr,1.tment - nor 
those of IJrofElc::;ional etiquet te . But tlwy are provided with nhat are 
cal l ed a ssessment r ul es which enabl e th-::nt to i nnovate in new :::ituations . 
The sense i n whi~h thuy do not operate without pre ce dents i s t hat i n which 
a pe r son arguinG in ~cl~ i~Bntly may b e said not to ope rate wi l;hout precedents 
it i s ratlle r silly to say that such a p~rson does operate· without precedents , 
for ;,i s skill i :..; JD arncd. 
A pcrGon nliO i c a rc,1Jinc; intc lJ.igcutJ.y \'lvuld not; , I should cay , bE~ on t h e 
l ook out fo r cila nco::; t0 c;:,1loit a l"b:i.rruit:i.• !S , but Dyle obvi ou.sly ~u.s in mind 
<i-'1 c.dvocn.tc out to l)(~r::;uadc hi~-· ~udicncc , i·:.d;her tl1an on•! ':tho is ttc1·c-l y alert , 
c; •·.i.L.i.cu.l , in.:;cniou:; , car.-J f u l .:.:.ud l o .. :.icc.l , and resoJute: ,~n stc<:J: inG the i?;C!1era.l 
c ,. ur so of ;1i::• rcuconin~ in thv d.irccti c'n of hi::: finul c;o<.~.l - li . ' tb.c cbc r;s-
·:. i ~~1 . ,Jjlt.T 0.1.' \..k l ' [11.\lj:;r ur.t:n inc; brc:alcs doi·,n Sil·!ply becau~.;e J1yl t:"• !w .G :i.no...: l uJcd 
t ll c int,~ llj.gcaco J i 1..~:~1 u~•cd in th. :.~.rt;.; of p<)!'f;uc:.:; i on b,-,r fa:i.r ::Je\..i.t13 or fcml 
----- ------
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us well as the intelligence displayed in logical m~lf-orcanised reasoning. 
It iz only the latter that the machine displays . But by these criteria , 
it is intelligent and is , by Ryle ' s definition, thi~kine; what it is doing -
not r epeating hackneyed moves , but innovatinc;. 
R.:,'le tht:refore is obliged to hold that machine s think . For if they 
think what they are doing, whi~h by Ryle ' s criteria th~y obviously do , then 
of course they think . Ryle riao 'not only provided no evidence for his 
statemc:n t that men arc not machines but on the contrary described human 
behaviour in a way which su&eC'sts that they arc . He plainly did not intend 
t o do this. Nor did he intend i n his account of dispositions anu propensiti es 
to be Givin& a causal account of hu;nan behaviour . But that is >t1at he has 
done. 
llavin;;; ar,sucd that Ryle gives no r e a son for supposinc; tha t John Doe ' s 
kno;·:in,3 French i:J lc ss a cansal conJition of his ;:::;pealdn[; French on variou:::; 
occa~:;ions tha..>l thr rlirc bcin(; Cn2 is a causal condition of cood conduction 
on various occasion:; , I had better indi catc briefl~, w.hat knor:inc French meam;. , 
Pinrt, i t i:; cr.: hod i.e d speakin[; ::;ubject.::; r1ho kno·.'l Frc.nch , 11ot things . I have 
lt.. 
already triod to -:;uy ;·:hat it i:::; to have a native lan;:,ua..;e and to be a tal.tLnG 
beinG (Chapter lG ) and I have al ::>e tried to sho·.v ho·.'! one is in a si.tuation 
or mi.l .Lcu - orc;ani :;;cd nnd c.li:..;po:.;c..d about one - by vi rtnc of one ' s bodil~r 
be inc in all i tc mocJe:.; , in.clndinc ~1or:crs and ::;kills . Y:nm·:int; ano t;h e r l c.ng1w.ce 
" 
!'Ia.::; to he con cide r'::d in thi:3 1 i.::;ht . 
T t ic easy f•lr the moderately sophisticated person to forGet the peculiar 
cl~ u.raetcr of hi::; nutive laneuacc for hirn:.;clf : it is in it l:ha.~ he i.c :1t ho;;re 




an Ene-lish speaker. He knows that it is one language a..11ong many others , 
all. langu.ages , all of equal status. But for the speaking subject his 
' 
laneuage is the language - only the others are foreien lD.J."lguages . He 
lives in it , docs not construe it or interpret i t or think out r;h at the 
right way of saying such-and-such is , much less thinl<: about it as a language; 
everyth~ng is essentially e xpressible in ' + 1 " . Tho lived world is spoken 
essentially in Bngl:i.sh , for the embodied subject is possessed of English 
as he is posse::;sed of oieht or tho power of movemEnt - he sees, moves , speaks , 
and for him to speak is to speak English. Other language::; are not just 
other, but. foreign , alien , not incorporate d in his being in the world as a 
s peaker, nor part of tho hnman milieu in which he is at home , ·which he can 
take for c r anted. 
An Ent;lish speaker in his ordinary transactions is no~ a·:; arc of speaking 
I:;nt;lish , any more than · Uonsieur Jourdain was avmre of 'talki.n.:; prose . If 
he opens a book he does not s ee a lot of Enc;lish nord s on the pa c;c , but 
reads the meaning . He listens ·to what re ople say ( their voiecd hle.::tn ing), 
not to ;o:nelish riords \'lhi.ch 11': mu.::.;t construr. a:Hl in L r~ rpr·c t . l:n nnotlv:r lin-
e; .. tistic milieu , tho monoc lot is like a fish out of wate r, out of his e lG:mont , 
or , t o u~e ruJO thor si 1:d.J.e, liku a visi t or to tho zoo , looking into t he com-
!)Otm d , but not froli ckinG wi Lh '1'. ~10 othor .::tni.mals . 
J ;,hn Doc ' c 1-:no>;ing French - ca• t have som:l re : ;~.: mbla:1ca to br;i nc i n pos :J'3:::sion 
"' of ::tno l.n'3 .r no.ti ·vP. l J.n;:).w.:.;c , bc in;:; c.ul e t o i nhahi t anotht.:r n i.l i.cu , t o :-.:·;i;;1 
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and doeo frorn mor ni nc; to ni.eht , o.o it is f or .Jcun Dupont . John Doe i.e 
unaware of S.._)caki ng En:.;lisi1, J cc.n Dupont of spoo.kinc; French . 
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Chapter 19 
To ask the question "what knowledge can a person get of the: •rorkings 
of his .own mind?" says Ryle (page 168) , 'is to invite an absurd answer 
about his peeps into a windowlo::.;o chamber t o which only he hac access. 
An introspectionist answer . To get the behaviourist answer one mu::;t ask : 
" How do we establish law-like propositions about t he overt and silent be-
haviour of per son::;?" And tho anfJwer i s that we just observe , watch , 
f:c 
notice , lis t en.< and compare the behaviour of persons . Jus t, i t may be 
asked , as <re obS(!rve , watch e tc. the behaviour of rats , vo lcanoes or of 
T. i'J . T. ? Ryl e gives no ground for· thinking otherwise . Ryle is not in-
deed an orthodox behayiourist , for the orthodox 'behav:i.ourist offers an 
explicitl y causal account of hw:1an behav iour . Bnt he is unorthodox only 
in the sense that he does not r eali se thCJ.t explanation in ter ms of dis-
positions and propensi ties , as he presents it , i s cau ~.;al explanation . 
" There is" , says nyJ.o , " a C0n8idcrabl c loc ical hazard in u::;ing the 
nouns ' rtlind ' anJ. ' lnincls ' at all. ••• m1ere loeical cantlour is r0.quired 
. fr~,r~ u::; , '\'te oucht to f o llo1; th..::· cx<.:.~tlple ::;et by novelist s , biocrn:p~ers c.nd 
r 
rii.;J.r-i.:;,;tc; , who :::;p~ak onl.)' of pe rsons doinG and und~r.:;-oi.nt~ thint;:: ." ( va.,:;c 
168 ) . 
I u:n a p(;r:::;vn , accord.i.nc; t,) l~yJ.c , but I can ob::;crvn tl';~t pcr::;on only 
in rmch the ;_::.J.mo ·:tay a::; T ohservc any oth c:r p8r-~3on , c ;cc:c-il t; tha·~ J can lj nten 











quies , a'1d notice more of his excuses , as I a:;t never absent when they a r e 
· made . (P. l69) . I can ask ho·:r I find out that this person has seen a 
• 1 JOKe . I can eavesdrop on his ut·~era.-:tces and discover the frDJOe:::: of mind 
Tihich these utterances disclose . (P. l84 ). I can also hold sociable 
intcrchan0os of conv0rsation::; \'lith him . ( P. l85 ). It should , one mieht 
think , be pos::;i.blc for me to eavesdrop on his sociabl~ interchanges with 
himself. 'Po think ";.'lha·t; fun t he two o f the m are havine!" or ask , "VThat 
·nould they 3as' if they Y...new I was list ening?" or even "V/hat 'l"lould t hey 
say if they knew 'l!.2. were listeninc?" (The more the merrier .) Aeain , 
self- control is " ::;imply the rnana[;f~mcnt of an ordinary pe rson by an ordinary 
pe rson , namely vrherc ,John Doc , say , is takin:; both parts ." (P. l95) . Ryle , 
I f eel , must hav~ writte n this before he wrote his section on make- believe 
and prctcnd.inc. 
The question 4 f'- • ... .., . .John Doc one person or two or more ? '.Tnen I ob-
Gervc my:Jclf , or Hst;en~ to the inter0sting thinc;s I say , or an addressed 
by :ny::;clf , or ltc<. r " hi:::" e:wn:::;es , or eavesdr op on "his" utt@.ra.nces , or 
di:;c:over " his" rra;cs of mind , am I one person or two or· more? If two or 
-:1 ore , ho·:; do I t e ll v.idch :i.s v1b:i.ch? I f " person" b n u:::ed univocally, we 
d.rr l anded ·:11th a co:1 tradi ction : one person i s tvro pcr::::ons , th0 othe r is 
If i .t i ~: 110t u:::; cd ll'1.ivoca.lly , it is used cq1tivocally. 
:Ja\'i h~:> lo(~icul candour been advanced or locical ha ?.:;.:rd avoided by te.lkinr; 
"' 
o [ r'. r :;un:- ? 
·ro:, :1 •1 . :; t.~v:. 'contradiction O J:' equivocation .:t'Ci ;; ..: ? 
of tr.u Lt~.co of fact , C{:i;a.bli::;h·.d by e:npiri. cal obse rvation, ·::lH:>t : · ~r the thine 
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1bserved is a piece of gla::~s, a wire , T. N. T., or a person. Since one 
.s a person , which is at least a human body antick:i.ng about the world , 
·hatever is to be lmo'l'm about i t is to be knovm not only in tho same "r~ay 
•S what is t o be kllO'I'm about any other person , but in essentially the sa.ne 
·ay as whatever is to be known of a.nythine. It is of course a diff crr;nt 
;ort of thing from ronks and trees and ·amoebae , but a thin(; nonetheless . 
·enuine knovd.cdge of it il:; ob j ective k.novrlcdge by tho oamc tokcm as know-
edge of anything el se. Not only is t ho s elf another oth..:: r (vrhich, in a 
ense to be explained , is true ) but all others are object ::; . Thc:: rc arc 
·esidual but uni111portant difference s in the supplies of data , and that is 
.11 . 
The first or tiecond pcr::;on (\·:hichevcr one pr efers ) of the two- pc roon 
orson is ·the chosJ; that haunts all theories which a.ttutnpt to r educ e the 
elf t o another olJ j r!ct ,: the disembouie d epistemolocical ';ubjcct . This it 
s which obsc rveo , \·mtchE.s , notices , listens to , and com~u.rco the behaviour 
including the di::;coPrse ) of persons , a '"oncr whom , or which , i::> one it 
ualntly call::; " myself". J1; is not easy to sec ·:rhy the cbo::;t :;hould call 
11c person " myoclf" rathrJr than ruw ther, o r indeed v1hy it ~;houl.d Jw .. ve more 
Al)art :from tho cur i ous fact 







is silent , the ghost hears and overhears and eavesdrops just as ·if its 
person were thinking aloud • It doesn ' t of course have eyes to sec or 
. ears to hear - the pe rson has these - but they vlonldn ' t be much use for 
silent soliloquies an;;/YTay . And since when did ghosts need these to 
observe , ~atch , notice , listen or compare? 
Thi;,; farce i:> not of my invention. I have ju:::t entered into the 
sp~rit of the thine;. Only a. c;ho::;t could observe ,Yratch , eavesdrop , listen "(;, 
and compare v1i bhout usi'ne- eyes or ears . If one: takes Hylc seriously , 
it is i mpooslble to sec hon "tihe [;:host cari ever be laid. Let us as::mme 
that there i::; no gho::;t , and then watch it appearin.]. Let us accept Ryle ' s 
account of h'J\7 dioposi tional questions , performance question::; , and occurrence 
que stions arc de~i<lr;d : by watching, foll0\7ing , noticinti 1 listening, e tc . 
Ho~ do I uatch , follow , notice , li~ten , etc . ? \'Ti th my eyes a nd ear s . Hovr 
do I know or fine! out .that I natch , follm~ , noticq, listen , etc . ? Since 
th0::;c are occurrences o.n<l pt.:rformanccs , ·the ans we r hu.s to be by rw .. tchine, 
f ollord. ne , noti<..:lna , listcnint:; , etc . nut not rri th my eye::, and cars . And 
bcilOld the . eho:.;t . Or if there i;:; no g-host , then I cannot; flnd out or k nOYI 
this . 
' l ' D" 1. At a .later stac;c , t!1L. mnl t.i- pur::;on p c::c:>on or the pc:r:.on ruw 11C Ofi)C -
C'Ullce?r , i:.; rcp.luc0d b~' ac"tn of th.J fi.r st , sGcond, "vaird a!1d hichcr orde r s . 
A'"! <.~.ct CL.I.n n<..v~r be LhL. :;;nhjcct in i ~ sr,lf , hut only of a f urt!v.r ;.tCt o f a 
"' 'l'i1· ' r·•u.l. i n .:.; o f e very entry in a diary may oc: Cl!J'oJ: i. cl ~.;d i n 
. --~-------~~~-~-----------------------------------------------
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for, and that your past or present self could be ex.hau{-tvely dencribed 
and accounted for. by me , but t hat my today ' s aelf perpetually slips out 
of.any hold of it that I try to take . It also explains the apparent non-
parallelism betvieen the notion of 'I' and that of ' you ', without construing 
the elusive residuum as a:ny kind of ultimate mystery." (P.i96). 
lJow I do not have thi:::; fee ling about my last year's or yesterday ' s self, . 
but if I did , I would still, I think , find it difficult to sec how Ryle can 
think he has explained i t . Let us ask in what sense one could " in principle" 
cY~"lanstively describe and account :for one ' s past conduct . 'h1ere is one 
v;ell-knorm sense in wi:J.ich thi s has been alleged to be possible in .Principle, 
and this i s precisely the sense in which it has been alle ged that all our 
future conduct is in principle pre:'dict.able : the sense propos~d by La ~.1ettrie , 
d ' Holbach, and mo.ny subsequent mechanical determinists . There is today mor e 
than ono rea~;on wl!y people who are inclined to 'hold. s uch a vievr in a more 
s ophisticate•l forr.t ~o not hold it . The simplest reason , howeve r , is t his 
t hat no satisfuctOl'J' meanin:; cn.n be attached to " in principle". \ihut it is 
n.lle 'cod co~1l tl be dune cannot be donv in fact, <U1d v1e c annot say how it could 
~.'lie· ;:1c'-l.n i.n.:.;rul u~.;e or: " in pr:i.nc i.ple " i ~> in C'-l.:w o wli<;re on~; hn..~ -!.he 
1-:no,·:L :dce and techniques to Jo :->ur110 t hin.; whi.ch hasn ' t been done , and r..'-l.y never 
br: done bccau~;c i t i:::.; too c;:~cn:.:;ivc or no t ·:1o ~·:th Vil:il c , c . r; . t o produce a 
{SJ.s - tnr'::d.n'J r.1o tor cur. Trd. ::.: is po ~;~>ib le " in pr.inc iplc", t)CC<l')C0 '::o lmoi'; 
"' 
~~l·incipJ.c. c <.:.n br!. c ;d1un:..t.i. vcly uc~Oil iJt '.:d for , one ' ::; fvturo i ;:; unpre dictable , 
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for one datum relevant to the prediction, the prediction itself , must 
be left out of account . It is a higher order operation. Now again, 
R.yle masks from himself and the unvrary reader the fact that what he is 
concerned with is causal explanation and prediction. That this is wi1at 
he is about is made plain in the para~raph followin~ the one I have quoted. 
" '..ihen people consider tho p.· ob lcms of the Freedom of the Will and try to 
i magine thci r O¥m careers as analogoun to those of clocks and water- courses , 
they tend to bot;gle at the idea that their ovm immediate f uture is already 
unalterably fixe d and. pr·edictable . It seems absurd to suppose that what 
I am junt about to think, f eel , or do is already preappointed •. • 
" The solution is a s before . A prediction of a deed or ·t:Cwucrht is a 
l tighc r order opc:ratlon, the p c~rforrnance of •:d1:i.ch cannot be a mon& the t h ings 
Ye t ao the ::-Jtatc of mi.i1tl .i.n which I 
c.r.; ju ::;t be fore I do som9thing may make :::orne difference t o ·.vho:t I do, it 
follows tha t I mu:;t overlook <-~.t l eaot one of the data rele vant to my pre-
eli c:t ion • •• 
" '!.'he fact tl1a t my i mmcdlat(. future is in this vray ::;y s tcmatically elusive 
to me h.::t ::; , of cvur ::;e , no t endency to prove that my caree r is in princi p l e 
nnpr r:di :.-: t ablc to pr ophet::; o thor than r:Jy ::;el f , or CV!)n th a~; it i :.; inGxpl icable 
:·.o r.~,y ::;olf afte r ti1C houL of tho action ." ( P. l96- l97). 
110t. 
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many causal predictiono are hithly r eliable, while m~~y causal explanations 
of past e ve n ~s are h i .:;hly unreliable , the r elevant data beint; irre c()l ero.blc. 
The contrary is of ten suppo:;e d o r tacitly assumed , and the qtv~s tion is even 
careless ly posed in discussi ons of causality and induction : How do ·ue knor; 
that · causal lans \'!hie~ alwn.ys held good in the past rrill alweys hold good 
i n th0 fu t urc ?· But in fact we are neither more nor less in a position to 
I 
say that they a.lr1ays he ld c;oo<l in the past than that they will al\·rays hold 
good in thl- future . (We simply have no doubt about it, but that is not 
the point .) The future r1c predict is the f uture of the preocnt as we know 
it . Dut we don ' t kn0\'1 all there is t o know. '!'hat is why we are poor 
prophetn. li'or like r e a sons , \7e are worse his t orians. r:e don ' t know enough . 
If, then , t he sense in Vhlich my last year ' s or yesterday ' s self could 
"in pr i nci :plo be= exhaust i ve ly dencribe d and ac~oun·ted f or " is the co.nsal 
sense , t.his i s e qua lly- true or untrue of try today' s o r tomor r ov1' o se lf. 
In a.no tho r sen:;c , ho,;.cve r , we l<no\'1 far more about our past titan about 
our fut ur e , m1d c ..u1 a et;oun t; for a good deal of :i.t , though no~ c auGally and 
not c xh<:lu:Jti vel.'/ . ~·:e l<11 or.· far 1nore about v1hat we ' vc hcc.:n and done than 
about; ·:; ha:h· \'le ar e go t nc t o clo . Th() r oason i::: nn~ far to s~ck : ne haven ' t 
tiwu(.;ht tm·::h abon"L ·:IJ.l.:tt ·:.e ' rc [;Jinr; to do ye t : suf ficient unto the day -
a•1d t;o fur a~; ·:1c i t~vc , we hn.vn 1wcn rl0ci<.l.i.nC; what rrr: ni l l clo if t~1e ~ircum-
:; lo.ncc ::; tLtr'!l ont a8 r:e expect , :na:d nc ap our minds , for::ti nc in~- " ~lons , but 
"' 
..  - -·-- --------~·---·,-·..,..........,.... --~----=---...... ,__,_y .. ~ 
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i s , whethor or not it was the foresee able consequence or effect of our mm 
.... ac vl.On::; . Dut a large part of tho accou .. ,t is not about the happenincrs -
what one had to contend r1i th - a.:1d not causal . I t is about ..-;hat one did 
and r1hy one did it , r1hy one nan ted to do it or decided t o do it or thour;ht 
one ought to do i L, for v1i1at purpose , and so on. The account is largely 
concerned r1ith one ' c actions and the r easons for them . Since this is not 
a cau s a l account , it is difficul t t o see i n wha t sense anyone can suppose 
t hat it was all pre- o:ppoi nted , 1111less he holds the doctrine of pre- destin-
ation in which cvcrythi.ng co.n be accounted f or , but only in c:tcrnity and 
only by God . I t is just as difficult to sec in r;hat sen::;e one ' s past \73.5 
pre- appointed as to Sf.)e in v1hat :::;ense one ' s future can be , unless one i:::; 
tryincr to crive a cau:;al accowrL. But t .=.is :is not the sort of account we 
do , or Ci.l.t1 c:;ive , cn:cept a r: r e0arc'!.s \"lhat. happens to us or hefall::; us . !3ut 
it is cnch an account that Dyle has in 1~ind , and of cvur:Jc h0 c-i.ves the 
shor: away l'lh•.;n h•· ci ~e:3 a " ::;tate of mind" as a cu..u..;c of ::;nboequcn t conduct . 
Our ~n·cdictinc suci1- and- such on thi::; viaw is a nental ~vent , an effect of 
antecedent 0VC'nl,!:: , and a contr:i.butr.ry canso of :::;ub ccq~'cnt cv•.:mt::: . 
nor of an~·ono else ' :::; pJ.st , t':~c c.pt r;hcn riC r1o.nt to :~ak ::: c ::eusc:J , di:::;clo.i m 
ti1i.;:\.: r:c ' v'. b'. ': l1 Cool.:; , if :10~ l:nc.:.ve;.; . 
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causal accow1-t of our onn p<1st life is f<1l se . The difficulty of prediding 
our oun future causally would be only marginally greater than that of ac-
counting for our o·.m past cau::><l.lly - physiolo0ically, neurologically, 
/ 
.genetically , chemically , physically, economically, ceog-raphically , climatic-
ally , dietetically, etc . Only people Yrho do not take caus<lli ty seriously , 
as I do , could suppose otherVIisc . Ho•-; could I even bec;in to give a causal 
account of my pas t? nut I know why I di d t his and that , and why I am 
wri ting this now . 
As it io a mi.::;take to :::uppose that v1c account for our pas·t · causally , 
exc ept as regard~; what h<lppcns to us with or vri thout our orm prior agency , 
so it is a mi:.;tukc to suppose that Y:e even try cau~<1lly to predict our future. 
\:e can s ay nilat v;c in Lend to do - if 11e ' ve thoncht about it - and c~ ve our 
reasons for doin(:; it , oay ;·;hat our purpose is , and ::;o on . Bnt this io 
not to make <1 predl c t·l on • If we ch:!nge our minds it non ' t be because \'iO 
have prevlously Hladc "P ou r m:i.nd::1 •. '..h! co.n , .i.f. VIC .l .iJ;c: , mukc ~;en oral pre-
dic tion;:; - th<l ~ vrc \':ill oat on wore than 99 pe r cent of o t1r fu lau·c days , 
that our i n ~Cl.ke nf (:<.llor len p<:i· d.i.em will be u.bovc 2000 (if r:e arc F.urO!,)Ca.ns ), 
o.nd oo on. Hnt oin(;c r1c n v.uld not be a111 c to du 'i: lw:t e vc r r:c mi [.;ht v~ant to 
C.o if ::;o r::o :::;uch [rC'!..r·u l conditions v1ere not fulfill e d , \ '!C cha.ll in effect 
ta.'w ::;t0p ::; t o :::;cc tha t tiH'.f a rc f 1tlfille d. . Other quccti0n :.; ~i.wni; ou r fut11.::.·c 
con r.; ~"L'n ·:·!.at •::0 i.n tr.ml t o do . 
one c::.rmn ~- con ~ro l. 
·::na.t one~ predicts ure t 11C ci. J.'C:ll i·iS t unccs r:hich 
" 
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- that would be to think it . r:rv Ryle lumps thin~dnc and doinG' togeth0r 
in this connection I ca.·mot i magine , c;{ce~t tnat he rcp ... atedly tries to 
!~alee thinkinG' a. kind or doing. The great ad van tatie of it io that it 
isn ' t a kind of doine; - if it ncr e we should all be dcJ.d . The point of 
it is in part to o.void doing foolish and disastrous thincs by seeinc i n 
advance where they might land us . .This sim1,)le fact mal~es hi::; account of 
theorisin{J as just another sort of practice absurd. Tlie muin point of 
it i s to i nform prJ.ctice and avoid blunders in practice . 
" .. y process of prc-envi::;ut::;in~ may divert the course of ;ny en::.uing be-
havionr in o. dirccti.on o.nd dceree of ,.1hich my proenosis cannot take account ~ 
One thine that I cannot pre:pare myself for i:::; the next thoucht I o.m going 
to thinG"." The last sentence is tautologous : to be conGcious is to be 
con:;cious nov1 , not som,~how or othe:r in thr~ future , ,.:hethc.,r one i:::; tninl~inc; 
of the rast or of the future . nut the point about prc-cnvi::;o.~:i.ne is to 
t hink qf th: futnrc and \'ihat one :::;hould do . That , as J :::;o.y , is why ,.,e arc 
not all doad . 11y i nm0d i.atn fnture is not systn1:~at:i.cally elu:.d.vc to me , · 
a s Rylc allct;es . I am bent on ccttin~ t his chapte r finioh(.;d bcfor~ l unch . 
The ::;e:1s c in \'l lu .ch it can be said t o he e lusl vc il:.i simply t! :o ::; t.;nse in r:llich 
:!.n~c or r 'IC ·k; , it 1:.: of objcc ~ ::; , hi.lppe,1incs and c.vc1tb . ·:;,, ca n only project 
' o r c:~·.rl c ;:.:.;e the f •ttu1· no· ... ; t: tc ft:·~; tu·c. is t~1~ ft: ·~·t -·r: .!.'1 r ... li.l ~ .i on ~o lw·:1. 
i.ll\_) ll.il. Jlt . 
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I will do). How? I understand why they should want to do it and can 't 
i 1nceine \'ihy they shoultl want t o de otherwise . That is \7hy t h r)y often 
surprise me . But there is no question here of prophecy or causal pre-
diction. I explcin their actions in the way I explai n my own. I have 
li ttlc i dea of n hat the causes a~·e in the one case or in the other. I 
unde rstand or fail to understand what they are up to in t e rms of my own 
experience as a beinc· l'ii th purpose s and desire s and reasons f o r doing things . 
:.lome of th8t:l are s a i d to be pr edictable ( t he bo~es) and some unpredictable 
( the nuisances ) but one cannot r e.adily think of a causal nxpl anation of 
t h eir conduct. Tiel iahle people are people one can tru::;t , not r:e ople one 
can make cau:::;al predictions about. They are people who ·.-:ould not deceive 
one or le·~ one do1•:n . The explanati on of this whi ch we give is not causal. 
It is tlHJ.t t hey t hink i t nrone to decci vc or t hat t hc)y urc devoted to one 
or love one . It is not that ce rtain me ntal or other event::; or ::;t ate :;; of 
mind occu r r ed i n their hint ory. 
f\yle c onfuscc cauDal predi ction Y:it h hav:i.nc intrmtion s and unders tanding 
o the-r l)COple ' s i nt 011ti ons a.nd concluct , . and tJ.1e diff lcultie :::; of pr ;;d.ic.t ion 
r;ith t h':? perpc:.. t ual pr e se nce of con.3 c i ou::;n8s s - the impos c ib ili t y o f t :1inking 
one ' c ll ~.,; kt t hou;sht i n advance . 
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Chc.pte r 20 
'l'fiE SELF A !D OTHERS - II 
Ryl e ' s c.c:count of self-knowledge and h i s account of our knov1lcdge of 
:)"!;hers are , I b el i e ve , open t o the same criticism. Though I have made 
:ny essentio.l poi nts about embodi ed experience and r efl e.ocion , I vd.ll briefly 
r epeat one or tno. of thern in order to shor; how r efl exion io enme shed with 
:<nOI'iledgc: or under::::tcmdi. ng of othe r::; . 
·i:hat a 1)ernon can Jr..nO\'l of his ovm body us an object or thine i n · ~he 
·:orld e mpirically by ob:::;e rvatlon and experiment is ro.thcr l :!::;s than \7hat 
1c can find out c.bout a:1othcr body . nut hi::; o rm embodied expe ri<.mce 
3€ein[; , touching , movlng , brea thing, laut;!":ing, sne.ezing, bcine el:l:~cd or 
i epressed·, talking ( mcauinc aloud ) - is not an ob j ect or t hing v1h ich may 
) e empirically observed , nor the an~ics of an observable thint:; , nor ic it 
1is ob::;ervation of a body ; it is his being a body. Only by being a body 
i.s he in the r1orld and only so can he .observe any body or know anythinG" 
1bout any body. 'r.h<.. r l. can be no objective , empirical, scientific o.ccount 
)f the c :nbodi.ed ::;u1,jQct , fo::- it; i:::; a pr i ori , !Jresuppo~ed in o.r.y :::uch c.cconnt. 
But , i t •.my be ::;o.ld , at leo.:;t ·::e lmoi·/ n.bout othl;r~ ohjcctivc ly , e •ltpir.i.-
:;ally , hy 0h ::;c ::-v'-l.l.i. ·"'n , by t ih.ir obs c; rvcd behaviour , j11::;t a~ \:e JJ1o·:: uhovt 
. "' t'10 C0'1'.luct:i.vi ty of co . ...,~cr ·:. J. r ' , t:hc ,... ·• ,t.~ lo:::l vc-
10 ~. I/ (.' l"J c l. ... ar :.:.l H ' t"l. i L, 
i 
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i n accountine tor and undcrstand.i.ne; their conduct , ,.,e do so , oo f ar an ,.,e 
.may , by virtue of knowing them as others . Others arc not othe r t hin.:;3 , 
oth<.: r organisms , but o~her embodied subjects , seeing, feelint:;, proje ct ing, 
trying to do this and that , ,.,i th ends in vi evs . If , and to the extent that , 
they are a·~ all predictable that is why . 
R.yl e c·ould not F:Jay a s111all fraction of tho t h ings he says in " The 
Concept of Tind" :Lf thi s v1ere not s o. But he does not seem to r<::alise it. 
And t ho r e a son , I ~mg.:;est , is that he is the victi n1 of a.n intellecttia list 
l egend much more insid.i.ou::; than those he attacks : the cmp:i.r .i. 0 i ::> t theory 
of kno->1 l e<lc;c nhereby we know •::hatever YTe know by objective obs0rvo.tion or . 
reports of such , by expcri.m<mtation a nd induction , and undc r:..:ta."ld or cx.plain 
·:thatcve r ;·;c unde r nb'!'ld or c.:plai n ca.u:.;ally , ::;cientifi cally . His r c3toration 
of sclf-J~no;·;l cd::;c to " o.:p:>ro.-:imate parity" \'li th lmo•:rlc.dee of oth..:rs con:::;.i sts 
in t he r s dw.:tion of the self to · o..11o'thcr other and all othc.:rs to objects of 
empirical inve::;ti.eation , t ool s , instr~m.:.nts , and r;hat t hey are t;ilou for. 
Thc r r. . ir; a rc::;.i.dt•ul ct.i.ffcr cncc i.n t ho supplh!S of duta. , hc :> uy ::: , and this 
r c.:vc al::; ve r y c lE:: u.rly the type! of kno;·:l udt;e h<: ha;; in rn i.ncl . I1; i3 poss ibly 
.· - 233-
is not in the firs t pl ace that of subj ect to object , of se l f t o things , 
but of embodied subject or self to othE3r embodied subjects or selves . As 
children even our r e lation to things has somet hing of t his ch aracter, u.nd 
in some ways we remain animis ts in our relation to some things, to ships 
or to f r 'i endly old houses, for i nstn...'1ce . Of course , we lmov: they are 
ju:;;t stick s and s tones and ironmongery, but we are cad at t heir decay and 
destruction. 
\7e s e e the expre s s ions and attitudes of othe r s and unde r r.rt and th~t' 
mcan ine a::; \70 understand the meanins of the ir \'tords (hearing the ir meaning) •. 
·:re see t h<- l ook i n their eyes , v:ld.ch is not to s ee or l ook at or examine 
an eye a s a thing . ·,;e feel t heir eyes upon us and arc affe cte d thereby 
in our being a s v;e couJ.d neve r be by a thing. We unde r s tand and e xplain 
t he ir conduct, s o far as we do, because we know r e f lexively vthat it is to 
:::; ce , hear , move . gra~p , be elate d or depr essed, or a i1.gr y or afrai d or d i s-
appointed . '.'fe under s tand t heir r e asons by s eeinG t ht) s i tu<:~.tion they a re 
in. Anr.l our expla.:1uti om.: of the conduct of ot hers· in t he nor ma l nay are 
entir e l y b us ed upon tl1i.s r a f l c xi. ve under s tanG..i.n [;' . '!{hcr eas cau ::: a.l cxplan-
' at:i.onG a rc ne v0r f i nal , e.xplaYl<.tti.ons of t his ::;ort frequrmtly .::..r0. f i nal :f:or 
th~y a:1:~r1~ r the que stion '"jfhy?" as cau:-;al c xp l o.n ::1.tions r e ve r d o • 
.. c .::..r0. ot hers for tlr:i~l , D.r::.d l:nol'i it r!he n ·,·10 s ee t~tcm l ook at n 3 und •shcn 
t !·u.:y spc :t,( to t1::; ' ;end ':IC r c o.d. in t h '."' ir cxprcs::;ion ().]1!] at ti t wk '::hat th<..,/ 
f i>Cl .:.ho~1t n::; . ':!c .:~.rc i n t !'J.c i 1~ Vi l.] \': 1 :.J.1)~'r , ;ved or r1i --~n-:1rOVC"l · ··--- ~.·• . . ' rbll or 
The ntlr:::r i. G .:1.!10 Lh'T ::;el f , 
Hcfl c X l v·~.ly 
. --------------~---- .. ~.....--· --""""""'".,_..--- .. ...  _._......IA'W.~ .. -,. ..... , ...... ~<# ,.. 
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we underctand ho·:1 we look in th£ other ' s eyes , we n.re con::;cious of being 
en- soi pour- o.utrui. If there i::; an "apilroximate p:'..ri ty" it i:::; by virtue 
of thio dialectic . iqlc talks freely of vanity , for ex<:.~.t~tple , but never 
of this dialectic whe reby \'le are vain and v:hereby we nndcrs ~and th~ vanity 
of others . 
Ryle makas much of SLlCh things as tones of voice , vllw::;c IJ').') ardric could 
only be un dcr3 too<l as tho c;xpres:.:;ion of another embodied. subject and not 
a s a mL:rc sound. And in his treatment of avowals and nnstucli.ud uttcr2.nccs , 
surely a most promising tack , he in e f fect mi sses the cs::;cntial point by 
making all nclvcs otl1erc and only other s , so that r1e hear our m·;n unstuuied 
ut Lcranec::; exactly in thr: ;;amc \'ID.Y a::; ne hear othe r::; ' unctudic.xl utterances , 
v:hich is to cey " we" do not utter , do not say, do not mean aloud. " i,7c" 
·know •:!e arc dc'pr c::;scd or elated by bea.rinl$ our oun v:ords 1 not by beine de-
pr essed or elated , not r e flexi vely, but empirica.lJy by observation of our 
cnr.i.ouc hchaviour . " i.':n", as I have ;:;aid, in this Qontext can only be the 
c;host , th8 disCI'lbod.Lcd epi.Htemo lo&.i.<.:ul .subject . 
For r ('a:-;on ::; T havo exronnd.cd before! 1 others r.tay knm1 our mood. or fee l i nc 
before~ r1c do 1 but om· ·;,ord.:.;;. or tum~ .:1.re not ::mi c-crwric a1tl not r.1erc happen-
C'ur cxplici t 
uvo·.1 al:..: ':lf fr-cliot;::;t; , J::ood~ n.ud e.,.otlon;:; arc. already r ;flcxi vc c.nrl cx:r o3:J 
Of r;o•:r s c n,;;lc knor:s t!t L;; . 
' 
d.i:;•:u:·G " c D.t; i.:t;:; on!..;clf IJc;:;i:1r. i:Jt.; tt"~ Jre:a·1" r:i thout ':n'"~ .. .!.:~..; i ·,? 
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explanation. Apart from t his , hovt should t he so- called problem of pre-
dieting one ' s orm future behaviour or indeed one ' s o\·m thoue;hts ever 
arise'? Surely no one who hao not been bamboozled by pseudo- science ever 
trie s to do this : vi hat he tries to predict is the circumstances he will 
have to contend r1i th : in rnakin~ up his mind what to do he is not predictine 
·:;h~t he will do , but dccid.i.ng what he had bettQr do. 
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Chapter 21 
LOGICAL GRAUPAR AND REFLEXION 
Hylc is cu~ac;c:d , and heavily cnt;aged , in r efl e x i ve description at 
various points throucrhout the book . nut h n noes no·~ or vr.Lll not r ccoe-
nise it , nor pursue i ·t systematically. His acc9unt of nhat h('l ic doing 
i s that he i!J tryine to " show l':hy ce rtain sorts of o·per ationo with the 
coneepts of m m·liu.l po .-.ers and pr ocesses are breache s of l oeica.l r ules ." 
( P. 8 ). One mi.cht not (;l.lCSS from his account of Y.h at he is doine that the 
" l ogical ruleo" or the " loci cal .:;ra!Tir.l ~.r ·~ of the words he discucses are 
discussions of ·;:hat r;c embodied subjects r.tean by r:h~t ,.,e s ay. One mic;ht 
suppose that the l ocieal rules and erammar of' the la.nc-Uacrc a s he nrofes::;cn 
t o discuss them ·wr c rw:tter s for the gra;nmarian , the philolo.:;i:::t , and the 
lcxico.::;ra}')hc r , and thouch P\i'lc is ri .:;htly convinced that he ic doinc some-
thine diffe r ent from any of .them, he neve r , never, explains v;hat it is , and 
~here tho diffe rence linn . • 
I t i s in om; of his \w:::;·t chapters " Sen::; a tion <.'l.."'ld Observ ation", that he 
say c. " th.:.r·. i.::; comct h inr; zr.:r l o'l! ...;ly amios n i th the di scuc:.:;ion::; o<.:cupyinc 
t hi::.; clla,t:> i-cr . I huvc to.H:ccJ (.1.:3 if n o knov; ho·:: to u.;c t!tr concc ,:t or con-
C r · •)t- "l~ -, ., •. . 'J.. on . • '-" J. •.J .., ·~ Uc,..itoo ' ) J huvr. :>~0J.:un y;j:t;, aJ.r~o:.:t .!'' rfunct ::ry r~crr:t of our 
Pnt I U!:l :>Jrc t~1 n:t 1~onc of th:i.::; r: .Lll d(l ." (?. 2.JO ) . 
* 
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>thi ch is allied ~·tith certain pseudo- s cienti fic , Cartesian theoric..s , and 
he confesses that he does not kno;·; the " right iuio:us" in ·:.llich to discu:.;s 
these mat l;ers . !~ven in the proce ss of using the vocabulary and falling 
into some of the errors , he succeeds in seei ncr that it \'/On ' t do . This 
story about not knov;ln::; "th~ ri~t idio~s", however , o.s if they were n1ys-
l;er.iously la..id Ltp in heaven beyond the r each even of a hiahly educated 
mo.n , is somEmha:t abr.urd . It illustr(;l.te s t he t endency to trout t he l ancuaae 
as sui ccnerir-J , az if it had some exist ence independent of those who speak 
it , as if its :1wo.ninc;s and id1orns were not our meo.nines and idioMs , and as 
i f we were stmnped if r1e could not f.ind one r eady- made . 
"',1e do not", he seys , " and cannot descr ibe haystacks in t e rm::; of this 
o.r.d tha ~ set of nen so. tlons . ..c describe our s~nsation::. by ce rtain sorts 
of refe r e nce::; t o obce rvers a nd titine;.::; like haystack.::; . " ( P. 203) . The sen-
cation::; r~r lc i ::; tall<fnc about arc no~ , for example , the pri ckinG of the hay 
•::hen one l e an::; o..:;u.in:;t o. hay::;to.ck . But r:hat oUwr ::;enr;o.t.ior&s arc t ltr.:r e ? . 
Eo l ate r rcma r <n ( P. 208 ) that ~cns;;::tions do not ho.vc siz' ;:; , shape ::. , po::;it i ons , 
t eGreraturcc, colnurs or smalls . This :i.::; not q1;i'Lc t 1·uc of lJodily ::;en-
cations - a pai . n ln tll ': toe i s in th. ~ to0 and in tbiD :.:;cn.::;c hu.::; po::>ition , 
o.nd Gir.d . l a.l'ly ::;or:lO r u.in ::.; 0.!'!..- in a !;;i:!all U.!'IJD. o.nd ::.;OJ:1C Sill.' ' :U.d , ( ' • 6 • , ull 
up o.nd Jo·::n tlw l c..,.:;. 
o.nd ·:::tat :::; c. ·1..;o.+i ons ur e tht:- r c , a.:_1n.rt .fror.1 bodi ly cc n:-;ut i on::;? 
" 
T ~ i c t r ue 
o f l;odlly ::nv:~:~~t Lon:.; t·la t on•.: do..: ::; not a nd ca mot ob:;cr vc: t .ilt: :'l , <.!.G ~~·l ~ point :::; 
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sensation::; , but it .i~ to say more than that . Similarly to describe 
scm.cone as t ryine to make out whuther \7hat he see::; is a chaffinch or a. 
r:obin, or a stick or a shadow , a fly on the windo\•: or a mote in his ey e , 
is to say something about his visual sensations, but it is to say more 
than that ." ( P. 224 ). 
H ia surely not to say that at all . To try to maku out ,:,hat one 
sees is to try to make out what it i s . What is the point of calling 
the indeterminate "it" a sensation? But what else could one be calling 
a sensation? And r1hat could one be saying about it? The s ..... mc point 
arises at tile Ctld of his good .description of the experience of r ccognisine 
a tunc a:1d li.:;·~cning to o. familio.r tunc . R:,·J.e says t hat \'/hen we hear a 
tunc ·;;c arc havin~ auditory :;;en~a~ions , but more t han th'-l.t . But what could 
th,cy be but the 110 tc::.; of· the t u:1c ,·:c hear? And v:hy call tl lt:r:t sensations? 
There io al·;1aya a di ... itiaction t o be rn a.de betwcon t he " t !: i.s" (.J.ncl the " cuci1", 
but " thi:::" i ::; a!."l1.l-J'S " :.atcl•- and- ;:;uch", t he uni vcr:::al j s i n ££, tho tunc v;c 
hear - for c':a.itplc , "Li,llihurlcro" , t hough we .nay no~ lmo\'; the na-ne - i:::; 
t !1i:::; tunc no;·; . To apprch-md the - ~~~- ac :::uch , as cY~, •:;oul.d b~ to appr ehend 
it a~> t hE> for<Jl of i. t ::;clf , t ,> c l ir.1inate t :w " ::.;uch", the: unive r::;al. 
,_·. t ~1 1 ~:t lJ. CZ.l•lor•.·r1 , r:'l1C r·o:"l •1 , rl i -- c o·, -. r ,...rl .,..,., l " "rn· ,1 - r _ v . .. .... _oJ • '-' -- ,.., ,u . ..... ~, . ..._ .; 
ths i:· :.;~rk . 
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sations ; a mo.n could not be described u.s watching a robin who had not 
t:;ot a sin{jle glimpse of it , or a s smelling chees e vrho hc.d not caueht a 
w!liff. (I am pre t end :Ln.:;, nhat is not true , tr~at words lil<E~ ' .:;lir..psc ' 
a!1d ' '"~hiff1 stand for sensation::; ••• )" He t:;ocs on to ::;hovi tho ab ourdity 
·of supposing that ,.,o observe the gl i mpse . But why should he pretend t hat 
0limp~es are sens ation::;? To catch a glimpse of a robin is to see a rob i n 
for a brief InomC;~nt before it disap1)Ga,rs from viev: , . To \':atch a robin iG 
not to be catching glimpses of it unless it is popping into and out of vie'l7. 
J3ut the g limpsing or catch i.nt; ;.;limp:;es is the seeing. The whi f f on the 
other hand is not t he s;.iellinG but what is smcl t . Smells ar~ sr.1elt nith 
t h·3 nose , not in the nose , bu t in the a ir, in t hG room. To G8t a r:hiff 
of cheese i s t o sr:1cJ.l briefly t he smell of cheese , cominG, for example , from 
t hu gr ocer ' s door a s one passes . ( If s mells vH:;r c i n the nose , they would 
not come from a:ty d:i. rcction : oth~r a<'1i muls of cou.r;:;c find thr:: ir prey by 
s1nell or to.l(o flicht from t heir enemies i n the dil·~;c't io11 opay f r om the sme U) . 
'l'he r e i ::: no mo re reason to 0all mucll s or Villiffs sensat i ons t han to cal l 
tl10 brm-:n Q.f t he t ._d.Jl0 top a sc:1cat ion. 
l\:1; the end of tho chapte r , ':lh.er c he in discw:;si'nr; hurts ancJ i lichee , 
clear o r tmcl ear . ·:;:lcrc a.::; :findl ng sowG thin& out by sic;,t or tvnch i.G an 
D.c!ri.c vo..v,ut , ' I i t ch t•~r:d.hly ' rl.,lE;S not r e; port an achi ::vcr~ .n~:. , or dc::;crib~ 
" . I c.l.o not knm·; rh at r:1or c i ::; to he :;;c:.:Lli alJunt t~l· l q;i cal 
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the l ogical grammar of the la.ncuage . nut isn ' t it abourd to su~pose 
that he docsn ' t lmo1·1 the idiom<; ancl the logical grammar? If h·J doesn ' t, 
who does?. If no one does, then t he l~~guagc is indeed not our lru1~1asc, 
but an it v;cre lu.id up in heaven , and only God knO\"lS all the right idioms, 
only some of v;hicil arc vouchsafed. to our limited understandinG• The 
c;enuine pcrplcxi ty concern::; the nature of sense-c;~periencc ; the re is of 
course a difficulty in seying precisely and unambiguously VI hat we mean , but 
the primary difficul-ty is that of reflexive analysis of our experience . 
And. a l ar0n part of Ryle ' c book consi::;tn of such analysis - never pushed 
ve ry far , but unquestionably that sort of analysis , and hi::; linguistic 
analyses themse lve s depend f or understan~ing on the r efl exive nr isc de 
con:.;ciGnce of ti:1e reader . The appeal i .s t o the r eader ' s c):pericmce. The 
reader understands him and a.:;rces or disae rees by virtue of hi::; orm embodied 
J 
heine; , wh·~rehy h·.: knows ,;:ho.t it i:::; to ::we, hoar, tllink, to.lk , feel, have 
pain::; and tickles , etc . , :i.n a vari.cty of ::;ituation::; , o.nd by hc.ine in poe-
::;es:::;ion of a. lo.nc-na30 :i.n r;hich he meauz , voices and expresses his mc a.r1inc, 
and hears r:i th h is l'a rs others ' r:;eaninc::;. 
·::hJ' docs h i ; r epeatedly t a lk as if , 
0 : t :-v, oth ; r , _a;; i.f '::hatcvfJ r CO! llU bo trul;y G::J.id of r conlc n.no] th, ~ ir condnct , 
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vrhere things secretly happen . He identifies the contrary vi 0';/ chir~fly 
v1it.h introspection, on which he launches a very effective at·~ack , but n.n 
attack which consists ess.enti ally of asldng the ree.dcr: de you have such 
exp£riences ar; you ought to have , if what intr ospectionists say is true? 
This is the point , not the diversity of i.dioms and metaphors,live and dead, 
in which WC talk about our CXl)vricnce . 
' .. Any such appeal i s an appeal to 
our r c flexivG a•1:ar eness . And this is ·~he appeal \':hich must be made in 
the case of ccn3ations. For example , v;hen yon see a haystack \'li:lat s en-
sations do you have and vthcre? There is no diffi culty in l<nov;ine how to 
talk, apart from th(: clifficul ty of reflexive analysis . It is reflexive 
analysis that can be difficult . 
For ~:xamplc , if one co1~cc out of a cool dark rOOl't into brilliant hot 
sunshine, h c,•;i i-:; the c;lare experienced? One sees the glaring colour of 
thi11~s , but al so or~e· cannot bear it - i i; hurts t he eye-;;, , one h~s to scrc\'1 
thc111 up , a.nd t hey water . Ouo is havinz- sensations in the e~rcr, a s •:1ell 
as scr::i.nc the t.;la.rc of "th<~ colourc, but the c-lare i:; not tnv discomfort 
in the eye ; it :i::; rihe:d; hurts th()J, . (In other cond i tlon c v1lw.t one ·sec:; 
isn ' t ~roduci1~0 <J..ny f cclinc in th•:· eye~) . The hurt : m1~sid.c s r:i th t l1e c;lat·c 
t h;!t hurt::> ; from bt~:Lnc gla.rln::; the c:olour::; become brilliant . One can 
l ooJ.: a t thc:: !.l non . One doer; n o ~ 1 or,}: e. t tile e;l a rc . On tlv · contru.r~.. . 1f 
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For exa.i!pe , one feels the hot , hardJ metal pot- ha!'ldle u.:::; one :::;ceG the cnlours 
of the flol\er:::; , but it is too hot to take hold of, ju:>t as the colour::; are 
too glaring to look at . It burns ; the colours t;lare . 
nut to try to find a prop·~r sensation vocabulary is futile . If we 
thoucht VIe ho.d f ound one , it •:1ould mer ely stop us from so.yinG half the things 
i'Ie · \'tant t o ~ay* , and s t ill norce lead us into the p:i.i.fall of the old sen s at-
ionalist doctrine \'/hich has to insist t hat v1e don 't experience v1hat v:e t hi nk , 
or fondly imaeine , \'IC experien·ce . The hankerinG' for a "neat vocabulary" 
in the inte rests of l o,Jical gra:;nnar is f ortunately doomed to dicappointment . 
Lm1guaee never fails us if we knO\'! what \7P. want to r;ay . One only lac!<s words 
nhcn one hu~n ' t ye·t cot any thine to sa~r . One can c;o on correcting, adju::;ting, 
varyin:; ·the _exprc::;::;ion_, but tui::; , as Ryle in effcc·t GUJ'G , is no·t somr::thing 
inde pendent of thinkine tlw matter out . The r e is no problem~ of the idioms 
as such ; if t!L(?re were " richt id.iom::;11 which Icyle ditln ' t l~no·.; ' this v;ould 
mean ::;imply that someone had thoucht the mutter out before , hut Ryle hadn ' t 
r ead v;hat he h ad. to Gay . Id:i.or:lS arc not Gt:·i. c;cnr.~ri s . Thurc ~as a firs t 
time for every i<l:i.om and m.:tu.phor i n tllr: lancnacc - someone .Lnvcntcd it , 
l?u·~ t!~c only ph:i..lu:::;op: .Lcal l'Oi.n·l, of ti1is 
·;JOql<.J. be to l)tt~-rd a.:;c.in:;t r:d.::;1nalcrs~<.:!.n;lln.:; in :::;a~·i.nJ ·: 1lul; on' · iJ<.:!.d. ~~" -c;.;.y about 
" 
,~.t i !.i L:; r:' r;} :; J'rt(. P:-> .1.· l.h ~\1 -: .. cic.;~n r :-~v..-'.-! l!c:'> l o~.i .~·'· .. ~ w..r· 
•) f' :;ilt)l<' < .. J. f,iGctl. ;.:.t r. II i;-I;·.:' O::. ''J ~') • 
It i.tu :; no 
'. 
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relevance to the intcrcotinc; a.'1d illuminatine thin~s Sa.rtrc , for cxa.r:~ple , 
ila.o to say a.bou·~ the ima.gin~ consciousness in ." L ' Irna.ci!1aire". Rylc ' s 
failure t u r ealise that philosophical perplcxi ty is not a ma·tter of not 
knor.-.ina. the ri6ht idioms or of not having got ther:1 sorted out as if they 
\7ere all there , somewhere , if one could find them , ready- made accounts 
for. his failure t o consider r e flexive awareness or concc:i.ousnens on v.h ich 
all descriptions of experience depend and to which ht: con::;tantly appeals. 
l fe take::; \'/hut ic "apt to be -inade quately covered by thu umbrella- ti-tle 
' cclf- c on:ociou::meo3 " ' to be hiGher order acts of various no::::-tc , of •;hich 
r cvie·:;::; of bool~::; , criticism of acti ons , and so on arc the t ypon . But 
reflexion i~ not a hit;hor order act of this kind , nor i3 th'1.CC any sort Of 
puhlic: or !'r i. val;e pr ·rfor;n~lCe l;o be th•..! object of it . It is not ob:::c rvation , 
a~:d it has no nbjcct an.J.lO[:."<mc to the b0ok •:rhich .i.~ cri '!;lei :.;c d or the scorin.:; 
of the co:1l •:J!tioh is :_->ro.i.sed . 'rhe object is t!w obj•'Ct o.f n·:iJC.C'i.cnce in 
t he ordln~r~ ~cnse the tre e· tl1at one sees , ·ror inst(l.rtco . An experience 
bccomc·s r c flc• dvc : r c flr;:don is tile expl icitat.Lon of r;hut is implicit in 
it , the pri. ~~r.: de con:3c'i.c~:cn , not the ob~>ervation of ann tl:v.;r ob.j~ct . Th<~ T.'C 
i::: notidnc ob::;cnro or occult ahout i t . 
a· 1~rone: ~~l::;c ' ::; ox •• cr Lcncc ; no•rclc ·::vuld be incom;lr chcnuiblc , ~md the r~orali::;tc '::; 
t:,ou~1t ··la:ty ~ :;>'-)ri .. ;··~{; :; do . 
" 
:::cf -
'ro bs rcfl c... : i:1elJ u:: aro o l' ::..;··.,_..:. :.~ one 
T~ be r e .f.l c.d. vc lj- :;;:::arc of ·:;rLl:lnc; 0:1~. i u.; t l'c :.r.l 'c:..:.n:::;. 
f'q t: one ca11 be . 
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and paper, and seeing someone e lse writing, the answer is given by 
reflexion. For example , as one i·.-ri tes one does not •:1atch to see what 
letter or i'lord comes next, nor does one even watch the tip of the pen 
formina the letters ; one nri tes the r;ord as a whol<1 in cursive , not as 
a series of letters , but one may no·Uce v:hen one ha:m ' t formed a l e t tor 
properly or v1hen one has mh;spel t a v1ord. I n lookin~ at ·.mat someone 
else is Y! ri t i ng , one \':a'bc}tc:J the l<::tters appearing and guccccc from the 
context and tlw be0inninr; of the word i'lhat the word will be . Reflexive 
analysis here merely explicitate::; a difference wfl.ich eve ryono i~ more or 
less n:::are of . The r e i c of cour so an analoey with the diffe r ence bet,::een 
saying somGthinc and h~arin.:; comcone e lse say sor~cthing. (A::; I have remar ked 
earlier , one m:i cht ::;uppo:::;e from mmt Ryle says t ha t it \·:as mer ely a matte r 
of the di.ffcrc.nt , :outh.s the sou."ld:.> came out of and the po.:;i tion of v<1rious 
pairs of ear o in relation to thccc 111ouths . ) 
Rcfle:d.on 11ay be rctroq>cc !.i ve and i s :>r esupposcd in mcoory of having 
seen and ht:a rd <.1.11d. done cuch- and-::;uch . 'ro r emember the namr, of tll r~ capital 
of Colombia ·;iht..n c~ :•kcd. rlo•..:::; not invol vc rc~f.lE:xion - but t.o " knO\'l " t hat one 
kno·,.,::; it; and tr;t to rc;,J(:J!1l' ' r :i.t , or to " knm'i " t h'-!.t one ris:H .. tm ' t , aro r •..: f lnxi.v c , 
1; tl. i on . .... 1. IJ • 
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self - sn.ying " Oh , I lmor; it but it ' s slipped my memory, " by overhearing 
hi s unstudied uttcra..."'lcec . And according to R~·le , he wonldl" ' t kno;·; it 
since ho couldn ' t say it. 
:.ncn one acks Vl•lat. the C.if.fcrcnce is bet\·;ecn a happenin.; , event or 
occurr ence , :J . .ud ::~.n action or· C.oin0 , or >"i.ilat the difference is betr:ecn some-
thin~ r1ov.ing , or a ":lovem,~ .-lt t~inc pla ce , and a movern ..:nt that one makes , if 
puopJ.e a rc a:t a lo:;::; it i::; not because t hey doubt the.; di :lf e r .:nee or because 
thr: difference is obscur e , but because it i s a lready familiar r e flexively 
and is already cxpr cs:,cd in the very words in which th..: que stion is asked . 
"":vc ryonc l~nor:s the difference bc~neen som..:thing h::~.ppcninc- to h i m and his 
doing :::;o•o t:. t!1in t;; everyone has c.x!Jer icnced the e f f ects of exte rnal at;encies 
and ovc r .. ; one is a do•-r rlit.h desire s and ends in view \'Thich he sets about 
ac!lic vin.:;. I t i:.; upon this com,_wn reflexive tmclurstandin.:; that the analysis 
of c:\pc .r .iC!lCC , i.nclu~.inL," the analy::;is · of meanint;, i::; fvundcd . That Uyle ' s 
analy:::; .:. ::; o1' concc oLs i::; f,.mnded upon it and pr esupposes it is r eadily sho·:;n. 
';>o.J;:c , for cxa::i.f>lc , his sta:tcJ,JCnt : " Hurts and itci1..:s cu...mo ·~ , f or instance , 
be d.i~:.d;in ct o r indJ.s t.inct , cle.:ar or unch:ar ." They cun be mil<l or dull , 
or :::;c:v r.: t ' r or acntc . Iio\·; do v:c assc::nt to , or dis::.cnt f rom , t .d:::; ? ~'.y t hi nki n fS 
• • f' h11rt:: :.!. •• r.J i ., r:: }1., ;; 1 ror \'/C l:nm·: r:Lat va rious sort::; of hurts c.nd :i tc).cs ~re 
li'· ·- r ' ilc::iv~: ly , r:i.1'-l.t i t :L s to have a. i1urt or <.:.r1 itch , a::; r:• l':.!'.n •. · .. . 1at i.t 
i ..; l.~.~: ~ "' :;cc. :-:o-:<..thi:1.:; ch.::..d~· , to r~a:\:~ it out, :!..'1d to :.c c: ::; o;:Jc~:.:"lc -:!.nd.i:-:-
"' 
. • l . L "t: ~ , :.l..i r .'> r. ~.J 
•ro + ; ,.., ,, o,.. 1.· ,.., vi••• ·-' ,_ :1 ·• 
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expcr icmccs . 
But if one v1an 1,::; to dissent from Ryle ' s n.n<llysiz of the l or;ic;.;.l r;ral1imar 
of these v1ords it in e<l.sy to do so . All onl~ ha3 t o do i~ ·tt• t !1i.nk of a 
kind of hurt or i tch of \':hich the v1ords "distinct" or " indistinct " c ould 
be used , for lanr;uar;e is essent i <llly to be exploited . Is o. fierce itch 
u. hnrt? Is an u.c onisine; bur ning itch, with f e ver , from sunburn, o. hurt? 
I s it disti nctly an i tch or dictinctly o. hurt? Could one not call the 
acute but cen8r<:tli ::;cd diocomf ort of a f eve r Yrhen one vm.l<t: s up , indistin~t? 
'l'hu.t i c s urely •.vhy one wo nd!'!rs \':hat i t is one f eels : one ic di.atrc::::ccd , 
but how and v:i1u r c ? To pursue th:) sort of que ctions which Ryl e rais~::; , 
it is of li ttlc usc to ex<l.:!line the Enelish la'1~aze ·:rhich all \':e embodied 
Enelish-speaJ~inc subj ects kno·:1 , one mu;:;t thinl< of variou::> e::p·.;l.'icnces . It 
Ywrrics Ryle th...~.t there~ is no nea t scns<l.tion voca?ulary . I ::;n ;:;pcct that 
undr r lyi.nr; ±hi ::: no rry i3 t h0 dc3i r e for "unambic;uouc" \'IOrdr; . r-.ut r:ords 
are n0i t ht. r amb.i £.L.tons nor unambiguous , only what p~opl •.: m·; u.n . 
Jpt uc no·:: l ook at Ryle ' ::: accc.mnt of m'Jn~.;al i.Jna,sos c.nd pic t ures in "th:J 
mind ' s r..;yo , \':! J.i ~h he hu.::: ~ 1i m::::e lf rccoc,·n:i.scd to be u.kin in GOiiC rcr;pcctr.; to 
Su.rtre ' ::.; r cfl c ;d V (• n.nn.lyci. c . ( Ln. ?hilosopbi c Am.J.ytiquo , PJ\1 ) . l't i::: 
hr. doin:; ; it f~.i l :.; onl~· bccun:;~ l,e clurJs not do .::.11"\'1 ";;1 '>:' 5. t . 
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ness - which Hume essenti ally rccot;nised - io an extreme a.mbig-uity in 
some of tho t hings he docs say. This ambiguity , us I shall shov1 , 
actually res ults from his pr e- occupation wi th v1ord.s , '>vhen he oueht to 
be anal y sinG experience . It isn ' t the fault of t he words ! 
" I nant to s hov;, " he s ays , ":that the concept of pi cturing , visualis.i.ng, 
or ' Geei ng ' i s a proper a.nd u s eful concept , but that i t s u se doe s not 
entail the existence of pictur e s which vre cont~mpJ. atE': or t he ex i s t ence 
of a ga llery i n v1i.lich such picturc~ s are ephemerally suspende d . Rouchly, 
i maging occurs , but i ma.;es are ·not se en • •• A pe r son picti.lring his nurse ry • • . 
is npt be i n3 a s pectat or of a r e semblance of his nursery, but he i s r e semblinG c.. 
s pectator of hi n nursery ." ( Concept of i:~ind, P.247- 24fl). 
Th~. :'J i s f 1ne ·fo r a start, but only for a start : i ma.ges are not pict u r e s , 
nor r (,Sei:lb l anePs , n_ot r e preo.::n tat ions , a.nd they cannot be sr,~en or lool.~nd at . 
T?.u t f ur tile ::; ~ ~me r ca;:;on a p:; r:..;on i ma.z:i.n i nc- i1i s nursery i.s n0t rc~;~~nbl inG a 
s pe cta tor of !J i s nur sery. A s_pcctat0r of t he nur:;~ry r:ovlcl he i n it and 
see it and could exw:Jinc all th') de~ails of it, dis~overine the::: th€r e . For 
the s ;...·::c r c [ .. :Jon t h:xt. an i ma .;e L; not , and cannot be , a. r s s 0::1blanc0 of a 
nu rser~· , a. ps rson ir.m:.;in:i.nc a. n:n r::;c ry i.s no~ , and can not he , a r e :.;cmb l u;1::: c 
TI,Y· l e :L::; l ud , onr; mi c ht think quite in!w::: 0ntly 
~.-.. o.:;on 
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is spectatin~ , seeing. 
An imace i:.:; o.n i ma0ine, a consciotlsness of, a mode ·of intemine or 
~eanirr~ an object. As Sartrc says : When I i magine my friend Pete r , it 
is Peter I am in.a<;inine- ; r1hcn I have an image of Peter , my i rqa.;e is of 
Pe ter. This ic tautologouc , even if one has no idea rrhere Peter at 
pre;sent io , or of r1hat he j.s do:i.ng. Who or what is '?ctcr? He is the 
man I r:1ean . To imaco or ima-~inc him i s to mean or intend tk.1.t very man 
in person . An old man picturing his nursery ·would mean or irrtc nd that , 
very nursery in ·the house \ 'I he re he vtas qorn , then a11d thert: , three score 
years and t en aso , even if it 11ere long since de:nolished and even if he 
kncu it ·;;as l on0 since dewolished. 
The suc.:;estion that he is resembling a spectator of his nursery is 
clo::;cly comv'ctcd rli t h r'Yle •s tendency to regard i macine; and i J.•a.:;inine as 
a l~ind of make- bc1i0ve ( ·;~h ich of course depends upon i ma r.:;i rd.n0) or pr e -
t cnci.inc, a.nd hi:-J f~lure .to realise that to thin~ of or r en.e;,:,l.Jcr , for ex-
ampl e , the spl~Jndid J:lroportions of st . Paul ' s is to i tr.aGine St . Paul ' o, 
O.JJ U that \':Jwrwvc:r one thinks of any actual pL.1.ee or p.:r::;vn or thine i n th(:) 
'::vrld ~1d r em,:mber::: v;hat he Ol' she or it r:J.s like , onu :i...; i m;.;.c.Ln i:'!C t }tat 
plar.:c Ol' ~)C .C3un or t c,in£;. !3trt n ot pr e tE:ndine or maki.n,3'-bc licvc or fan-;ying 
One c;...n J.l:::;o inu.::;.:..nc ... 'L:::.t one doecn ' t r 0:10:!1b<,r or br;licvc t n cxi st 
't'!1C ~)Oi!Yt of Hu:nc ' s n :::.t ur<..l bcli·~ f i ~ t J l! :l.~~ <.: ti~1' c.i::;-
" 
o1· i·;a:::;J really in t:-:e :;:orld , not f t . . . '. . d .. 0 • .. • • V"' . .. "('•' • ,.., l""" 'l • ~ o r..c 1. . .... ~.l. l- ~o •. , " ·• -·• .... ._. _ ..,~on-> 
1 . .1' 
. l ~ .1 .. ' 
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t here is f o r u s 'Nhat r1e c all a r eal world, Sartre a.naly :::;cs in t f.:r ms of 
t he wa:; t he i ma0i nc consciousness posits its object. The obje ct can be 
posi-ted i n four r1ays - as non- exi stent , a::; ab::>ent , as existing el sewher e , 
or as "neutral", (in which case t he object i s not posi ted as e xi ::;; t cnt.) 
" Thc::;e positional acts ," says Sartre , "are not adde d to t he imac;e once 
it i s con ~;ti t u t od: the positional act is consti tuti vc of t h o i magine; cor.-
SC i OUGnGS'B . i'my other the ory, in fact , beside s being contrary t o the da ta 
of r c f lexion , land::; us a ca:i.n i n the illusion of i mmanen ce ." ( L ' I maci nai r c , 
p . 24) . 
"'ilhen I fancy I a :rr h .:.:aring a very l oud noise, " s <J,ys Tiy l e , "I urn not 
' r eally ltcar :Lne e i the r a loud or a f a int n oise : I u.m not havinc; a mild 
auditory sens aticn , a s I am not hav i ne an auditory sensation a t ull, t hou::?;h 
I a m f U11CJinc; tha t I am huvi nc a.n intense one . im i nuci nnd shr iek :i.s not 
car-spl i t t inc, nor ye t i s i t a sooth ine llmrrilur, a.nd an i~:.azinecJ. sh r i e k i s 
nc i thr;r loude r no r f aint e r than a he ard murmur. I t nci t h or dro~ns i t nor 
is dr ormccl by it ." ( P. 250 ). 
a :1d i n pc rfc r;t co;n~o : :mrc , f or 'i!C a r n not n ow hourl n,:; i ·~ . :Dnt i t ic con-
o r t o f .: .. nc:; one l;c ~:.rcl t :w door- b0l J. , :i. :.:; tu thi nl< tlw.t r·~ s tl.ic1 !K:ll' i.t , ~::ut 
To imao;l nc a vc r J l oud noi &e is no i; V I L.n~y or iL:<.J..:;ine 
on<.: .i. :; h :u;: j nc;- i t no·r: . 




see the bush as a man crouching, to take it for a r.1an : not t o im<.::.gi.ne 
either a bush or a man , but to see what is in fact a bush as .:1 man , a::> one 
mi~:;ht take an attendant at J.f<ldarnc Tussaud ' s for one of the exhibits r.nd 
say: " I fanc;ted I v:as seeing one of the ~Yax:norks. " To i ma0ine is not 
to fancy th::J.t, or irna:;.ine tbn.t in t hic sense , nor to fancy that one ::;ce::; 
or hear:J , o r t:w.t one: :i ;.; havin::; an i.n tcn:.:; r..) auditory :.>cn:..;o.t.i on ( rti J<.::.t (~vc r 
t.hut \'l uuld be. ) One Jmow::; perfectly v1cl l one is not sG~:.:i.ng or hearinc; 
in see i nc and hearing ·the object is posited as present and nor1 cxi::;tcnt; 
in it~aginG the object -is posited as not existent, or not here , or exiGting 
elsev1here or " neutral" - the positbnal act is in every case negative . 
Thor(! i s another s ense, however , in Vlhich we imaeine thD.t such-and-such 
i..:; t he case , t he s ense in •u!'lich v1e envi:::;age a si·tuation and i ma.:;ine people 
\'le know in it. For exn.1nple , one can try to i:nacine v1.ha t an interview will 
be lil<\.: (.l.nd nha·r. sort ' of qut: s tic,ns wi ll , be asked, o:c one can t ry to i magine 
ho':i :1 fri c·"ld i n ::::o rne o i tua l.ion i::; bearin.:; up . On.) docs ·not 3U1Ypoce fc> r 
a. mo10snt ·~hat one is no':i t he r e ; one is not halluc i na tin~ or drc D.!ni nG, 
t houGh ina :;.i.n:\.!1;_; mn.y be very v 'i.vid . As I shall a rote prc :-Jen;tly·, vividne ss 
i::: u rn<.:~.ttor of uffcct.i vity: :fcdinc;s a~1d OJ.Jo·l;ionz , the ct::1t~o o; t he CJ~­
b c,d.icd O'.<bje d c~. r-r r· L.:!.'Givc: t a 'Ghe vo..luc pre:dj.c::1~c ::; of t h·::! object , c:1n bs 
a~; Jt r unc, li vc ly, or " r eal" i11 t!1c ~b;:;cncc as in t he pr·c:::cnee of the obj !:.:ct . 
!lyle ~o·~ ~; on . r.~dnG t h:i::; C\~·nfu::;~_on , or at l ca .;t f i.!.il i:-:~; t ' :-; ~l: c: -tlx : 
dl :~rt.:." <.;t.i.on , 1 l~.-:~d~''l1 t ':;o ::;cn :..;c·:-; •')f " .L;·!o.,:;inin .:; "Glla!c" and 0 1.,. c~· -a· sc hi.;; n;:;c 
• • 'l'•""f 
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assimilate i magi ning to makc-beJ.ieve ) . It le.:1ds hilii to s ay that to 
hc.ve " a nenta.l picture of Helvc llyn" is " to imagine that vre s ee Helve lly-.a 
in front of our noses." To i magine here in E<linburgh , Helvcllyn t here 
in \'Tales is not to ir.1a:_;ine Hcl vellyn in front of t his nose here: in 
l':dinburgh. It is to imagine oneself (nose and <.~.11) in i.7alea lookinc at 
Hc lvcllyn : to i magine oneself in a situation in v1hich one i s . not , for 
one is imaGining her e , not there , and one ' s nose is here , not there . 
There is a further , and important po i nt , whi ch is y:orth i:,al<inc in this 
coru1cction : · pcrcei v:Lne o.nd i magininG" may a l tcrna t e but cann"t fuse or 
combine . (One i:> i nclined to say t hey can in the case of the bush seen 
as a crouc!1:i.ng footpad on the dark road, because ar;ain the fear o.nd appre-
hension ar(-l as strong and live ly ·as if it were a footpad . Dnt in fact 
~nc ::;c:;es nur;11.::th:i.nu- in the :Jhapc of a man , and this case is entire ly :1s-
siJ;d.lablc to other mi s takes of perce:ptio,n .) I f one il:Jagim;s a fr i end 
si tt·Lng , tal kine; and laur;[1inc in the ch air a.cross tilis p::E:scnt room , to 
ir;!a £;i.ns him i n th!~ chl:!-ir one mu::.;t imaginG t he chair and all , a.nd mu;t ccn.~e · 
to sec it . For to 080 th0 chair is to see ·the backrc-:::;t and cc c.t of the 
cha i r , v:i.ich one conld 210t s ec i f he ·::er e i n it . Or i:.; " he:.: " tran.::;~arcnt? 
Lr.t ,,ln r • turn to t h..: i n a ._;in ;d ::;llrie k . 
~--------·---




the study of lo[;ic11l {!rammar - one has to im~ine ear- oplittinc shriek::: . 
If I nor1 in()£;i.ne th~ e ar- splitting shriek that the secretary lr.:t out r;J.wn 
she S3.\"i the mouse , it is that v er-J ear- splitting shriek I in:J.~inc: - I me~ 
that very shriek , the same shriek, 'l.llich I then heard but no·:1 il'lQ.~ne . 
There c.rc not two shrieks, one heard and one imasincd , but one, juot :1c 
there ic one eirl r!ho let out the sllrielc , whether ::;con and heard or imagined . 
Afte r suying un ima;,r:Lned shriek i s neith•..; r ear- npli ttinc- nor a soothing 
mur mur , Hylc continues : " Similarly , there arc not tVJo S:!1CGie :-: of murderers , 
those v1ilo murder p..:oplt: , and those .who act t he part::; of mur<l~rt:: rs on the 
sta£;e ; for theoe last are not murderero at all •• • As mock- muriicrs are 
not murders , so ina~lncd sights and sounds are not sleht:; :md oouncls . 
They are not , tlw r efvre , dim 3.i.ghto , or f0.int sounds . And they are not 
private 3i~lts or s ow1ds either. There is no answe r t t• ·the :::;pnrious queotion , 
•::he re have you d cpor.i t ed th~ victim of your mock- :rrurd0,r? ' s ince ·!;he re \7as 
no victim. There i::: no anv\·: c r to the ::;purious quc;ntion , •·::here d0 thr. 
obje:cts ro~:id0 tha t we fancy •:;e scP.? ' sine e th<.;re arr. no ::;uch objc C!ts ." 
(Cor.ccpt of T~:i.ntl , P. 250- 251 ) . 
Acu.-Ln Tiylc ' G 'l.l::lC of the cxprc ~;sion " f.at1CY ne soc" I.!Onfn.;c ::; the :i.::>suo . 
I tB.ke hi.m to mean " -trr.agine" . 
I c.n i• ~ .. :;t"lil•c :-;t . r u.:.l l ' :>, t h ... ~nv>:cr :t :-> : in t:1~ Cit.r of l~n·;•1 vn , "Cit .i';ir ... 
l 
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of voice, it is the se I am now i magining. If these be c<:;.llcd s i chts and 
sounds , I saw and heard them yesterday, and today I am recalling them in 
i r,;a eination , i r.:aeining them , tho s ame sights and sounds . It is quite 
f alsE: that the i maeined siehts and sounds arc not sights and. sotmds - .they 
arc the same ci.::;hts and sounds I saw and heard. They are not now occurrinz 
and do not no·:: " res ide" anywhere - they are pas~ . nut i"~ is thorn I r cmom-
be r and irna~inc U OI'i , the same ones I then saw and heard. I do not nov1 
fancy I sGe and h0o.r them nO\·; , I now r crac:l.ib e r seein.::; and hearinG th,~m then . 
There i s no a.nalo.::;y of the sound~ and si~;hts I now j.;aae;inc with mock- uJUrdcrs . 
( Sta&e murders, pe rformances of fictions, imitation::; , mimicry dcmo.nd a 
scpo.rato a.nalysi::;, and so do l)Ortrai ts and caricatur e s or indeed fa.ces in 
the fire : the i Ma,:;ing consci.ousncss is essential in all of thc ::; c as Sartre 
has cho\'!n .) (L' i!'la.::;inaire , II , La famill e de l~ ima.;c . P.30- 76) 
In hi::; discu:::;cion· of the.: qur:: ction , "Ho•.'f can a p t"r s on seem t.o hear a. hme 
rtUminc; in his head nn lc ss there is a tunc to hear? " (Pace , 251 ) , Ryle i a 
ae ain O.!llb:icuow:; . It is i ltl!IO:::::;i.bl0 to su.y •:;hcther by " s ecl:t:i.ng to h8ar a tune" 
he r1o ans " !1avine; a t'-' 11~ i n one ' ;:; head" or " thinkinc one d.o~.;::; huar a tunc". 




To adopt . such ling~uistic pr acticos is to try to convert into s~Gcies-
concepts concepts Yih ich are designed , anyhow partly, to act as factual 
discl aimcrs ••• Similarly a perr:.;on Ylho ' sees Helv c:l lyn i n his mind ' s 
eye.• is not seeing e ither t.b.<~ mountain , or a likene ss of the mountain •• • '' 
Apart from Ryle ' s am'oi;rui ty of express i on , vrhich rE1suHs f r om the 
rcfu::;al to analyse di-fferen t experiences , unl ike things a r e hero yoked 
by violence togethe r : t unes ~1d dragons and Eelvellyn • . Nov1 if one 
ir11acinea Ilelvellyn , i ~ is that very mounta in one imaeincs , a rcn,l rnoun·lia in. 
The factual disclai:ncr, if i t ca..n be call ed that , i::; that H is in '.'iales 
and not here in E<li nburr;h : i ·li i::; posited as existing e lsewhnr o , in !Jartre ' s 
terms . Dragons on the other hand are . posi.tod us ·non- existent. Th·~re . 
are no dragons . They are vlhat · ore calle d fict i ons or. purely i m<::.einary. 
Since " drueon" does not mean the same as " g r yphon" or " centaur", it is 
convcnieut to r t:c;ard :them a s un:i.ver:;als in vc~rbo. 1mt not in ££• Evc ryont.: 
k now::; '::hat the word. " drac;on" means , but there arc no in:::;tat1Ces . 
Tun<:: ::; or cym;:honi c. s or pocws have t il:Lr:; :Ln conw;o11 tho.t the,;,' ac-e not j ust 
:·:e: '-l.n-1. ·i.dc :·lt:i. t.i . :-; , b ut i.llc.:.!. l , t l w -G :l.::; t ( ) :::,ay t hey o.rc tm:i. 'tO :r. ~;;:;,~ ::; . 
" 
• I ., ""• . ,,.,, , 
l'ro.:··n~ .~ ' :.; ~,ourth ~~r · 1:1hony ~:.; r;uclt j s t () di scuGG tl1c !.tn.L'r,.·r·;·\!1 , ~; ~1': ·.·:\"' r·~~ i. ·. ·· .. l = ... " 
•n'o rl ~ , .. ,, , ,. · ·'L· · J·· n 1 • f'o ··· r • 1 '"' C~" 01~ 1. i J . .<1~t t•·i.; ·ll~li J. . . : i;u {ti.s r; a :.:; :; ·.:.!. ,' :'J0tl ~ • .4•.J ; • • .,_) ' • ..... - · · , ... •• J.. \.N 1 ._, • • j -- ...... "' _, 
( '1:", ,.1. tj "'~ "' .. ' • I . ' . , ~ · ·· . .... J , ' ..... _ .... J :_ ... ' K(. 
\. 
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tiated every time they are portrayed : if they were instantiated they 
would be i nstantiated as a.nimalsJ not as pictures.) It does not much 
matte r in what t erms one makes these distinctionG , so long a::; one makes 
them. 
In h€arin;; a symphony or a movement of a synphony , as in all sense 
experience , one hears the universal in ££_. If one has heard i t before , 
it ic t)1e very sam(; symphony one hears acain, in £.£ both tir.1o:;; , then and 
now. A point ;-;hich P..yl e obscures is that the tw1e "Lilliburlc ro", for 
exa:>iplc , is idoo.l, o. uni vc rsal, but tho mountain IIel ve l l yn is not ideal , 
not a univer s al , but a r C!al mountain . A performance of "Lilliburl e ro" 
i s h'9ard in tht; world in o. place , as Helve llyn is ~ecn in a place , but the 
Hclvellyn one sees isn ' t a perfor mance or an instance of Helvellyn. It 
is Hclvellyn itself. When one imagines Helvellyn it is that mountain 
there in Wale s now qne is imagining. Similarly i.f one recalls in imag-
ination a porfo·r:nancc of a pi ..: co i ·t; iz that very pe rfor mance one i s i 1:1a e -
inins. But to have a tune running in one ' s head , or to ~) owJr a tune in 
one ' s h<)o.d o r imr:1 it aloud.~ i s not to i mac;ine any perfor :!lance , much loss 
to fancy one is h0aring H . I t is to t h i.nk of, r:wc.n, ir.tc.;n<.l , the tune 
::; j u.iJ.arly , in til~ cu.::;o o f a '90 0!'t . 
I 
·;: o rd.:-; D.lld li:h .. ~ thc;n~clVC' :>;, not 5.n ·:: i1~t they n.rc ulJont, n:c no ~ · •a .inl.y i.n 
" ro~_.try is in tl1i::; like , bLtt nr:;(, r1ni.''~-; J. L:·: ; ;·u::;ic , 
1; • rcc~l.l .?.n r··, ; 't''" '1 ' /' r )•r · ~ · ' > to .... ) c ·LJ)< 
--· -· ·- · - ·- . ' '·' "' ··' 1 , l,._ .. , 
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poem is not posited as existing elsenhere or as non- existent , and is not 
... posited in Sartre ' n sense at al l . One can have the very cc3cnce " in 
one ' s head" and find a perfor:-:~ a.ncc by contrast a revelation o r a bitter 
disa.p!)ointment. 
It is in this r espect that tunes a.re like peo!Jle one !mow::> , who in 
othe r respects , though smalle r and mobile , ar e like TI0lvcllyn in b r-:ing 
bits of stuff in thu v1orld . At a pinch one can di scu::;s " cce:i.ne IIe>lvelJ.yn 
in the mind ' s oye" nHhou·i; brini3-ing in affectivity and value - though to 
discuss ima.:;inine it vividly , on e must - but one ca.nnol; dir.;cu:.>c ima;3"ining 
one ' s ~r!ecthcc..rt or mo.l'1a. v:ithout doing so , and one canno-t di::;cu::;s r ep.:::atirig 
a poem or r,oinG over a. piece of music to oneself \':i thout doinc co. It 
is affectivi·l;~· \':hi.ch makes one na;y " It ' s u.s if I ,·rere the r e", or "I can 
h--ar it now" or " I can just sec the darling t;irl", i7hcn one 1':no•;1s very 
r:ell it i s n ' t and ope can ' t . That indeed is \'Thy one i:.; lon;sing or r:i::::hinG 
one could . 
'l'nncs a .rc nobl e , ca·i , (;rand , e o..y , jaunty , r:istful , rncltine 1 in::::inuo:tinG, 
etc: . 1\c nne J.i ::;t cns on~ i~ , rrrapt, sn.t , jaunty , Gay , mcltc<.l. , cntra.ncsd , 
etc . The d L:.:rt .i.nction bct·:;eEJn h<::aring or scein~ and imc....cinint; h :.~.s no p<.1rallel 
in the 'l Oll:.:. i.n o.l c.ffcc ~: i. v i.ty and v:.:.luc . 'l'lliG is no L to G <..~' one f r.· .. ls the 
"' ·:.v:·!: f :_r .or ·. :n Ol'l() ' !J head , :;o -~o np:,~k , thar: in t'H: c.:>!•C.•l'~ ::~11 - tf t0\1 :;h 
1 . 
E' ,() v.I.011S 
..... .. .. ,~-__,..... ·-·__,_..-·~ -·- ----·----- ·-·-···-·--- ---- . 
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"auralisine" (cf. visualislng) a tune, or between ha.vinc a dear person 
·.-:i th one and ima..:;inin~ him in his absence . ~notions , fcelin~s , affectivity 
are e qually "real " or " unreal" in either case , thoueh to som:J e xtent o-r 
course thuy arc different feelings - for instance , one doc:.:;n ' t l ong fo r 
someone who is present , only for someone who is absent . But ·;,hen one 
ir.Jat,incs a p~rson or a place of v:hicll one is f ond , ancl ecpeeially if t:ne 
i utat,;.i.ncs being there wi Lh h i w ,. i ·t~ i s l U;:c being there in the :;;cnse that 
one has actua.l f eclint;::: about it; and t hey arc not i1.1a3ined f eelings . 
I'crhapc , hut only p0rhaps , this is v1hat Ryle ~s rcferrin:; to ::>vmet imcs 
·::iicn he identifies ima.:,inint.; GOMdhing r;i.th fancying one ::;cos it . To 
irr.o.~inc anythinG v i viJly is t o be strongly affected. . To i mazinc i~s 
c'larm , c;ra.CG , .:>nci oth(~r val11e :predicates . It is not to reme mber thr:: 
cidail.:> of i t one Cr.ln rem-.:: · bcr the ezpres ::;ion or physiot;nomy of a face 
v ividly ·_-:i thout for _e;::.ti~plc beinG able to r emenbcr the colour of tiLe r:ycn 
'r1Ji::; i ::; not to mak .. - o elieve any rnm·c "tl1;.m t o r cci te 
a p0cm to onosf~lf or ~o over a tun r~ in one~ ' s hear) is to Jnu.};:c- hc licvc . 
One isn ' t pr(;t•.:nJ.in.; o.nyth:i.nt; · i.s th<.. co.s c rthich i:.m ' t t :1c co.r;c . 
J·:o·;, J do not clb.illl to h~vo done nor c t hun mo.kc a. f e r: poin Ls a.bout 
-t1w. 
::u:rl t." '1r: ... o'1 .. rl;r.::~v- L l·l"' L t a.tiO!'.J of t llr: o.nal~' :; ·i.!'.: 0!. loc;i c ...:.l Gr::.1 ·w.r. ~ylc ' s 
r' -IJ!.. · i.v 
---------···__.....,_.~..,. -
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At the Colloque de Roya.ul!lont on a."'la.lytic philosoph,y in 1961 , P.yle 
n2.de some interesting comm2nts on his treatment of i 111o.:;i:-w.tion . " I \!a,~ ' 
I thi.nk , on the r.icrht track ," he says , " in assimilutinc th:; notion of 
ima~ininc, for cxo.nple to evoke in an i~age , to thJ much mor e aeneral 
notion of pretcndinc; , of \'lilich I understood quite clearly oi;llc r kinds 
. 
such as the notionc of playinG ac"ld s i rnulatinJ . Dut l'lhen I c~w1o to con-
sidcr i ma Gining as o. ' prctcndin~ to see '*, I fcl t a conCC!)tuaJ. uncacinc ns , 
v1hich i:.:; u l'.":uys a mrc sie;n that something has &'Dne wroncr. 
unea:.:inoc:J carne :ft•om the fact that v1l10n I had prcvioucly tren:Lc cl vi::;ual 
}X;rccption prope r , I cot stucl< over· tllC relation betnccn th~ c:onc·:p ~ of 
scclnt; , l et 1w ::;o.y , trees o.:nd stars;; , and t!J.at of havinc; an optical sen-
sory i mpr ession . This ohor; s ho .; conceptual investi&ut ions can ' t be e:n-
closed in 1·:atcrt'i.:;ht com:!?artm.:;:1ts . During the lone pe riod ,-;.i:wn I v1as 
flotmdcrin.:;, I r:a::; , .•hO\'iCVC.L' 1 cnickd by an idea wllich I ::;t:i.ll thinlc is 
ca. pi tal in th( concept of inaci~1inc . I t i s thi.:::l . :'. pr: r:::;on can hear 
o.t a concert a piece he J.oes nc·!; knov; , so that he a:t; 01~ ~ c tr:Lv::; to l earn · 
hu.vt; n.lrr.o.dy lcal'nCl1 , n.nu not have for::;ottcn , ho·,, the t nnc .::.;0 ·~ ::; : furtllr r -
.. ~oro , not only :m.::;t he ulr0~dy lmO\'/ hor1 tl1C t unc c;o- :..; , 'bu ·:; b . t..lU"t at 
P "\1 - '' ? ) -. ~ - . 
•*• "p~ ~CM.k~ 1H:W. .. : it..:.~ -k "s-~,';)~j a-.~~ 
~~ ~(.- :_, :.,.. f" ~d... 
---,----·--- .... --~----.. - ... _., __ ·- -- - ... ___ .. ,_ -· -- .. .. _,...- --· . 
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thought to other pe ople , mi~ht have reallf:ie:d that ·the re in s l r •• ilar ly 
no Great differ<.:nce bd,>7el:!n t;oing over a tune in one ' s head and hu;•!ninc; 
it, or bet\'Jecn rcci t ln<.,; a poem cilently and aloud. 
t iw.t cxi~t in the ·::orld , like l:clvellyn , t houc;h they are performed - psr -
f or mancc:s tcl~e pl a ce and arc he <lrd. Only a pcrfo;cm\;l.ncc couJ.d be ab::;<;n·~ 
or II J.COII - no·t the tunc itself : i f one has c;ot it in one ' s J-:ca d , one hu:::; 
got :i.t . 
"Rut ·;; !l \.l. ~ ctopl>Cd nc , " Uyle (;0C 3 on , " vr as th\.l.t I didn ' t l~now "'ho:t more 
·to scy on thi:; notion of t :1j.nl:inr: hm; the: tunc r;oe::; . 
even nith an air of :mrprice , ' It vms almost an if I r e ully heard the note s '. 
The k i nd of ' thinkin~ ' in which he y;as r-m~aced 'iil:l.G so live ly, ..u1d had such 
a dec;1·r,e of r c ::;er1blancc •;; i th th·~ r eal thing (avec l<1 v ie ), th\.l.t i ~ l ed hi.1'1 
.to CO' ll~<u'C th_ n <)tc:; ·::lli . .;h he h..1.d ;:;it:!ply tho'-lt;ht to heard not.e::; , · .... ith 
ho;·:cv cr thi::; crucial diffcr~ncc- that · the no Lc:;; i n thonc;ht r1erc O!lly no teo 
He di d no L h, ,o,r a no ~c ; but he 
"h a ard" t hc ;.1 v.i.v:i.uly . 




vivacity is plausible . He cays in ·Dook II, that a.11 ide a of a paszior. ca.n 
be enlivened into the passion itself, and· of course his mechanism of 
sympathy, whereby we knovr vrhut oth<..!rs feel , de!)cnus upon thio . iTO\'i •;;here -
as it is not true tha·t; to i ma.:;ine some t hing vividly is to sec j_"i; , and hi s 
diGtinctlon in tcrmc of force and vivacity won ' t worlc t here , it \'fOrks 
very vrell as reeardo tho passions • To imac;inc an infuri<:~:tln(.;' oituation 
. t hat a.rone yestc rdo.y is actually to be angry all ov<"3r :.:.a6.i n , not j ust to .. 
r eli!cmbcr one was ancry . . 'rhu:t; i s v:hy it all comes bacl< co vividly befor e 
ono . One r cuH.:J!lb(trs uvoryonc and eve rythinG with all tho value predi ca.·t;cs . 
To r elllcmber the c:i. tua tion and remembe r being aner y i:J just to have the 
" fdep. of the pa c&ion 11 ; but i t is easy for tho idee. to be c·nl i vurtr;d into 
the pa.::;~ion i Lsclf, i . e . , one can be quite furious· agc.in here and no•;t . The 
trvubl e is tho.'t l!Ur.JC also rrants the " idea of the pu.oci6;," to serve in effect 
as the r::canini of tl1c riord , for c.xa;nple , th(: meaninG of the r:ord " anc;er" . 
As a fainter copy of tllc pa c::;ion itself , ·the i dea of a n.::;(!!' i ::.:n ' t ·:;hat ~;o;::c-
\'I<Al l u b(' , CVCl' 30 S J.ic;htly , a uGry . He lmorrr.; th :) mca:-:i.n;:; of " o.n.:;cr " , hac 
the· conr..:~.:pt uno j_:; ll:..ii.nc iL , but he .isn ' t anc;ry r.::t all. 
~a•b j 0c ~ , i.:i.:.; u'; l i.~./.11: .i.n ·l:h{: ~nne - ti1.<: ~O!'!'Ol -..:. 1;- n f i ~:.; c:.~.i ... i;.j' '•T t; l • .::_r; .. or 
" 
